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First Release date:	29-June-2011
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Date range of document:	29-March-1972 – 07-March-1988
Source of document:	Federal Bureau of Investigation Attn: FOI/PA Request Record/Information Dissemination Section 170 Marcel Drive Winchester, VA 22602-4843 Fax: (540) 868-4391/4997 Email: foiparequest@ic.fbi.gov
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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

June 29, 2011

Subject: FBI FILE NUMBER 65-HQ-74480

FOIPA No. 1145585- 000

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Deletions have been made to protect information which is exempt from disclosure, with the appropriate exemptions noted on the page next to the excision. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted in the file to indicate where pages were withheld entirely. The exemptions used to withhold information are marked below and explained on the enclosed Form OPCA-16a:

Section 552		**Section 552a**
☒(b)(1)	□(b)(7)(A)	□(d)(5)
□(b)(2)	□(b)(7)(B)	□(j)(2)
□(b)(3)_____	☒(b)(7)(C)	□(k)(1)
_____	☒(b)(7)(D)	□(k)(2)
_____	☒(b)(7)(E)	□(k)(3)
_____	□(b)(7)(F)	□(k)(4)
□(b)(4)	□(b)(8)	□(k)(5)
□(b)(5)	□(b)(9)	□(k)(6)
☒(b)(6)		□(k)(7)

641 **pages** were reviewed and 185 **pages** are being released.

☒ Documents were located which originated with, or contained information concerning other Government agency(ies) [OGA]. This information has been:

- ☒ referred to the OGA for review and direct response to you.
- ☒ referred to the OGA for consultation. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is finished.

☒ You have the right to appeal any denials in this release. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy, U.S. Department of Justice,1425 New York Ave., NW, Suite 11050, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001. Your appeal must be received by OIP within sixty (60) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

□ The enclosed material is from the main investigative file(s) in which the subject(s) of your request was the focus of the investigation. Our search located additional references, in files relating to other individuals, or matters, which may or may not be about your subject(s). Our experience has shown, when ident, references usually contain information similar to the information processed in the main file(s). Because of our significant backlog, we have given priority to processing only the main investigative file(s).

If you want the references, you must submit a separate request for them in writing, and they will be reviewed at a later date, as time and resources permit.

☒ See additional information which follows.

The enclosed documents contained in sections 2 and 4 of FBI Headquarters file 65-HQ-74480 represent the first interim release of information responsive to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.

To minimize costs to both you and the FBI, duplicate copies of the same document were not processed.

No fee is being assessed at this time. When the second interim release is made in this case, you will be billed for the $5.00 fee associated with this first release as well as the $15.00 duplication fee for the second release for a total of $20.00. Each subsequent release will be made at a cost of $15.00 per CD.

Sincerely yours,

David M. Hardy
Section Chief
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Records Management Division

Enclosure(s)

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

September 15, 2011

Subject: FILE NUMBER 65-HQ-74480

FOIPA No. 1145585- 000

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Deletions have been made to protect information which is exempt from disclosure, with the appropriate exemptions noted on the page next to the excision. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted in the file to indicate where pages were withheld entirely. The exemptions used to withhold information are marked below and explained on the enclosed Form OPCA-16a:

Section 552		Section 552a
☒(b)(1)	□(b)(7)(A)	□(d)(5)
□(b)(2)	□(b)(7)(B)	□(j)(2)
☒(b)(3) 18 U.S.C., Section 2518	☒(b)(7)(C)	□(k)(1)
_____	☒(b)(7)(D)	□(k)(2)
_____	☒(b)(7)(E)	□(k)(3)
_____	□(b)(7)(F)	□(k)(4)
□(b)(4)	□(b)(8)	□(k)(5)
□(b)(5)	□(b)(9)	□(k)(6)
☒(b)(6)		□(k)(7)

1,271 pages were reviewed and **511 pages** are being released.

☒ Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning other Government agency(ies) [OGA]. This information has been:

- ☒ referred to the OGA for review and direct response to you.
- ☒ referred to the OGA for consultation. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is finished.

☒ You have the right to appeal any denials in this release. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy, U.S. Department of Justice,1425 New York Ave., NW, Suite 11050, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001. Your appeal must be received by OIP within sixty (60) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

□ The enclosed material is from the main investigative file(s) in which the subject(s) of your request was the focus of the investigation. Our search located additional references, in files relating to other individuals, or matters, which may or may not be about your subject(s). Our experience has shown, when ident, references usually contain information similar to the information processed in the main file(s). Because of our significant backlog, we have given priority to processing only the main investigative file(s).

If you want the references, you must submit a separate request for them in writing, and they will be reviewed at a later date, as time and resources permit.

☒ See additional information which follows.

The enclosed documents contained in Section 1 and 3 of FBI Headquarters file 65-HQ-74480 represent the second and final interim release of information responsive to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.

To minimize costs to both you and the FBI, duplicate copies of the same document were not processed.

By letter dated June 29, 2011, we sent you a CD containing the first interim release for this case. At that time, we explained that the $5.00 balance associated with that release would be billed with this release. Accordingly, upon receipt of the enclosed CD-ROM, please make a check or money order payable to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the amount of $20.00 and remit payment to the Work Process Unit, Record Information/Dissemination Section, Records Management Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 170 Marcel Drive, Winchester, VA 22602. Please include the FOIPA Request Number(s) with your payment. Failure to pay for this release will close any pending FBI FOIPA requests from you. Nonpayment will also cause an automatic denial of any future FOIPA requests.

Sincerely yours,



David M. Hardy
Section Chief
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Records Management Division

Enclosure(s)

FBI File No. HQ 65-74480 - Section 1

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0610

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
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Public Affs. Off. ____
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Director's Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. O. Cregar

5/79

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)
DATE 01-13-2011

FROM : [redacted]

b6
b7C

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

PURPOSE: OF B.I. Foreign Intelligence Analysis

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review," for dissemination to elements of the United States Intelligence Community, as well as the Senate and House Intelligence Communities. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved for dissemination, as detailed on attached list, to elements of the United States Intelligence Community and the Congress. (U)

DE-11

65-74480-45

TJD/JPT
JPT

APPROVED:

Director ____
Exec. AD-Adm. ____
Exec. AD-Inv. ____
Exec. AD-LES ____

Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
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Rec. Mgnt. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

OCT 16 1979

2- ENCLOSURE

65-74480

(CONTINUED - OVER)

Enclosure
TJD:en (8)

1 - [redacted]
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

1 - [redacted]
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas
1 - [redacted]

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~~Classified and Extended by 1756~~
~~Reason for Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (3)~~
~~Date of Review for Declassification September 26, 1999~~

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI/DOJ

97 OCT 2 1979

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. W. O. Cregar
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review
65-77480

DETAILS:

b1
b6
b7C

This publication provides an overview and analysis of [redacted] (C)

[redacted] This particular issue is devoted to the (C)
activities of [redacted] during the latter half of 1978 through May of 1979, and also the (C)
activities of the [redacted] during the first five months of 1979. It is a sanitized (U)
version of one furnished to FBI Field Offices. (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-13-2011 BY 60322/UC/LRP/PLJ/ETG

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[redacted] President for National Security Affairs - 1

b6
b7C

Department of Justice, The Attorney General - 1

Department of the Treasury, The Secretary of the Treasury - 1

Director of Central Intelligence - 1

Department of State, The Secretary of State - 1;
Attention: Director of Intelligence Liaison - 1;
Attention: Office of East European Affairs - 1;
Attention: Office of East Asian Affairs - 1;
Attention: Office of American Republic Affairs - 1

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency - 1

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army - 3

Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force - 1

Director, Naval Investigative Service, U.S. Navy - 1

Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Attention: Deputy Director for Operations (Counterintelligence Staff - 1: Attention: National Foreign Assessment Center - 1; Attention: Executive Secretary, Director of Central Intelligence Security Committee - 1

Director, Division of Safeguards and Security, Department of Energy - 1

National Security Agency, Director - 1;
Attention: M503 - 1

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department - Attention: Navy Security Committee Member - 1

Department of Commerce - Attention: Director, Office of Intelligence Liaison - 1; Attention: Director of the Office of Investigations and Security - 1

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DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)
DATE 03-15-2011

FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE



REVIEW

OCTOBER, 1979

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
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Training ____
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Director's Sec'y ____

Classified and Extended by 1756
Reason For Extension ~~FCIM,~~ II, 1-2.4.2 (2 and 3)
Date of ~~Review~~ For Declassification (October 1, 1999)

TJD:en

MAIL ROOM ☐

~~SECRET~~

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FBI/DOJ

~~SECRET~~

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b1

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b1
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b7C

b1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to afford an (C) overview and analysis of [redacted] This particular issue is devoted to the (C) activities of [redacted] during the latter half of 1978 through May of 1979, and also the activities (C) of [redacted] during the first five months of 1979. For purposes of brevity, these services will henceforth be referred to in this paper as th[redacted] (C) [redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, (U) documented form. (C)

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[redacted]


Referral/Direct

(U) [redacted]

At any rate, Soviet action did not prevent the trial, [redacted] in the [redacted] In the meantime [redacted] b6 per FBI b7C And [redacted] were waived and they too were allowed to leave their country of detainment and return to the Soviet Union. Thus, [redacted] shared the same fate (although, of course, their [redacted] still stand) as the other Soviets arrested since the early 1960s. But the outcome of the [redacted] case was different in one sense. [redacted] (U)

Despite the arrest and conviction of the two Soviet operatives and the impending SALT ratification debate, during the past year the large complement of United States-based

(S) [redacted] b1 per FBI



b1

(S)

The Soviet official presence continues to be greatly augmented by large numbers of Soviets visiting the United States as tourists, as well as under the East West Exchange Program (EWEP). During the last six months of 1978 and first six months of 1979, 2,359 Soviet tourists visited the United States. Under

the EWEP, 5,636 Soviets in commercial, scientific, technical, and cultural delegations entered the United States. [redacted] b1

(S) [redacted] In addition there are (as of early May, 1979) currently 43 Soviet graduate/research students studying at 29 universities located in 24 FBI field divisions. [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

During the last six months of 1978 and first three months of 1979, 1,090 Soviet merchant vessels, which have access to 40 deep-water ports in the United States, docked in American ports. These port calls afforded repeated shore privileges to

(U) 26,861 Soviet seamen. (S)

(S) [redacted]

Since the official United States recognition of China, diplomatic relations between the two nations have continued to improve. An American-Chinese trade agreement has been settled and awaits approval by the United States Senate. The People's Republic of China (PRC) also hopes to be granted most-favored-nation (MFN) status. The opening of two PRC Consulates, one each in San Francisco, California, and Houston, Texas, is imminent. The rationale for choosing San Francisco as a Consulate site is obvious--this city has the largest population of overseas Chinese in the United States, and its location will give the PRC a base on the west coast of the United States. The choice of Houston reflects the PRC's interest in acquiring oil exploration and production-related technology. The opening of four further PRC Consulates has been agreed upon; two of these four will probably open within the next year. (U)

Since January, PRC official presence has increased somewhat. There are now 239 PRC officials stationed in the United States, as opposed to 188 at the beginning of 1979.

b1

(S)

In [redacted] the East German intelligence services (EGIS) were dealt a damaging blow when [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] An immediate result of [redacted] defection was the [redacted]

[redacted] b1 b6 b7C

[redacted] Overall, a total of 36 suspected EGIS agents have been uncovered in West Germany. Of these, 10 have been arrested, judicial enquiries have been instigated against 13, and the remaining 13 have managed to escape to East Germany. [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

b1
b6
b7C

The arrests that followed th[redacted] defection helped to illustrate the degree to which [redacted]

(S) [redacted] Within the past decade a number of other East German agents have been arrested in the FRG, some of whom had manuevered themselves into very sensitive positions. The most notorious of these was most probably Gunter Guillaume, longtime former aid to German Chancellor Willy Brandt. The publicity surrounding Guillaume's arrest forced the resignation of Brandt.

(S) [redacted]

b1


(S)

Scientific and Technical Intelligence

(S)


Strategic Intelligence

(S)



b1

Political Intelligence



(S)

b1

It has often been stated by observers of the international scene that former President Richard Nixon is held in much higher esteem overseas--including the Soviet Union--than in the United States, and that many Europeans could not quite understand how Americans could drive a seemingly effective chief of state from office.

(S)

Economic Intelligence

b1

(S)

b1

(S) [redacted]

(C) A detailed listing of [redacted] targeting was contained in the January, 1979, issue of the "Review." During the first five months of 1979, a large number of new targets have been detected. Listed below are those which are most significant, with emphasis upon items which indicate a shift in the targeting strategy of the respectiv[redacted]


(C) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

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
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


Within the past year, the Soviet overseas establishment has been rocked by some damaging defections, most notably that of Arkadiy N. Shevchenko, who served as Under Secretary to the Secretary General of the United Nations. Shevchenko is one of the highest-ranking Soviets to have defected to the West.

(S)




(S)



b1

Below are three photographs depicting the type of paraphernalia and instructions which the asset received from the

(S)



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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

b1 per FBI
b6
b7C

(S) [redacted] "Lemon Aid"

On [redacted] the Soviets [redacted] and [redacted] shortly after clearing a dead-drop. Additionally, [redacted] was detained, although he was not arrested [redacted]

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

b1 per FBI
b6
b7C

(C)

Upon their arrest, [redacted] were jailed at the [redacted] they were held in lieu of [redacted] was forced to leave the United States. O[redacted] however, [redacted] Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, to await their trial, which was held in [redacted]

[redacted]

(S)

[redacted]

(S) [redacted] The arrest of these individuals came, however, at a time when relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were strained. There was thus some concern that the arrests and trial of the two spies might place further strain on U.S.-Soviet relations. Therefore, the decision to arrest the Soviets was by no means a cut-and-dried affair, but involved the consideration of highly complex issues.

b1

(U) (S)

(S) [redacted]

(Blank)

APPENDIX

COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, SEPTEMBER 1, 1979

Country	Officials
USSR	1,217
PRC	239
Poland	287
GDR	77
Czechoslovakia	98
(S) Cuba	100
Romania	80
Hungary	79
Bulgaria	51
Vietnam	12
North Korea	12
Yugoslavia	154
Albania	12
Mongolia	10
Total	2,428

b1

NOTE: Officials is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations.

(Blank)

~~SECRET~~

DISSEMINATION LIST

[redacted] President for National Security Affairs - 1

b6
b7C

Department of Justice, The Attorney General - 1

Department of the Treasury, The Secretary of the Treasury - 1

Director of Central Intelligence - 1

Department of State, The Secretary of State - 1;
Attention: Director of Intelligence Liaison - 1;
Attention: Office of East European Affairs - 1;
Attention: Office of East Asian Affairs - 1;
Attention: Office of American Republic Affairs - 1

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency - 1

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army - 3

Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force - 1

Director, Naval Investigative Service, U.S. Navy - 1

Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Attention: Deputy Director for Operations (Counterintelligence Staff - 1: Attention: National Foreign Assessment Center - 1; Attention: Executive Secretary, Director of Central Intelligence Security Committee - 1

Director, Division of Safeguards and Security, Department of Energy - 1

National Security Agency, Director - 1;
Attention: M503 - 1

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department - Attention: Navy Security Committee Member - 1

Department of Commerce - Attention: Director, Office of Intelligence Liaison - 1; Attention: Director of the Office of Investigations and Security - 1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Director, FBI - 1

Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

APPROVED:

Director	Adm. Serv.	Legal Coun.
Exec. AD-Adm.	Crim. Inv.	Plan. & Insp.
Exec. AD-Inv.	Ident.	Rec. Mgnt.
Exec. AD-LES	Intell.	Tech. Servs.
	Laboratory	Training
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. O. Cregar

DATE: 8/10/79

FROM : [redacted]

b6
b7C

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary," for dissemination within the FBI. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices and appropriate Headquarters personnel. (U)

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)
DATE 01-20-2011

DE-33 65-74480-44
V-33

ET AUG 22 1979

TJD:en (7)
Enclosure
65-74480

ENCLOSURE

(CONTINUED - OVER)

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

1 - [redacted]
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas
1 - [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classified~~ and Extended by 1756
Reason for Extension ~~FCIM, II,~~ 1-2.4.2 (3)
~~Date of Review~~ for Declassification ~~August~~ 10, 1999

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI/DOJ

97 OCT 12 1979

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from Mr. [redacted] to Mr. W. O. Cregar
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary
65-74480

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DETAILS:

(C) This publication provides an overview and analysis of [redacted]

(C) [redacted] this issue is devoted to the activities of [redacted] during the latter half of 1978 through May of 1979, and also the activities of the

(C) [redacted] during the first

(U) five months of 1979.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)
DATE 03-15-2011

FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY

JULY, 1979

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____ MAIL ROOM ☐

~~Classified and Extended by 1929~~
Reason For Extension ~~FCIM,~~ II, 1-2.4.2 (1,2,and 3)
~~Date of Review~~ For Declassification (~~August 1, 2009~~)

Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources
And Methods Involved

Not For Dissemination
Outside The FBI

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to afford an (C) overview and analysis of [redacted] This particular issue is devoted to the activities of [redacted] during the (C) latter half of 1978 through May of 1979, and also the activities (C) of [redacted] during the first five months of 1979. For purposes of brevity, these services will henceforth be referred to in this paper as the [redacted] (C) [redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Some of the material contained herein has been obtained from other elements of the United States intelligence community, as well as the intelligence services of certain (U) friendly foreign Governments. (S)

b1

the EWEP, 5,636 Soviets in commercial, scientific, technical, and cultural delegations entered the United States. [redacted] b1

(S) [redacted] In addition there are (as of early May, 1979) currently 43 Soviet graduate/research students studying at 29 universities located in 24 FBI field divisions. [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

During the last six months of 1978 and first three months of 1979, 1,090 Soviet merchant vessels, which have access to 40 deep-water ports in the United States, docked in American ports. These port calls afforded repeated shore privileges to

(U) 26,861 Soviet seamen. ~~(S)~~

(S) [redacted]

Since the official United States recognition of China, diplomatic relations between the two nations have continued to improve. An American-Chinese trade agreement has been settled and awaits approval by the United States Senate. And, within the near future, the People's Republic of China (PRC) will probably be granted most-favored-nation (MFN) status. The opening of two PRC Consulates, one each in San Francisco, California, and Houston, Texas, is imminent. The rationale for choosing San Francisco as a Consulate site is obvious--this city has the largest population of overseas Chinese in the United States, and its location will give the PRC a base on the west coast of the United States. The choice of Houston reflects the PRC's interest

in acquiring oil exploration and production-related technology. The opening of four further PRC Consulates has been agreed upon; two of these four will probably open within the next year. (U)

Since January, PRC official presence has increased somewhat. There are now 234 PRC officials stationed in the United States, as opposed to 188 at the beginning of 1979. b1

(S)


In [redacted] the East German intelligence services (EGIS) were dealt a damaging blow when [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] An immediate result of [redacted] defection was the [redacted] Overall, a total of 36 suspected EGIS agents have been uncovered in West Germany. Of these, 10 have been arrested, judicial enquiries have been instigated against 13, and the remaining 13 have managed to escape to East Germany.

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(S) [redacted]



(S)

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The arrests that followed the [redacted] defection helped to illustrate the degree to which [redacted]

(S) [redacted] Within the past decade a number of other East German agents have been arrested in the FRG, some of whom had manuevered themselves into very sensitive positions. The most notorious of these was most probably Gunter Guillaume, longtime former aid to German Chancellor Willy Brandt. The publicity surrounding Guillaume's arrest forced the resignation of the embarrassed Brandt.

(S) [redacted]

(S)

[redacted]

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On the diplomatic front, the Czechs appeared to be making some steps toward improving the stagnant relations with the United States. In February of this year, the [redacted] three influential U.S. Congressmen, Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Caliborne Pell, and Representative Clement Zablocki, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. [redacted]

(S)

[redacted]


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(S)



Scientific and Technical Intelligence

(S)



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
(S) [redacted]


A detailed listing of [redacted]

(S) [redacted] targeting was contained in the January, 1979, issue of the "Summary." During the first five months of 1979, a large number of new targets have been detected. Listed below are those which are most significant, with emphasis upon items which indicate a shift in the targeting strategy of the respective [redacted]

(C) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]





Referral/Consult


Aircraft Surveillances

As previously reported, the San Francisco Division has made successful use of aircraft surveillance in affording physical coverage of Soviet intelligence officers. Within the

past year, San Francisco has continued to make good use of aerial surveillance of particulary active KGB officers on both covert and overt missions without the subjects becoming aware of such coverage. ~~(S)~~

SF SPIAs, 3/79, p.15; 11/78, p.18

(S)



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APPENDIX


COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, JUNE 9, 1979

Country	Officials
USSR	1222
PRC	234
Poland	271
GDR	77
Czechoslovakia	107
Cuba	84
(S) Romania	80
Hungary	78
Bulgaria	48
Vietnam	9
North Korea	13
Yugoslavia	151
Albania	10
Mongolia	11
Total	2,395

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NOTE: Officials is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations.

MAJOR COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES



(S)

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~~SECRET~~

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-22-2011 BY 60322/UC/LRP/PLJ/ETG

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

MEMORANDUM April 11, 1979

TO : Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

ATTENTION: [redacted] Liaison Officer Intelligence Division

FROM : [redacted], Director
Office of Intelligence Liaison
Bureau of Intelligence and Research

SUBJECT : FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review

I would appreciate receiving three additional copies of the March 1979 issue of FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review for transmittal to the Department's Offices of East European Affairs, East Asian Affairs, and American Republic Affairs.

[redacted]

3 copies mailed to INR/OIL, State Dept

[redacted]

[redacted]

File 65-744480

65-744480-42

15 JUL 19 1979

84 AUG 3 '79

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. O. Cregar

DATE: 3/20/79

FROM [redacted]

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review," for dissemination to elements of the United States Intelligence Community, as well as the Senate and House Intelligence Committees. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved for dissemination, as detailed on attached list, to elements of the United States Intelligence Community and the Congress. (U)

APPROVED:
Director
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.

Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

2 - ENCLOSURE

TJD:en (8)
Enclosures (2)

DE-49 REC-65 V-21 65-74480-41

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ~~ATTACHED~~

65-74480

23 APR 19 1979

(CONTINUED - OVER)

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - [redacted]
1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson
1 - [redacted]
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas
1 [redacted]

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)
DATE 02-22-2011

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified and Extended by (1929)
Reason for Extension ~~FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (3)~~
Date of Review for Declassification (March 20, 1999)

6 MAY 10 1979

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI/DOJ

Memorandum from Mr. [redacted] to Mr. W. O. Cregar
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review

DETAILS:

(C) This publication provides an overview and analysis of [redacted] This particular issue is devoted wholly to the activities of [redacted] during the latter part of 1977 through December, 1978. It is a sanitized version of one furnished to FBI Field Offices, with some updated material added. The next edition, which is now in preparation, will focus upon operations of both [redacted]

(C)

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DISSEMINATION LIST

[redacted] the President for National Security Affairs - 1

Department of Justice, The Attorney General - 1

Department of the Treasury, The Secretary of the Treasury - 1

Director of Central Intelligence - 1

Department of State, The Secretary of State - 1

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency - 1

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army - 3

Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force - 1

Director, Naval Investigative Service, U.S. Navy - 1

Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Attention: Deputy Director for Operations - 1; Attention: Deputy Director for Intelligence - 1; Attention: Executive Secretary, Director of Central Intelligence Security Committee - 1

Director, Division of Safeguards and Security, Department of Energy - 1

National Security Agency, Director - 1; Attention: M503 - 1

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department - Attention: Navy Security Committee Member - 1

Director, FBI - 1

Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

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b7C

65-74480-41

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)
DATE 03-15-2011

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

REVIEW (U)

MARCH, 1979

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

TJD:en
(10)

MAIL ROOM ☐

Classified and Extended by 1929
Reason For Extension FCIM, 11,1-2.4.2 (1,2, and 3)
Date of Review For Declassification (March 31, 2009)

65-74480-41

ENCLOSURE

Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources
And Methods Involved

National Security Information
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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DISSEMINATION LIST 52

b1

INTRODUCTION

(C) The purpose of this publication is to afford an overview and analysis of [redacted] (S) This particular issue is devoted wholly to the activities of [redacted] during the latter part of 1977 through December of 1978. For purposes of brevity, these services will henceforth be referred to in this paper as [redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. (U)

b1

(S) [redacted]


Bilateral relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC), after more than two decades of mutual hostility, have come out of the deep freeze during the 1970s. Secret negotiations led to President Nixon's 1972 journey to Beijing, and three months before that trip the PRC was admitted to the United Nations and the Republic of China expelled. Recognition of the PRC by most of the world's nations followed these events, and with the exchange of liaison missions in April of 1973, informal relations between the United States and the PRC were established. Within the past two years, although there have been difficult moments in U.S.-PRC relations, the basic stance of the Chinese has been to achieve full normalization of its relations with the United States, including the achievement of most-favored-nation (MFN) status. On the night of December 15, 1978, a major step was taken in this direction when President Jimmy Carter announced that the United States would grant full diplomatic recognition to the PRC. The current rulers of the PRC, with Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping in the forefront, recognize that China is a backward country and has much to gain from the West, especially the United States, in its drive to modernize industry, science and technology, agriculture, and the armed forces. It should be pointed out that the Chinese tilt toward the West is further stimulated by the PRC's profound antipathy towards the Soviet Union. (U)

Despite Romania's continued good relations with the United States (typified by the April, 1978, meetings between President Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania and President Carter),

(S) [redacted] b1 b6 b7C

Unfortunately for the Romanians, the RIS were dealt a crippling blow in [redacted] with the defection of [redacted] The damage that the defection of such [redacted] can have on an intelligence agency is obvious. [redacted]

(S) [redacted]



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(S)

Commercial, Special Exchange, Shipping, and Students

With the onset of the period of detente between the United States and the Eastern European countries, there has been a proliferation of commercial establishments with attendant, increased exchanges of students, cultural and business visitors, and non-Soviet, communist country ships (these include Cuba, Hungary, East Germany, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania) calling at U.S. ports. Since 1972, the number of exchange visitors entering the United States has increased yearly, and the year 1978 has seen a continuation of this

escalation. From January 1, 1978, through December 31, 1978, 10,559 exchange visitors entered the United States as compared to 6,393 for the entire year of 1977.

(S) [redacted] b1

Throughout the year 1978, 170 vessels from 7 non-Soviet communist countries made 806 port calls in the United States at separate United States ports. Crew members of these vessels made at least 17,300 individual entries into the United States of varying duration,

(S) [redacted]

Analysis of Eastern European students attending academic institutions within the United States during the last three years determined that roughly 170 of these students have been within the United States at any one time. Of these 170 students, an estimated 95 percent are graduate students, 80 percent of whom are engaged in advanced research in scientific

and technical fields. [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

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
(S) II. [redacted]

Included below are objectives which, during the period under review, received the greatest amount of attention from the

(S) respective [redacted] The primary objective

(S) of [redacted] was the collection of scientific and technical (S & T) intelligence. The reason for this is readily discernible--all of these countries are plagued with economies and technological bases of varying degrees of underdevelopment. [redacted]

(S) [redacted]



(S)


b1

Two of Poland's principal natural resources are coal and copper, and the Poles have banked heavily upon the development of these resources to help diminish somewhat their massive trade deficit. In order to enhance their nation's

ability to exploit these resources [redacted] b1

(S) [redacted]


(S) [redacted]



Referral/Consult

Within the United States and its possessions, Cuba's internationalist policy has been exhibited in relation to several different political groups.

(S)



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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

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Magic Dragon

On the night of [redacted] an Alexandria, Va., federal court jury returned a [redacted] in the espionage trial of the United States of America vs. [redacted] The defendants were [redacted] The trial arose out of the alleged passage of material "relating to the national defense of the United States" to the [redacted] Several weeks later, on [redacted] Thus climaxed an investigation [redacted]

The [redacted] intelligence operation consisted essentially of the transmittal of classified [redacted] The material, which was composed of both "Secret" and "Confidential" documents, included, but was not limited to, [redacted] who held a "Top Secret" security

clearance, had access to the information due to [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] was motivated to act as an agent for the [redacted] by his desire to gain [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] was introduced in [redacted] an individual who supposedly could help [redacted] in this effort. [redacted] also occupied his time with another function--as an agent for the [redacted] (U)

Shortly after [redacted] became acquainted with [redacted] he began to pass documents to the [redacted] Evidence indicates that [redacted] had made a bargain with [redacted]

[redacted] by supplying him with information, then the [redacted] although [redacted] continued, telephonically, to supply [redacted] with classified information up to a few days before their arrest. (S)

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(U)

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

The successful outcome of the investigation was also furthered through the utilization of a panoply of technical surveillance devices. [redacted]

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[redacted]

b6
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The outcome of the appeals of the [redacted] convictions, which are expected to be taken by defense counsels to the U.S. Supreme Court, if necessary, could have important legal ramifications. Most significantly, the appeals question the inherent power of the President of the United States to authorize warrantless, electronic surveillances of American citizens in cases involving the national security, and further question whether the Government has the right to use the fruits of such warrantless surveillances in criminal trial proceedings. The U.S. Supreme Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of these issues. (U)

Another unresolved legal question relating to [redacted] arises from a civil suit filed by [redacted]. If the defendants are successful in pressing their case, such a court decision could open a veritable Pandora's box, for other individuals involved in previous, unrelated electronic surveillances could be spurred to launch similar civil suits. (U)

Finally, defendant [redacted] while under cross-examination, implicated certain other individuals as being possibly involved in this matter. The U.S. Department of Justice prosecution team is presently considering additional action concerning those implicated by [redacted] Further action must, however, await the outcome of the [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

Counterintelligence Operation vs. an Eastern European Country

An operation was recently launched against the intelligence service of an East European nation. The linchpin of the operation was an asset who has access to classified information, and is a native of the target intelligence service's country.

(S)

Impediments to the Development of Assets

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(C)

APPENDICES

(S) [redacted]

In relation to [redacted]

(C) [redacted] the priorities of the FBI, based upon the degree of threat posed by these services to the United States, are as follows (as of January, 1979):

(C) [redacted]

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DISSEMINATION LIST

[redacted] the President for National Security Affairs - 1

Department of Justice, The Attorney General - 1

Department of the Treasury, The Secretary of the Treasury - 1

Director of Central Intelligence - 1

Department of State, The Secretary of State - 1

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency - 1

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army - 3

Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force - 1

Director, Naval Investigative Service, U.S. Navy - 1

Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Attention: Deputy Director for Operations - 1; Attention: Deputy Director for Intelligence - 1; Attention: Executive Secretary, Director of Central Intelligence Security Committee - 1

Director, Division of Safeguards and Security, Department of Energy - 1

National Security Agency, Director - 1; Attention: M503 - 1

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department - Attention: Navy Security Committee Member - 1

~~UNCLAS~~

~~SECRET~~


Director, FBI - 1

Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - 1 (U)

APPROVED:

Director		Adm. Serv.	Legal Coun.
Asstc. Dir.		Crim. Inv.	Plan. & Insp.
Dep. AD Adm.		Ident.	Rec. Mgmt.
Dep. AD Inv.		Intell.	Tech. Servs.
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105-271060-1825

x Airtel x

2/22/79

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-271060)
ATTN: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, CI/3 (A)

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: MONTHLY SUMMARIES
OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
RESEARCH MATTER - FCI
BUDED 2/23/79

Re Bureau airtel of 2/1/79.

The following represents Chicago's comments on the questions asked by the Bureau in referenced airtel. (U)

(U) 1. Frequency: Quarterly (X)

(U) 2. Content: Reporting of intelligence activities should be written in summary form with sufficient detail to fully explain developments. (X)

(U) 3. Format: The current topical headings are appropriate (particularly as they relate to SATPIA) with the following exceptions: (X)

65-74480-

3 - Bureau (RM)
(1 - 65-74480) (FINAL)
4 - Chicago
(1 - 65-4268) (SATPIA)
(1 - 65-3307) (SPIA)
(1 - 201-187) (YUPIA)
(1 - 105-33496) (FINAL)
EBC/cjb
(7)

[redacted]
MAR 30 1979
[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classified and Extended by 7107~~
~~Reason for Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (2 & 3)~~
~~Date of Review for Declassification 2/22/79~~

57APR 17 1979

A. Eliminate arrival and departures of officials and additions and deletions of known and suspected intelligence officers (item number 5 in SATPIA). (U) (C)

B. Eliminate travel of officials and the arrival and departure of couriers. (U) (C)

C. Eliminate forms 5-80 (Monthly Statistical Tabulation) and 5-81 (Monthly Recapitulation) unless one or the other or both have particular significance for the Intelligence Division. The information on the Monthly Statistical Tabulation form is available through COBRA.

D. Add a sub heading (SATPIA) relating to satellite commercial enterprises. Chicago did this on its own several months ago [redacted] (C) b1

4. Distribution: FBIHQ and establishment offices. (One FCI supervisor suggests that the document go to FBIHQ and the 10 major FBI field offices.) Access to SATPIA and YUPIA should be limited to FCI personnel. (U) (C)

5. Security: Summaries should be written in such a fashion as to protect the identity of sources and where appropriate, the circumstances surrounding the source's access to the information. Operations aimed at recruitment and assessment of officials for recruitment should be held on a strict need-to-know basis and not included in any of these documents. (U) (C)

6. Analysis: The field should include its analysis of developments on a timely basis as particular events or trends become apparent. (In the case of personnel handling YUPIA, the opinion seemed to be that FBIHQ should handle analysis.) (U) (C)

Threat Assessments? Personnel in Chicago have differing views on this particular topic. One FCI supervisor expressed the opinion that at the present time, the field was unable to recognize a threat assessment. However, others think the field should not be excluded from this option if, in any given situation, we have sufficient information and expertise to handle one. (U) (C)

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7. Countries: There is no reason why pertinent developments regarding non-criteria countries should not
(U) be added to our reporting. (S)

Comment: Chicago will take this opportunity to address at least two particular subjects in relation to this study by the Bureau which, we believe, have a direct bearing on the quality and usefulness of SPIA and SATPIA. In September of 1977, Chicago responded to another questionnaire from FBIHQ concerning our Foreign Intelligence Analysis (FINAL). Bureau personnel who prepare our foreign intelligence analysis use these documents as a basis for their reports -- reports that are no better than the information furnished by the field. We see SPIA and SATPIA as having great potential for summarizing in one place on a regular
(C) basis [redacted] activities. But this requires thorough and complete reporting for each period the documents are submitted. This is subject the Bureau should address in this study and then issue the field explicit instructions. If establishment offices are allowed to pick and choose on their own what will be included in SPIA and SATPIA, there will be practically no consistency in reporting and the documents themselves will loose much quality and credibility.
(U) (S)

The dilemma in this is the question of security and need-to-know as currently applied by the Bureau. We have already expressed our opinion that recruitments should not
(C) be reported in SATPIA and SPIA. Yet, there is a need for an exchange of information among those of us handling foreign counterintelligence investigations so we can be made aware on a timely basis of what [redacted] are doing in our own field in particular and other fields in general where we might learn valuable information as to techniques, targets and tradecraft. It is a question which finally will have to be resolved from the perspective of
(U) headquarters. (S)

All of us handling foreign counterintelligence investigations in Chicago firmly believe that if the requirements for SPIA, SATPIA and YUPIA are revised these reports be submitted on a quarterly basis. Developments in many of our operations do not lend themselves neatly to monthly reporting. A longer time-frame would enable the field to base its reports on a wider area of developments which often make details more
(U) meaningful. (S)

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
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Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. O. Cregar

DATE: 1/31/79

FROM : [redacted]

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

b6
b7C

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary," for dissemination within the FBI. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices and appropriate Headquarters personnel. (U)

APPROVED:

Director
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.

Enclosure 1 - ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

65-74480

CONTINUED - OVER

TJD:slp/en
(7)

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - [redacted]
1 - Mr. H. C. Peterson
1 - [redacted]
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas
1 - [redacted]

EX-106

REC- 79 65-74480 5 40X

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

11 FEB 14 1979

~~Classified and Extended by~~ 1929
~~Reason for Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (3)~~
~~Date of Review~~ for Declassification (~~January 31, 1999~~)

62 MAY 14 1979

DOC. CLASS.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI/DOJ

Memorandum to Mr. W. O. Cregar
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary
65-74480

DETAILS:

(C) This publication provides an overview and analysis of [redacted] This issue is devoted wholly to the activities (C) of [redacted] during the latter part of 1977 and 1978. An issue was published in June of 1978 which focused upon the activities of [redacted] (C) The next issue, now in preparation, will focus upon the activities of both [redacted] (C) "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary" is the successor to the publication "FBI Foreign Intelligence (U) Analysis (FINAL)." (C)

b1

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DATE 03-16-2011

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FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY (U)

JANUARY, 1979

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.: ____
Adm. Servs. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
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Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
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Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

JPT

TJD:en
(7)

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Classified and Extended by 1929
Reason For Extension ~~FCIM,~~ II, 1-2.4.2 (1,2,and 3)
~~Date of Review~~ For Declassification (January 1, 2009)

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ENCLOSURE 65-74480 - 40X

FBI/DOJ

~~SECRET~~

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54

b1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to afford an
(C) overview and analysis of [redacted] This particular issue is devoted wholly
(C) to the activities of [redacted] during the latter part of 1977 through December of 1978. For purposes of brevity, these services will henceforth be referred to in this
(C) paper as [redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Some of the material contained herein has been obtained from other elements of the United States intelligence community, as well as the intelligence services of certain friendly foreign Governments.
(U) (S)

b1



(S)

b1

Bilateral relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC), after more than two decades of mutual hostility, have come out of the deep freeze during the 1970's. Secret negotiations led to President Nixon's 1972 journey to Peking, and three months before that trip the PRC was admitted to the United Nations and the Republic of China expelled. Recognition of the PRC by most of the world's nations followed these events, and with the exchange of liaison missions in April of 1973, informal relations between the United States and the PRC were established. Within the past two years, although there have been difficult moments in U.S.-PRC relations, the basic stance of the Chinese has been to achieve full normalization of its relations with the United States, including the achievement of most-favored-nation (MFN) status. On the night of December 15, 1978, a major step was taken in this direction when President Jimmy Carter announced that the United States would grant full diplomatic recognition to the PRC. The current rulers of the PRC, with Vice Premier TENG Hsiao-Ping in the forefront, recognize that China is a backward country and has much to gain from the West, especially the United States, in its drive to modernize industry, technology, science, and education. It should be pointed out that the Chinese tilt toward the West is further stimulated by the PRC's profound antipathy towards the Soviet Union. (U)

(S) [redacted] b1

Commercial, Special Exchange, Shipping, and Students

With the onset of the period of detente between the United States and the Eastern European countries, there has been a proliferation of commercial establishments with attendant, increased exchanges of students, cultural and business visitors, and non-Soviet, communist country ships (these include Cuba, Hungary, East Germany, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania) calling at U.S. ports. Since 1972, the numbers of exchange visitors entering the United States have increased yearly, and the year 1978 has seen a continuation of this upward escalation. Through January 1, 1979, 10,559 exchange visitors entered the United States as compared to 6,393 for the entire year of 1977. [redacted]

(S) [redacted]


For the first three quarters of 1978 (January 1 through September 30) the vessels of 7 non-Soviet communist countries made 722 port calls in the United States at separate United States ports. Crew members of these vessels made at least 13,264 individual entries into the United States of varying duration,

b1

(S)

Analysis of Eastern European students attending academic institutions within the United States during the last three years determined that roughly 170 of these students have been within the United States at any one time. Of these 170 students, an estimated 95 percent are graduate students, 80% of whom are engaged in advanced research in scientific and technical fields.

(S)



(S)

(S)

b1

Two of Poland's principal natural resources are coal and copper, and the Poles have banked heavily upon the development of these resources to help diminish somewhat their massive trade deficit. In order to enhance their nation's ability to

(S) exploit these resources,

(S) [redacted]

b1

(S) [redacted]

Residing within the United States is an unidentified subject who emigrated from West Germany in the early 1970s. The subject has assumed the identity of a citizen of West Germany (who will, for purposes of security, be called Schmidt). [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted] Also significant is the fact that after moving to the United States, the subject married a woman who, although being a naturalized U.S. citizen, is an

(U) emigrant from a communist country. (S)

(S) [redacted]

b1

(S) [redacted]

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

b1

Within the United States and its possessions, Cuba's internationalist policy has been exhibited in relation to several different political groups. [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

b6
b7C

The outcome of the appeals of the [redacted] convictions, which are expected to be taken by defense counsels to the U.S. Supreme Court, if necessary, could have important legal ramifications. Most significantly, the appeals question the inherent power of the President of the United States to [redacted] The U.S. Supreme Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of these issues. (U)

Another unresolved legal question relating to "Magic Dragon" arises from a civil suit filed by [redacted] They allege invasion of privacy as a result of being overheard in the electronic surveillances of [redacted] and seek various forms of relief, including monetary. If the defendants are successful in pressing their case, such a court decision could open a veritable Pandora's box, for other individuals involved in previous, unrelated electronic surveillances could be spurred to launch similar civil suits. (U)


Finally, defendant [redacted] while under cross-examination, implicated certain other individuals as being possibly involved in this matter. The U.S. Department of Justice prosecution team is presently considering additional action concerning those implicated by [redacted] Further action must, however, await the outcome of the [redacted]

(U) [redacted]


File 105-298634; CI-2 Supervisors

False Flag Operation

(S)



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


(S)

b1

Counterintelligence Operation vs. an Eastern European Country

An operation was recently launched against the intelligence service of an East European nation. The linchpin of the operation was an asset who has access to classified



(S)

b1

APPROVED:

Director
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.

Adm. Serv.
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1 - [redacted]
1 - Mr. J. B. Thomas
1 - [redacted]

b6
b7C

Date: January 17, 1979

To: Director
National Security Agency
Attention: M503
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland

BY LIAISON
1/17/79 to NSA
[redacted]

Mr. [redacted]
[redacted]
DCI Security Committee
Central Intelligence Agency
Room 3E05
Langley Headquarters Building

BY LIAISON
1/18/79 to CIA

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Chief of Naval Operations (Op-009D)
Navy Department
Washington, D. C. 20350
Attention: Navy Security Committee Member

BY LIAISON
delivered 1-19-79 LHC

From: [redacted] Security Officer
(Security Committee Member)
FBI

Subject: FBI "FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW"

FBI, from

This is in reference to communications received from [redacted] National Security Agency Security Committee Member, dated November 30, 1978; from [redacted] DCI Security Committee, dated November 3, 1978; and from Mr. [redacted] Navy Member, DCI Security Committee, dated November 14, 1978. All of these communications referred to my offering at the November 1, 1978, meeting of the Security Committee to place each member of the Committee on the mailing list of the FBI to receive future editions of the "Foreign Counterintelligence Review" providing a specific request was submitted.

REC-106 65-74486-40

22 JAN 31 1979

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Assoc. Dir. ___
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Intell. ___

DR:lfj
(10)

62FEB 5 1979

for delivery 1/16/79

MAIL ROOM ☐

Director, National Security Agency
Mr. [redacted] DCI Security Committee
Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department

b6
b7C

For your information, copies of the last edition of the FBI "Foreign Counterintelligence Review," dated July, 1978, are no longer available. However, one Xeroxed copy is attached for each requester.

While it was anticipated copies of the "Foreign Counterintelligence Review" would be produced on a quarterly basis, as of this time, because of manpower and resource commitments, it has not been possible to meet the four-month schedule. I anticipate an edition will be prepared for dissemination in the immediate future and thereafter periodic editions will be prepared. You may be assured you will be included on the FBI mailing list to receive all future copies.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350

IN REPLY REFER TO
Ser 009DB/670722
14 NOV 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DAVID RYAN, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
HEADQUARTERS, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis United States

Subj: Quarterly Counterintelligence review; request for

[redacted] at the last meeting of the DCI Security Committee (SECOM) you indicated that upon written request you would try and provide a copy of the quarterly counterintelligence review. It is requested that you provide a copy for the Navy SECOM members use at the following address.

Chief of Naval Operations (Op-009D)
Navy Department
Washington, D.C. 20350

Attn: Navy SECOM Member

[redacted]
Navy Member
DCI Security Committee

REC-106 65-74480-38

22 JAN 23 1979

LETTER TO NSA, DCI SECOM, NAVY 1-17-79

4-

62FEB 15 1979

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs.
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Rec. Mgnt.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - [redacted]

DATE: 8/2/78

1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson
1 - [redacted]
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas
1 - [redacted]

TO : Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : [redacted]

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

b6
b7C

[redacted]

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review," for dissemination to United States intelligence community, as well as the intelligence Senate and House oversight committees.

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated, as detailed on attached list, to elements of the United States intelligence community and the Congress.

APPROVED:
Director
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.

DETAILS:

This publication provides an overview of [redacted] b1

(S) [redacted] This particular issue is devoted wholly to the activities of

(S) [redacted] during the latter half of 1977 and first four months of 1978. It is a sanitized version of one furnished to FBI Field Offices, and was prepared in coordination with CI-1 (Soviet) Section. Another publication is being prepared which will focus upon the operations of

(S) [redacted] "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review" is the successor to the discontinued external publication entitled "FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis-United States (Final)."

Enclosures

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

65-74480 ENCLOSURE

TJD:slp
(8)

65-74480-36

14 SEP 25 1978

Continued

61 OCT 23 1978

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Memorandum to W. O. Cregar
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence
Review
65-74480

DISSEMINATION LIST

[redacted] the President for National Security Affairs - 1

b6
b7C

Department of Justice, The Attorney General - 1

Department of the Treasury, The Secretary of the Treasury - 1

Director of Central Intelligence - 1

Department of State, The Secretary of State - 1

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Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army - 3

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Director, Naval Investigative Service, U.S. Navy - 1

Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Attention: Deputy Director for Operations - 1; Attention: Deputy Director for Intelligence - 1

Director, Division of Safeguards and Security, Department of Energy - 1

Director, National Security Agency - 1

Director, FBI - 1

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Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

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DATE: JULY, 1978

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65-74480

TJD:en

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65-74480-36

Classified by 1929
Exempt from GDS, ~~Categories~~ 1, 2, and 3
Date of ~~Declassification~~ Indefinite

ENCLOSURE

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The purpose of this publication is to offer the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI. Emphasis is placed on [redacted]

(C) [redacted] The "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review" is the successor to the publication "FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis-United States (FINAL)." This particular issue is devoted wholly to the activities of


(C) [redacted] during the latter half of 1977 and first four months of 1978. Another publication is being prepared which will focus upon the operations of [redacted]

(C) [redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interest or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination has been

(U) made. (C)

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PMS



(S)

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A survey of the geographical distribution of Soviet student assignments in April of 1978 indicates the degree to which one element of the Soviet incursion has spread throughout the United States:

PAS

INSTITUTION AND LOCATION	NUMBER OF STUDENTS IN ATTENDANCE
Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York	2
Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island	2
New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, New Mexico	1
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts	3
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland	1
Northeastern Fisheries Center, Narragansett, Rhode Island	1
University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois	1
Duke University, Durham, North Carolina	1
Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio	3
University of Akron, Akron, Ohio	1
University of Texas, Arlington, Texas	1
University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado	1
Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas	1
University of California, Los Angeles, California	2
University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin	1
Columbia University, New York, New York	2
New York University, New York, New York	1
Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma	1
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	1
University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona	2

PMS

INSTITUTION AND LOCATION	NUMBER OF STUDENTS IN ATTENDANCE
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia	2
University of Texas, Austin, Texas	1
University of California, Berkeley, California	5
Stanford University, Stanford, California	4
University of California, San Francisco, California	1
(U) University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana, Illinois	1 ~~(C)~~

Hence, 43 Soviet students were located in 17 different states across the United States, and attending universities with high technology research facilities. ~~(C)~~

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(S) II. [redacted]

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Scientific and Technical Intelligence

(S) [redacted]


Political Intelligence

(S)


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Strategic Intelligence

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
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The Soviet Trade and Economic Council was established in 1973 as a result of the Nixon-Brezhnev summit talks. Its main purpose is to help create an environment which will foster the growth of commercial trade between the Soviet Union and the United States.



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who unsuccessfully attempted to pass classified documents to the Soviets), ended on a perhaps equally discordant note. ~~(S)~~

WFO SPIA, 1/30/78, pp 33 thru 35; WFO SPIA, 2/28/78, pp 23 thru 25.

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(S) V. [redacted]

Students

(S) [redacted]

Shipping


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Use of Cover and Cut-outs

(S) [redacted]


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Infiltration Techniques


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Recruitment Targets

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[redacted]

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

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
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[redacted]

Upon their arrest [redacted] were jailed at the [redacted] in Manhattan. They were held in lieu of [redacted] each. [redacted] however, [redacted] the custody of Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobryin, to await their [redacted] (U)

Dangle Operations

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(S) VII. [redacted]

(C) [redacted]

b1

(S) [redacted]

a. Local Party Organization (Profsoyuz) - The term Profsoyuz, when used outside the Soviet Union, refers to the Local Party Organization abroad [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

b. Primary Party Organization (Pervychnaya Partiynaya Organizatsiya) - This is the basic Party cell of any department, office or shop of the Soviet colony. All Soviets in the Communist Party, therefore, belong to some Primary Party Organization, of which there are several. Within some, although not all, Primary Party Organizations are subgroups into which members of each Organization are concentrated according to their particular field of expertise. Meetings of the various Organizations are held monthly, [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

c. Political Seminar - In addition to membership in the Party and Primary Party Organizations, Soviets are also assigned to small groups referred to as Political Seminars. There are periodic meetings of these Seminars at which political issues are discussed from the perspective of Communist Party ideology. Attendance at these meetings is

(U) mandatory and considered a "Party duty." (S)

b1

(S) [redacted]

e. Zhensovet - The Zhensovet, or Women's Council, is similar to a women's club. There are two such Zhensovets in the New York colony. Overseeing both Councils is the Trade Union Organization of
(U) Zhensovets. (~~S~~)

f. Trade Union Organization - Every Soviet enterprise or organization, whether within the Soviet Union or abroad, has a local Trade Union Organization, headed by a committee called a Mestkom. The Mestkom is ultimately subject to Communist Party guidelines and control, although it is not a Communist Party organization.

(S) [redacted]

g. Friends of Russian Books Club - The Soviets sponsor a club of this name which is quartered at the United Nations. The organization sponsors events such as the showing of movies on the Soviet Union, the staging of Russian dance exhibitions, etc. Such events serve as a convenient vehicle through which
(U) Soviets can become acquainted with individuals of various nationalities. (~~S~~)

NY SPIA, 1/19/78, pp 15 thru 18.

HRe

(S) VIII. [redacted] b1

One of the most serious social problems afflicting the Soviet Union today is widespread alcoholism. Some observers believe that this disease has reached epidemic proportions. Per capita consumption of hard liquor in the Soviet Union is the highest of any country in the world. Staggering or unconscious drunks are a common sight in Soviet cities.

(S) [redacted]

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(S)

Since the late 1950's, Soviet-Chinese relations have been, to put it mildly, marked by acrimony. A new charge was, however, added to the arsenal of Soviet anti-PRC diatribes.

(S)

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DISSEMINATION LIST

b1

Dr. [redacted] the President for National Security Affairs - 1

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Department of the Treasury, The Secretary of the Treasury - 1

Director of Central Intelligence - 1

Department of State, The Secretary of State - 1

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency - 1

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army - 3

Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force - 1

Director, Naval Investigative Service, U.S. Navy - 1

Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Attention: Deputy Director for Operations - 1; Attention: Deputy Director for Intelligence - 1

Director, Division of Safeguards and Security, Department of Energy - 1

Director, National Security Agency - 1

Director, FBI - 1

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Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

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Dep. AD Inv.	Intell. WOC	Tech. Servs.
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

DATE: 7/26/78

REPLY TO ATTN OF: SAC, DENVER (105-0)

SUBJECT: FBI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS UNITED STATES

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74480)
ATTN: INTD, CI-3-A Unit

Re Bureau letter to Albany, dated 7/21/78, bearing same caption and which furnished Denver two copies of the new "Counterintelligence Summary," dated June, 1978.

Denver has read this summary with considerable interest and feels it is an excellent publication. It is obviously apparent a considerable amount of research and effort was expended in producing this outstanding summary. In addition, Denver feels it to be an ideal training aid for Agent personnel working FCI matters, whether newly exposed to that field or already possessing various degrees of expertise.

In line with the above, Denver requests the Bureau furnish it with 11 additional copies which will be used as training aids in upcoming conferences with headquarters and Resident Agency personnel.

REC-122

65-74480-35

23 SEP 15 1978

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b7C

(2) - Bureau (RM)
1 - Denver
TFH/sip

OCT 3 1978

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
(REV. 7-76)
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
5010-112

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1 - Mr. W. O. Gregar
1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson
1 -
1 -

SAC, Albany

7/13/78

1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas
1 -

Director, FBI (65-74480)

FBI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
Foreign Intelligence Analysis - United States

Enclosed for recipient offices are copies, as indicated, of the current issue of "FBI Counterintelligence Summary." This publication provides an overview of

(C) [redacted] This particular issue is devoted wholly to the activities of

(C) [redacted] during the latter half of 1977 and first four months of 1978. Another issue is being prepared which will focus upon the operations of non-Soviet intelligence services. "FBI Counterintelligence Summary" is the successor to the publication "FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis-United States (FINAL)." (U)

Issues of this publication will be prepared and disseminated periodically. Your comments concerning enclosed publication, as well as suggestions regarding similar future publications, are invited. Their purpose is to inform the field of current developments and items of presumed interest, within security limitations. Your comments and suggestions will assist in achieving this purpose. They should be addressed to the attention of the Intelligence Division, CI-3-A Unit. Additionally, submissions from the field of interesting case-type articles or analytical articles for possible inclusion in the "Summary" are also welcome. (U)

MAILED 2
JUL 21 1978
FBI

Enclosures (2)

2 - Chicago (Enclosures - 4)
2 - Los Angeles (Enclosures - 4)
2 - New York (Enclosures - 5)
2 - San Francisco (Enclosures - 4)
2 - WFO (Enclosures - 5)
2 - All Other Field Offices (Enclosures - 2)

REC-89 EX-136 65-74480-34

17 SEP 13 1978

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MAIL ROOM

59 SEP 26 1978

File 65-74480

TJD:ded
(12)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SEE NOTE, PAGE

FBI/DOJ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to Albany, et al.
Re: FBI Counterintelligence
Summary
65-74480

NOTE:

By memorandum [redacted], to Mr. W. O. Cregar, 6/30/78, same subject, it was recommended, approved, that subject publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices.

b6
b7C

APPROVED:

Director		Adm. Serv.	Legal Coun.
Assoc. Dir.		Crim. Inv.	Plan. & Insp.
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Copies not needed for all Assistant Directors since it is not policy-type matter and only a cover letter for FCI publication.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - [redacted]
1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson
1 - [redacted]
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas
1 - [redacted]

DATE: 6/30/78

TO : Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : [redacted]

SUBJECT: FBI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

PURPOSE: FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis - United States

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Counterintelligence Summary," for dissemination within the FBI.

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices and appropriate Headquarters personnel.

APPROVED:

Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____

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V-39 E-71

65-74480-33

REC-128

2 AUG 4 1978

DETAILS:

This publication provides an overview of [redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S) This particular issue is devoted wholly to the activities of the [redacted] (S) during the latter half of 1977 and first four months of 1978. Another publication is being prepared which will focus upon the operations of [redacted] (S) "FBI Counterintelligence Summary" is the successor to the publication "FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis-United States (FINAL)."

Enclosure

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

65-74480

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

TJD:en
(7)

ENCLOSURE

54AUG28 1978

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Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

DATE: JUNE, 1978

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Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
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65-74480

TJD:en

MAIL ROOM ☐

~~Classified by 1929~~
Exempt from GDS, ~~Categories~~ 1, 2, and 3
~~Date of~~ Declassification Indefinite

~~SECRET~~

(C) The purpose of this publication is to afford an overview of [redacted] This particular issue is devoted wholly to the activities of [redacted] during the latter half of 1977 and first four months of 1978. Another publication is being prepared which will focus upon the operations of [redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interest or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination has been made. (U)

b1

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IX. [redacted] 33

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(S) I. [redacted] b1

The USSR divides the responsibility for the clandestine collection of positive intelligence abroad between the Committee for State Security (KGB) and the Chief Intelligence Directorate, General Staff of the Ministry of Defense (GRU). The KGB is by far the dominant service and reports directly to the Council of Ministers and sections of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The GRU reports to appropriate command levels in the Soviet armed forces as well as to the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee. Collectively the KGB and GRU are referred to as the Soviet intelligence services (SIS). (U)

The First Chief Directorate of the KGB is responsible for the KGB's intelligence operations outside of the USSR. Its mission is thus comparable to that of the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States. The First Chief Directorate consists of seven Directorates and two Special Services, as well as a total of nineteen Departments (see organization chart on page 36 for the titles and heads of the various elements). Coverage of the United States is assigned to Department One, which reflects the United States status as number one target of the KGB. Of the seven Directorates--Directorate "R" (Operational Planning and Analysis) and Directorate "OT" (Technical Operational Support)--have been recently established. The new Directorate "OT" is an elevation to Directorate status of the former Fourteenth Department and, at present, there is no known Fourteenth Department. (U) (S)

Two of the Departments are also of relatively recent vintage. Department Nineteen was established in 1975 and is responsible for emigration matters. Department Twenty was established in 1977, and its mission is similar to that of the Eleventh Department. The former is responsible for maintaining liaison with intelligence services of developing countries, whereas the latter maintains liaison with intelligence services of socialist countries. (U) (S)

INSTITUTION AND LOCATION	NUMBER OF STUDENTS IN ATTENDANCE
Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York	2
Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island	2
New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, New Mexico	1
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts	3
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland	1
Northeastern Fisheries Center, Narragansett, Rhode Island	1
Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts	1
University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois	1
Duke University, Durham, North Carolina	1
Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio	2
University of Akron, Akron, Ohio	1
University of Texas, Arlington, Texas	2
University of Colorado, Boulder,Colorado	1
Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas	1
University of California, Los Angeles, California	2
University of California, Santa Barbara, California	1
University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin	1
Columbia University, New York, New York	2
New York University, New York, New York	1
University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma	1
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	1
University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona	2

INSTITUTION AND LOCATION	NUMBER OF STUDENTS IN ATTENDANCE
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia	2
University of Texas, Austin, Texas	1
University of California, Berkeley, California	5
Stanford University, Stanford, California	4
University of California, San Francisco, California	1
University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois	1 (C)

(U) Hence, 45 Soviet students were located in 17 different states across the United States. (C)

(S) [redacted] b1

(S) VI. [redacted]

Dead Drops

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(S) [redacted]


Tradecraft

(S) [redacted]

Students


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Shipping


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
Use of Cover and Cut-outs

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


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Infiltration Techniques


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Recruitment Targets

(C)



VII. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Dangle Operations

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[redacted]

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
Utilization of Aircraft for Surveillance

(S)

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
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


FBI Effectiveness

(S)



(S)



(S)

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Referral/Consult

(S) [redacted]

Since the late 1950's, Soviet-Chinese relations have been, to put it mildly, marked by acrimony. A new charge was, however, added to the arsenal of Soviet anti-PRC diatribes. [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

b1

NOTE:

Considerable material was also supplied by E Unit, CI-1.

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DATE 03-23-2011

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1 - Mr. A. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt
1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson
1 - Mr. J. W. Redfield
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

b6
b7C

SAC, Baltimore

8/11/77

Director, FBI (65-74480)

[redacted]

FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES
(FINAL)

Enclosed for recipient offices are copies, as indicated, of the current issue of FINAL publication bearing (S) the subtitle "Overview of [redacted] Operations in the United States."

This issue of FINAL is classified "~~Secret~~."

b1

For the information of those offices receiving FINAL for the first time, its purpose is to periodically provide to offices expected to be engaged in foreign counterintelligence investigations significant elements (S) of [redacted]

The objective of FINAL is to furnish to interested offices these essential elements without violating the need-to-know principle which precludes broad dissemination of specific details of hostile operations and/or counterintelligence efforts against them.

MAILED 16
AUG 10 1977
FBI

REC-56 65-74480-32
17 DEC 16 1977

Unfortunately, various other demands on the analytical and research elements of FBIHQ have, in the past, prevented the production of FINAL as frequently and in the form which was originally intended. Recently there has been some expansion of the analytical and research capability of FBIHQ and further expansion is anticipated. Accordingly,

Enclosures - 2 (ENCLOSURE)

2 - Boston (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Chicago (Enclosures - 4)
2 - Cleveland (Enclosures - 2)
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2 - Miami (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Newark (Enclosures - 3)
2 - New Haven (Enclosures - 3)
2 - New York (Enclosures - 5)
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2 - Portland (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Sacramento (Enclosures - 2)
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2 - San Francisco (Enclosures - 4)
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2 - WFO (Enclosures - 5)
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AGP/JPT:ded
(43)

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

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FBI/DOJ

79 DEC 20 1977

~~SECRET~~

Letter to Baltimore
Re: FBI Foreign Intelligence
Analysis - United States
(FINAL)
65-74480

the comments and suggestions of all recipients as to the type or types of periodic analytical and research products to be produced are requested. Current thinking is that it would be desirable to furnish on a frequent basis, possibly monthly, an informative review of current developments. Less frequent communications containing the essence of trends noted at FBIHQ or analysis of situations brought to the attention of FBIHQ might be produced. Possibly submission of interesting case type articles or analytical articles based on local observations from the field would be of value and general interest.

It is requested that recipients bring the current issue of FINAL, as well as the foregoing comments, to the attention of personnel engaged in foreign counterintelligence investigations and address the resultant comments and suggestions to the attention of the Intelligence Division, Section CI-3.

APPROVED:

Director	Adm. Serv.	Legal Coun.
Assoc. Dir.	Crim. Inv.	Plan. & Insp.
Dep. AD Adm.	Fin. & Pers.	Rec. Mgmt.
Dep. AD Inv.	Ident.	Spec. Inv.
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WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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(S) (Overview of [redacted] Operations in the United States)

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Director's Sec'y ____

AGP:ded ded

THIS DOCUMENT IS SOLELY FOR USE WITHIN THE FBI

~~Classified by 1929~~ RJC RMK
Exempt from GDS, ~~Categories~~ 2 & 3
~~Date of Declassification~~ Indefinite

RJC RMK

JPT

~~SECRET~~

~~JULY,~~ 1977

62-74406-32

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ENCLOSURE

FBI/DOJ

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
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(C) The purpose of this publication is to afford, through a summary of situations and events, an overview of [redacted]. It is intended solely for the internal use of the FBI. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination has been made. (U) (X)

TECHNIQUES AND TRADECRAFT


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
Experience has shown there are personal characteristics or factors which tend to make an individual susceptible to recruitment. These include political affinity for the bloc country or disaffection from the United States; venality; vulnerability to blackmail; need for sexual and/or emotional involvement or ego gratification; excessive drinking; marital or financial problems; and vulnerability to coercion when relatives reside in bloc countries. (U)

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A dead drop is a place through which communications, materials, or equipment may be transferred from one person to another without the necessity for personal contact. (U)



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[redacted]

[redacted]

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Determination of Intelligence Connection

SOME FACTORS UPON which we may base our judgment as to an intelligence connection include the following:

[redacted]

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[redacted]


Information Gathering

(C)

[redacted]

Topics discussed at these meetings range from fusion energy to the "Glomar Explorer," the ship which attempted to retrieve a sunken Soviet submarine. (C)

(WFO SPIA 11/12/76, page 24)
(WFO SPIA 2/15/77, page 26, 27)



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
Some Current Operations



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(NY SPIA 5/13/77, page 11)


Courier Service

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Shipping


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TRENDS

Intra-bloc Relations

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While it is obvious that not all clandestine activity has ceased, it is felt that the level of activity, now limited to essential contact with only the most trusted agents, will not increase until some time passes without derogatory public references to Soviet activity. (U)

(SF SPIA 5/13/77, page 2)


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TARGETS

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


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And each country in the bloc has the potential to benefit not only from its own findings but also from those of its allies. (U)

Thus, while two or more countries might have rather distinct target priorities,

(C)



AN ILLUSTRATION: In November, 1975, a man, who before his defection to the United States had for 17 years been an intelligence officer of a communist-bloc service, testified before a Congressional Committee. (U)

He identified a great many of the targets of his service:

1. POLITICAL - the Pentagon, the White House, the State Department, the Justice Department, the National Security Council; all bureaus and independent agencies; the Republican and Democratic Parties, and all smaller parties except the Communist Party, USA; all of the more important mass organizations including the American Federation of Labor - Congress of Industrial Organizations, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Civil Liberties Union; Ralph Nader and his organizations. (U)

2. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE - the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Secret Service; major police departments including New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Washington, D. C.; private detective bureaus; exile organizations and defectors. (U)

3. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL - the United States Atomic Energy Commission (now ERDA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Academy of Sciences and the National Science Foundation; research branches of United States universities, government research organizations and research of private companies; all research oriented toward the military; chemistry, computers, the fields of substitute energy and the entire "Project Independence." (U)

4. ECONOMIC - the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and Agriculture; economic relations between the United States and the bloc countries, between the United States and the Common Market, and between the United States and the developing countries. (U)

5. THE MILITARY - the Armed Forces of the United States; naval, air and ground bases; movement of troops, troop exercises, equipment, weapons, tactics, intelligence and morale; and military policy. (U)

IN ADDITION TO the above, the following targets are also pursued: developing contacts among workers of the United Nations Missions; penetration of the United Nations police, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the United States Coast Guard, and the United States Customs Office; and the obtaining of forms, documents, stationery, maps, schedules, cards, clothing, accessories and similar items needed for the support of illegals, including ascertaining the availability of housing and modes of travel. (U)

(Hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigative the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, 94th Congress, 1st Session 11/18/75.)

Although this list was obtained from one defector and reflects his country's intelligence services' targets, every country discussed in this study can be presumed to have the same generic target priorities. They will vary as to the importance given to any specific target in any particular time frame. That a country's current primary target is discovering the activity of emigre groups does not mean it has no interest in penetration of the United States Government or acquisition of scientific information, nor that such penetration or acquisition could not become its primary target with the passage of time. As a government's national objectives change, so too the intelligence services' targets. (U)

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Specific targets 1976-1977

THOSE TARGETS SOUGHT by the various intelligence services listed below range from items commonly, or at least publicly available, to classified material and those on the restricted commodities list or otherwise restricted. The reasons for the tasking of an individual to obtain any one item, or related or unrelated series of items, vary from a mere test of willingness to cooperate to a test of competence in carrying out assignments to, it may be assumed, a substantial need for the item in question sufficient to warrant the risks inherent in its obtention. (U) (C)

THE TARGET LIST which follows is not meant to be all-inclusive, nor does it necessarily fully define the current areas of interest of the country or intelligence service. It is, however, interesting, in spite of the fact that some of these targets might be shown to be somewhat dated, as it indicates areas of interest and suggests either the nature of ongoing projects within the country concerned; the state of development of a particular technology or industry in that country; or, perhaps, those items which logically will become targets of those intelligence services should these target acquisitions be accomplished. (U)

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ESTABLISHMENTS

Expansion-Security Measures

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
(C)

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TASS News Agency in San Francisco signed a 5-year lease, commencing October, 1976, for a 2 room office adjacent to the local UPI office. They also leased a 2 room apartment for the TASS senior correspondent.

(U) (X)

(SF SPIA 9/15/76, page 12)

(C)



(C)

(S)

IN AUGUST, 1976, SOVFRACHT, a shipbroker for bulk carriers, especially American grain bound for the Soviet Union, acquired new office space at 277 Park Avenue, (near 48th Street), New York, New York. (X) b1 per FBI

(U)

(NY SPIA 9/27/76, page 14)



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Referral/Direct



Referral/Direct

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(S)

THE ROMANIAN COMMERCIAL Office in Chicago, Illinois, occupied its new office space, Room 911, 100 West Monroe
(U) Street, Chicago, on June 1, 1976. (X)

(CG SATPIA 7/23/76, page 7)

THREE CASES

[redacted]

During the evening of [redacted] a Soviet

[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

On [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] was arrested by the FBI on [redacted] on charges of conspiring to commit espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. He has not yet come to trial. At the time of his arrest, in [redacted] he had in his possession a [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] and has since left the United States. (U)

[redacted]

On [redacted] was arrested (on an unrelated charge) in [redacted]. In his possession at the time were [redacted] was later returned to U. S. authorities. (U)

On [redacted] was arrested at his home in [redacted] California. He was, at the time, [redacted] but had been employed as a [redacted] and had possessed a "Top Secret" clearance which gave him access to highly classified intelligence communications, documents, and hardware. (U)

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

[redacted]

After separate trials, [redacted]

[redacted]

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b7C

STATISTICS AS OF 6/1/77

Country	Officials*
USSR	996
Albania	5
Bulgaria	47
Czechoslovakia	94
East Germany	65
Hungary	67
(S) Mongolia	8
People's Republic of China	141
Poland	216
Romania	88
Yugoslavia	226
TOTAL	1953

(S)

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*This is a generic designation used for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. These figures do not include working wives.

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt
1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson
1 - Mr. J. W. Redfield
1 - [redacted]

DATE: 8/2/77

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Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

TO: Mr. T. W. Leavitt

FROM: [redacted]

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES (FINAL)

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DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)
DATE 03-22-2011

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PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached issue of FINAL, (S) subtitled "Overview of [redacted] Operations in the United States," for dissemination only within the FBI, and attached cover letter to 18 field offices transmitting same.

DETAILS:

(S) FINAL provides to recipients an overview of [redacted] No lateral dissemination of such material is made in the field. With this issue dissemination is being extended to Baltimore, Boston, Detroit, Miami, and Philadelphia Offices.

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved, this issue and the cover letter will be dated, printed, and disseminated only to the Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, Miami, Philadelphia, New Haven, Newark, New York, Pittsburgh, Portland, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington Field Offices and to appropriate Headquarters personnel.

Enclosures - 2

65-74480

AGP:ded (8)

APPROVED: [redacted]

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Dep. AD Inv.	Ident.	Spec. Inv.
	Intell.	Tech. Servs.
	Laboratory	Training
		Public Affs. Off.

REC-56 EX-135 65-74480

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

17 DEC 16 1977

7 DEC 20 1977

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI/DOJ

~~SECRET~~

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DATE 03-08-2011 BY 60322/UC/LRP/PLJ/ETG

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt
1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
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Spec. Inv. ____
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Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. T. W. Leavitt

DATE: 10/26/77

FROM : [redacted] RTG RMX

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES (FINAL)

[redacted]

[redacted]

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached issue of FINAL for dissemination as noted on the attached list.

DETAILS:

FINAL offers the United States Intelligence Community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations within the purview of the FBI. This issue was prepared from material set forth in the previously approved July, 1977, FINAL which was disseminated solely within the FBI. The material was edited to eliminate sensitive information which should not be disseminated outside the FBI and has been previewed by representatives of Sections CI-1 and CI-2.

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved, this issue will be numbered, dated, printed and disseminated.

Enclosures - 2

65-74480

AGP:dedded
(6)

APPROVED:

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Dep. AD Inv.	Ident.	Spec. Inv.
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JPT

3 ENCLOSURE
ENCL BEHIND FILE

EX-135
REC-56

5-ACP
65-74480-30

17 DEC 16 1977

79 DEC 20 1977

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI/DOJ

GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)
DATE 03-09-2011

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74480) DATE: 9/30/77

(ATTN: [redacted] Section Chief, CI-3)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (105-33496)

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES (FINAL)

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b1
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Re Bulet dated 8/11/77.

Referenced letter solicited the comments and suggestions of the field concerning current proposals for the FBI's Foreign Intelligence Analysis. Chicago feels there is a tremendous need for the timely publication of FINAL in a form which will materially assist us in fulfilling our foreign counterintelligence responsibilities. To this end, FINAL should be both timely, consistent and draw on both the perspective of FBIHQ and the experience
(U) of the field. (S)

Since FBIHQ made the decision to stop lateral dissemination of SPIA and SATPIA, there has been a serious lapse of communication among those of us with counterintelligence responsibilities. When the field stopped exchanging information, headquarters said FINAL would try to keep us abreast of important trends and
(S) developments in [redacted] operations. FINAL has largely failed to do this, in part, because of its infrequency of publication, unnecessary brevity, FBIHQ's failure to obtain contributions from the field and to some extent the use of the need-to-know principal. The crux or heart of the whole matter is
(U) getting sorely needed information to the case agents in the field where the Bureau's work is being done. (S)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

65-74480-29

EX-108 REC-29 23 OCT 18 1977

~~SECRET~~
Classified by 7107
Exempt from GDS Category 2&3
Date of Declassification
Indefinite

3 - Bureau
1 - 65-63483 (SATPIA)
2 - Chicago
1 - 65-42268 (SATPIA)
EBC/mmg
(5)

1 cc removed & maintained

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-110

~~SECRET~~

Our specific comments concerning FINAL
(U) are these: (S)

_/ FCI analysis and the reporting of trends and targets should be separated from strictly training
(U) material. (S)

We have reviewed copies of FINAL which are available to this office. The July, 1977 copy is the only one we find which has been liberally filled with training material. This, in our opinion, has no place in a document devoted to analysis of past and current situations and the reporting of trends and
(S) targets of [redacted] It can, of course, be cleverly incorporated into a lengthy
(U) analytical piece to add substance and depth. (S) b1

_/ The Bureau at this point in time, should seriously review its requirements for SATPIA and SPIA and decide whether they are useful documents in their present form. Bureau letter of April 12, 1972, pointed out that the success of FINAL was dependent upon the field's submission of appropriate material through SPIA and SATPIA. This was simply another way of saying these monthly summaries of
(S) [redacted] activities would be the core
(U) or basis for the preparation of FINAL. (S)

FBIHQ must recognize that SATPIA and SPIA do not now accurately reflect the scope of our knowledge
(S) of [redacted] activities directed at the United States and our efforts to thwart these operations. Information from the field is purposely withheld from these documents - sometimes at the direction of

~~SECRET~~

of headquarters under the guise of "security" or "need to know." The cumulative effect of these practices - and not all of them can be criticized in highly sensitive cases - is that SATPIA and SPIA do not accurately reflect what has transpired in a particular field or operation and are therefore, less than meaningful documents. The editors of FINAL, and ultimately the field, in this process, (U) are often denied significant information. (S)

But this is really a question which must be addressed by the Bureau and which will directly affect not only the content but the credibility of FINAL in the field. If we continue to report only selected material in SATPIA (which is the only document Chicago can write of with any real knowledge), we are not fulfilling its purpose and at the same time we are cheating FINAL. Realistically then, it should be discontinued except, perhaps, for our monthly statistics but these, of course, are available through COBICS. On the other hand, if headquarters feels there is a real need for SATPIA - and SPIA - then firm reporting guidelines should be given to the field, or perhaps reiterated for the field, so that headquarters and ultimately the field through FINAL will receive periodic documents reflecting the entire scope of hostile intelligence operations in the United (U) States. (S)

_/ Chicago feels the basic format of FINAL is adequate, although the document has great possibilities for expansion. There is, perhaps, too much brevity in FINAL when there are opportunities to explore various topics in more depth. The impression one gets when reading FINAL is that what we have are a collection of synopses similar to what one finds on the front page of an FBI report (FD-204). We are never told how these

things are interrelated if, indeed they are, and how current trends are related to past operations or what we might expect in the future. This includes, but
(S) is not necessarily limited to, [redacted]
requirements and targets, utilization of tradecraft
(U) and new innovations by the various services. (X)

An excellent example of these so called new innovations appeared in Chicago's SATPIA letter dated April 7, 1977, concerning [redacted] Subject of separate paper
(S) [redacted] This development received only three paragraphs in the July, 1977, edition of FINAL but lends itself to a great deal more
(U) discussion. (X)

b1

Other field offices handling both the Soviets and satellites could benefit from Chicago's experience in this matter. [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

Referral/Consult

(S) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-08-2011 BY 60322/UC/LRP/PLJ/ETG

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt
1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. R. P. Finzel
1 - [redacted]

b6
b7C

January 10, 1977

[redacted]

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear [redacted]

Reference is made to your letter dated December 15, 1976, requesting the publication entitled "FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis United States" (FINAL).

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) recognizes the importance of your security programs to protect national security information and prevent the theft or diversion of nuclear materials or the sabotage of nuclear facilities. The FBI will fully cooperate with you in your efforts to discharge these responsibilities. Your interest in receiving FINAL is appreciated and I will see to it that future issues are disseminated to your Commission.

2 copies

MAILED 6
JAN 10 1977
FBI

Sincerely yours,

C. M. Kelley
Clarence M. Kelley
Director

65-74480 (FINAL)

RPW:dedded

(7)

X-105

65-74480

REC-14

Re Telephone conversation 1/11/77 with [redacted] NRC. We will furnish NRC 2 copies of FINAL

SEE NOTE, PAGE 2

23 JAN 13 1977

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1976 O - 207-526

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NOTE:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has requested future issues of our publication "FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis" (FINAL). The purpose of this publication is to offer the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI. In view of this Commission's responsibilities we are advising that future issues of FINAL will be disseminated to them.

On 1/7/77, [redacted] Office of Legal Council, advised the Attorney General's guidelines for FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations were not intended to prohibit this type of dissemination, and stated it would be consistent with the guidelines to furnish FINAL to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

b6
b7C

APPROVED:	Adm. Serv.	Legal Coun.
	Ext. Affairs	Plan. & Insp.
Director	Fin. & Pers.	Rec. Mgt.
Associ. Dir.	Gen. Inv.	S. & T. Serv.
Dep. AD Adm.	Ident.	Spec. Inv.
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DATE 03-08-2011 BY 60322/UC/LRP/PLJ/ETG

~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

DEC 15 1976

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
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Ext. Affairs ____
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Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

The Honorable Clarence M. Kelley, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20535 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Dear Mr. Kelley:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which was created on January 19, 1975, pursuant to the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, has specific responsibilities and authorities in the nuclear field and has a security program to protect national security information and a safeguards program to prevent the theft or diversion of nuclear materials or the sabotage of nuclear facilities.

b6
b7C

To discharge the aforementioned responsibilities and authorities, we need intelligence information regarding foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States. Consequently, we would like to receive the publication entitled "FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis United States."

EXP. PROC. 34 DEC 16 1976

The Commission will protect this information in accordance with existing Executive Orders (e.g., E.O.'s 11652 and 11905); directives (e.g. Director of Central Intelligence Directives); and statutes (e.g. the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which remain in effect in accordance with the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974) and will insure that it is disseminated only to direct NRC employees with a need-to-know such information.

Your favorable consideration of this request would be appreciated.

If your staff has any questions regarding this matter, please contact the undersigned or [redacted]

[redacted]

EX-105 REC-14 65-74480-27

DE-43 M-17

Sincerely,

[redacted]

65-74480

57 JAN 3 7 1977

Division number requested to follow per telephone request 12-13-76

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DATE 03-08-2011 BY 60322/UC/LRP/PLJ/ETG

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt
1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson
1 - [redacted]
DATE: 8/17/76
1 - Mr. J. W. Redfield
1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - [redacted]

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Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

b6
b7C

TO : Mr. T. W. Leavitt

FROM : A. B. Fulton

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES (FINAL)

This recommends approval of Volume III, number 2, issue of the FINAL publication for dissemination to the White House, members of United States Intelligence Board and all field offices.

The purpose of FINAL is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI.

This issue was prepared from material set forth in the previously approved July, 1976, FINAL which was disseminated solely within the FBI. The material was edited to eliminate sensitive information which should not be disseminated outside the FBI.

EX-109 REC 32 65-74480-26

Attached also is a dissemination sheet for outside agencies. Copies designated to these agencies will be numbered and recorded for strict accountability.

MAILED 15
AUG 31 1976

22 SEP 1976

ACTION:

If approved this issue will be dated, printed and disseminated to agencies on dissemination sheet as well as all field offices and to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors.

Enclosures

65-74480

RPW:dedded

[redacted]

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

dissemination to HQ officials (8-31-76)
2 - 22 to FO, SF, CG
1 - all other field offices

3- ENCLOSURE

APPROVED:

Assoc. Dir.	Ext. Affairs	Laboratory
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34 SEP 9 1976

5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI/DOJ

DISSEMINATION LIST

Copies

1 The White House

Honorable ~~Brent Scowcroft~~, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs b6 b7C

2 Department of Justice

The Attorney General

3 Department of State

The Honorable, The Secretary of State

4 Department of Defense

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

5, 5a, 5b Department of the Army

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

6 Department of the Air Force

Office of Special Investigation

7 Department of the Navy

Director, Naval Investigative Service

8 Department of the Treasury

The Honorable, The Secretary of the Treasury

Other Intelligence Agencies and Interested Government Agencies

D

9 Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Attention: Deputy Director For Operations

10 Director, Division of Safeguards and Security, Energy Research and Development Administration

11 Director, National Security Agency Attn: Director of Security

12 Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

3/23/77 13 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Not on requisition dissemination list) ENCLOSURE

[redacted] RDW

62-74480-26

~~SECRET~~

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AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)
DATE 03-16-2011

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~~Classified by Director, FBI~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 & 3~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
RECEIVED

65-74480-26

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1976 [illegible]

~~SECRET~~

(C) The purpose of this publication is to offer the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI. Emphasis is placed on [redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination is made. (U)

b1

TARGETS

(C) [redacted] continue their efforts to obtain both classified and unclassified material. The following
(U) paragraphs describe a representative number of these targets. (C)

b1

(S) [redacted]

TECHNIQUES

(U) A STUDENT AT Vilnius State University in Lithuania married a US citizen of Lithuanian extraction who was attending the University for graduate study. Subsequent to the marriage the student, who had been warned not to marry the American girl, was dropped from the rolls of the University and his wife returned to the US not knowing whether or not her husband would be allowed to emigrate. (C)

(C)


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TRENDS

(S)


(C)



b1

STATUS OF OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS

(C)



b1

During the first four months of 1976 there were four instances where violence was directed toward Soviet facilities located in NYC. On February 27, 1976, shots were fired into the Soviet residential complex; on March 8, 1976, a bomb exploded outside the Aeroflot Office; on March 26, 1976, there was an attempted bombing of the Amtorg Corporation and on April 3, 1976, a shot was fired at the SMUN which pierced a ninth floor window. The "New York Post" carried an article which reported that the Jewish Armed Resistance, an offshoot of the Jewish Defense League, claimed responsibility for the attack on April 3, 1976. (U)

[redacted] (NY SPIA 4/12/76, pages 12 & 13)

ON APRIL 4, 1976, THE Soviet Consulate in San Francisco received an anonymous telephone call claiming a bomb would explode in the Soviet Consulate within 30 minutes. The San Francisco Police Department responded and no bomb was found. (U)

ON MARCH 14, 1976, THE Soviet Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the SMUN Yakov A. Malik, was seriously injured in a car accident at Glen Cove, New York. A woman in the other car involved was killed. Malik [redacted] were taken to Community Hospital in Glen Cove. Local police said Malik's driver was not at fault in the accident. (U)

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b7C

(S) [redacted]

b1

~~SECRET~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

STATISTICS AS OF 7/1/76

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS*	DEPENDENTS	TOTAL
USSR	1165	965	2130
Albania	7	9	16
Bulgaria	51	87	138
Czechoslovakia	108	108	216
East Germany	87	68	155
Hungary	67	79	146
Mongolia	9	18	27
Poland	248	303	551
PRC	168	9	177
Romania	101	122	223
Yugoslavia	203	288	491
TOTAL	2214	2056	4270

(U)

*This is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. The definition refers to all foreign nationals assigned to country establishments in the United States, including embassies, consulates, United Nations missions, United Nations Secretariat employees, employees of ancillary organizations such as Amtorg, Intourist, Aeroflot, commercial offices, press representatives, and working wives.

~~SECRET~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

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	Intell.	Training

ENCLOSURE 65-74480 26

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt
1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson
1 - [redacted]

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
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Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. T. W. Leavitt

DATE: 8/3/76

1 - Mr. J. W. Redfield
1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - [redacted]

FROM : A. B. Fulton

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES (FINAL)

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)
DATE 03-23-2011

b1
b6
b7C

This recommends approval of attached issue of FINAL publication bearing the subtitle "Overview of [redacted] (S) Operations in the United States." This issue will be disseminated only within the FBI.

The purpose of this issue is to provide the field (only 13 offices included), through a summary of situations and events with an overview of [redacted] (S) [redacted] This is being done to keep the pertinent field offices aware of recent situations in sections of the country other than their own as there is currently no lateral dissemination by the field offices preparing summaries which involve Soviet Personnel Intelligence Activities (SPIA), Satellite Personnel Intelligence Activities (SATPIA), People's Republic of China Intelligence Activities (PRCIA), and Yugoslav Personnel Intelligence Activities (YUPIA). The identities of sensitive sources have been concealed and information from them has been suitably paraphrased.

MAILED EX-108
FIELD OFFICES AS INDICATED
AUG 11 1976

REC-13 65-74480-25
5 SEP 1976

ACTION:

If approved, this issue will be dated, printed, and disseminated to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors and to the following offices: Chicago, Cleveland, Los Angeles, New Haven, Newark, New York, Pittsburgh, Portland, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle and WFO.

Enclosure
65-74480

RPW:ded
(7)

APPROVED:	Ext. Affairs	Laboratory
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Adm. Serv.	Intell.	Training

~~TOP SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

ENCLOSURE

RM4426 [redacted]

54 SEP 15 1976

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI/DOJ

5010-108

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)
DATE 03-16-2011

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b1

(S) (Overview of [redacted] Operations in the United States)

THIS DOCUMENT IS SOLELY FOR USE WITHIN THE FBI

~~Classified by 4375~~
Exempt from ~~GDS, Categories~~ 2 & 3
~~Date of Declassification~~ Indefinite

downgraded to ~~Secret~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~
per 60324 uc bmw
sab/134

65-74480-25

ENCLOSURE

~~JULY~~, 1976

~~TOP SECRET~~

downgraded to ~~Secret~~
per 60324 uc baw
sab/lsg

The purpose of this publication is to afford, through a summary of situations and events, an overview of [redacted] b1

(C) [redacted] It is intended solely for the internal use of the FBI. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed

(U) dissemination has been made. (X)


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~~TOP SECRET~~

downgraded to ~~Secret~~
per EO 13526 ~~USC~~ DMV
sab/lsg

TARGETS

(S)



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~~TOP SECRET~~

TECHNIQUES AND OPERATIONS


(U) A STUDENT AT Vilnius State University in Lithuania married a US citizen of Lithuanian extraction who was attending the University for graduate study. Subsequent to the marriage the student, who had been warned not to marry the American girl, was dropped from the rolls of the University and his wife returned to the US not knowing whether or not her husband would be allowed to emigrate. (S)

(C) (S)

[redacted]

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TRENDS



(S)


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~~TOP SECRET~~



(C)

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THE POLISH SEJM (parliament) recently passed two amendments to the Polish constitution. One declaring the Communist Party as the leading party and force in Poland and the second declaring the Polish alliance with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries forms the foundation of Polish foreign policy. (U)

These amendments may represent the price Poland had to pay to maintain its special relationship with the West particularly the US. Those holding this view believe Leonid Brezhnev needed the amendments to show his adversaries on the USSR Politburo that despite Poland's dealings with the West she could still be trusted and is faithful to communism. (U)

(WFO SATPIA 4/5/76, page 46)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

STATUS OF OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS

(S)

(C)

b1

During the first four months of 1976 there were four instances where violence was directed toward Soviet facilities located in NYC. On February 27, 1976, shots were fired into the Soviet residential complex; on March 8, 1976, a bomb exploded outside the Aeroflot Office; on March 26, 1976, there was an attempted bombing of the Amtorg Corporation and on April 3, 1976, a shot was fired at the SMUN which pierced a ninth floor window. (U)

The "New York Post" carried an article which reported that the Jewish Armed Resistance, an offshoot of the Jewish Defense League, claimed responsibility for the attack on April 3, 1976. Information has been developed which indicates the Jewish Armed Resistance may be responsible for the SMUN shooting, the attempted bombing of Amtorg and the bombing of Aeroflot. (U)

(NY SPIA 4/12/76, pages 12 & 13)

~~TOP SECRET~~

ON MARCH 14, 1976, THE Soviet Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the SMUN Yakov A. Malik, was seriously injured in a car accident at Glen Cove, New York. A woman in the other car involved was killed. Malik [redacted] were taken to Community Hospital in Glen Cove. Local police said Mlik's driver was not at fault in the accident. (U)

(NY SPIA 4/12/76, page 13)

ON APRIL 4, 1976, THE Soviet Consulate in San Francisco received an anonymous telephone call claiming a bomb would explode in the Soviet Consulate within 30 minutes. The San Francisco Police Department responded and no bomb was found. (U)

(SF SPIA 5/12/76)

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~~TOP SECRET~~

STATISTICS AS OF 7/1/70

Country	Officials*
USSR	865
Albania	7
Bulgaria	50
Czechoslovakia	101
East Germany	66
Hungary	67
Mongolia	8
People's Republic of China	145
Poland	222
Romania	98
Yugoslavia	200
TOTAL	1919

(S)

(S)

b1

*This is a generic designation used for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. These figures do not include working wives.

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : F. J. Cassidy

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES (FINAL)

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan

DATE: 2/20/76

1 - Mr. J. W. Redfield
1 - [redacted]
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - [redacted]

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Dep. AD Adm. ____
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Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
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Director Sec'y ____

b6
b7C

This recommends approval of Volume III, number 1, issue of FINAL publication for dissemination to the White House, members of the United States Intelligence Board, and all field offices.

The purpose of FINAL is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI.

Attached also is a dissemination sheet for outside agencies. Copies designated to these agencies will be numbered and recorded for strict accountability.

ACTION:

If approved, this issue will be dated, printed, and disseminated to agencies listed on dissemination sheet as well as all field offices and to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors.

2 - NY, WFO, SF, CG
1 - all others
2 - CC Mr. [illegible] 3-25-76

Enclosures
65-774480

EX-104 REC-3 65-774480

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

DKP:lfj
(8)

2 ENCLOSURES

5 JUL 9 1976

MAILED 15
FEB 27 1976
FBI

54 JUL 20 1976

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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ANALYSIS
UNITED STATES

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MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Classified by Director, FBI
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

DATE:
VOLUME: III
NUMBER: I
COPY NUMBER:

~~SECRET~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

65-74480-24


GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

b1

The purpose of this publication is to offer the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI. Emphasis is placed on (S) [redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination is made.

TRENDS


(S)



b1

TECHNIQUES


(S)



b1

TARGETS

(S)



b1

FEATURES

(S) [redacted] b1

NEGOTIATIONS BY THE Bulgarians for purchase of Rosedale Campus of St. Alban's School located on Newark Street, Washington, D. C., are apparently progressing smoothly. The property consists of three three-story dormitories/general purpose buildings and seven acres of land. The Bulgarians currently have an option for the purchase of the property for approximately $3 million.

(S) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

THE LINE UP - 1/1/76

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS*	DEPENDENTS	TOTAL
USSR	1208	1116	2324
Albania	7	8	15
Bulgaria	60	84	144
Czechoslovakia	106	101	207
East Germany	87	60	147
Hungary	68	96	164
Mongolia	16	19	35
Poland	226	278	504
PRC	201	9	210
Romania	94	125	219
Yugoslavia	189	250	439
TOTAL	2262	2146	4408

*This is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. The definition refers to all foreign nationals assigned to country establishments in the United States, including embassies, consulates, United Nations missions, United Nations Secretariat employees, employees of ancillary organizations such as Amtorg, Intourist, Aeroflot, commercial offices, press representatives, and working wives.

~~SECRET~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

ENCLOSURE 65-14990-24

DISSEMINATION LIST

The White House

Honorable Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Department of Justice

The Attorney General

Department of State

The Honorable, The Secretary of State

Department of Defense

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Department of the Army

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

Department of the Air Force

Office of Special Investigation

Department of the Navy

Director, Naval Investigative Service

Department of the Treasury

The Honorable, The Secretary of the Treasury

Other Intelligence Agencies and Interested Government Agencies

Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Attention: Deputy Director for Operations
Director, Division of Safeguards and Security, Energy Research and Development Administration
Director, National Security Agency
Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

~~SECRET~~

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - [redacted]

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Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 2/11/76

FROM : F. J. Cassidy

1 - Mr. J. W. Redfield
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - [redacted]

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES (FINAL)

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)
DATE 03-23-2011

b6
b7C

This recommends approval of attached issue of FINAL
(S) publication bearing the subtitle "Overview of [redacted] Operations in the United States." This issue will be disseminated only within the FBI.

EX-104 REC-66 65-74480-23

b1

The purpose of this issue is to provide the field (only 13 offices included), through a summary of situations and events, with
(S) an overview of [redacted] This is being done to keep the pertinent field offices aware of recent situations in sections of the country other than their own as there is currently no lateral dissemination by the field offices preparing summaries which involve Soviet Personnel Intelligence Activities (SPIA), Satellite Personnel Intelligence Activities (SATPIA), People's Republic of China Intelligence Activities (PRCIA), and Yugoslav Personnel Intelligence Activities (YUPIA). The identities of sensitive sources have been concealed and information from them has been suitably paraphrased.

FEB 25 1976

ACTION:

If approved, this issue will be dated, printed, and disseminated to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors and to the following offices: Chicago, Cleveland, Los Angeles, New Haven, Newark, New York, Pittsburgh, Portland, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle and WFO.

ENCLOSURE

Enclosure
65-74480

~~TOP SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

DKP:lfj
(7)

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

[redacted]

84 MAR 2 1976

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

downgraded to ~~Secret~~ per 60324 uc baw sab/lsg

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FBI
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ANALYSIS
UNITED STATES

(S) (Overview of [redacted] Operations in the United States) b1

THIS DOCUMENT IS SOLELY FOR USE WITHIN THE FBI

~~Classified by 5736~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3~~
~~Date of Declassification~~ Indefinite

65-74480-23

~~TOP SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

FEBRUARY, 1976

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MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

downgraded to ~~Secret~~
per 6032 4(c) b4w1sab1sa

~~TOP SECRET~~

b1

The purpose of this publication is to afford, through a summary of situations and events, an overview of

(S) [redacted] It is intended solely for the internal use of the FBI. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination has been made.

~~TOP SECRET~~


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downgraded to ~~Secret~~
per 60324 uc, bnw
sab 11 by

TARGETS

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
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~~TOP SECRET~~

TECHNIQUES AND OPERATIONS


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TRENDS


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STATUS OF OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS

(S)



b1

STATISTICS AS OF 1/1/76

Country	Officials*
USSR	1025
Albania	7
Bulgaria	58
Czechoslovakia	97
East Germany	68
Hungary	68
Mongolia	15
Poland	201
PRC	175
Romania	88
Yugoslavia	185
TOTAL	1987

(S)

b1

*This is a generic designation used for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. These figures do not include working wives.

~~TOP SECRET~~ downgraded to ~~Secret~~ per 60324 uc bam 5ab/139

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ANALYSIS
UNITED STATES

(S) (Overview of [redacted] Operations in the United States) b1

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NOV 19 1975
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~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

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NOVEMBER, 1975

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

65-74580-22

GPO : 1975 O - 569

ENCLOSURE


~~SECRET~~

(S) The purpose of this publication is to afford, through a summary of situations and events, an overview of [redacted] It is intended solely for the internal use of the FBI. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination has been made.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

TARGETS




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~~TOP SECRET~~

TECHNIQUES AND OPERATIONS


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TRENDS


(S)



b1

As a matter of interest, the starting salary for a teacher with a Master's degree in the NYC school system is $11,550 annually. NY SDIA, 10/9/75, p. 18

(S)



~~TOP SECRET~~

(S) [redacted] b1

THE PRESENT ECONOMIC situation in Romania, according to recent reports, is worse than ever before. The people, including members of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP), are disillusioned, with the general populace being openly critical and those in the RCP making their displeasure known to proven friends. There are extreme shortages of skilled labor and materials. Huge foreign purchases of industrial machinery have created immense obligations, especially to West Germany. The people feel that the forced industrialization policy which led the country to compete with efficient, established industrial countries was poorly conceived; and the excuse that future generations will enjoy a better life no longer offers satisfaction to the average Romanian living now under miserable conditions.

NY LHM 10/7/75 captioned, "Foreign Miscellaneous - Romania; IS - RO"

~~TOP SECRET~~

STATUS OF OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS

CONTRACTS HAVE BEEN executed allowing the Soviets to take possession on August 1, 1975, of the property at 9 East 91st Street, NYC, which will house the Soviet Consulate General. Several families are now living on the premises, and NYC Police Department officers are stationed outside.

NY SPIA, 8/11/75, p. 24
NY SPIA, 9/12/75, p. 32

THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT is desirous of establishing both a tourist office and an import-export company in the US and is continuing its efforts in this regard.

NY SATPIA, 10/7/75, p. 3

STATISTICS AS OF 10/1/75

Country	Officials*
USSR	1039
Albania	8
Bulgaria	49
Czechoslovakia	95
East Germany	80
(S) Hungary	69
Mongolia	14
People's Republic of China	182
Poland	212
Romania	76
Yugoslavia	181
TOTAL	2005

b1

*This is a generic designation used for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. These figures do not include working wives.

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : F. J. Cassidy

~~1 - Mr. J. B. Adams~~
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. V. V. Kolombatovic

DATE: 10/28/75

1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - [redacted]

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b6
b7C

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS -
UNITED STATES (FINAL)

On 10/22/75 [redacted] Security Office, Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), telephonically contacted Acting Section Chief Fred J. Cassidy to request additional copies of captioned publication for distribution to ERDA's 25 field offices throughout the United States.

On 10/24/75 Supervisor [redacted] advised Mr. [redacted] that, because of the classification and the sensitive sources and methods involved, dissemination of FINAL is extremely limited and strict accountability maintained. Mr. [redacted] was told that, although we are unable to comply with his request for additional copies, we have no objection to his officials who have proper clearance and a need to know having access to information contained in FINAL.

Mr. [redacted] was thanked for his interest in and comments concerning FINAL.

ACTION:

None. For information.

EX-115

REC-65 65-74480-21

65-74480

SJM:lfj (5)

12 OCT 30 1975

File

5 NOV 10 1975

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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1 - Mr. J. W. Redfield

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Spec. Inv. ____
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Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 9/30/75

FROM : F. J. Cassidy

1 [redacted]
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 [redacted]

b6
b7C

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES (FINAL)

Recommends approval of Volume II, number 4, issue of FINAL publication for dissemination to The White House, members of United States Intelligence Board and all field offices.

The purpose of FINAL is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI.

Attached also is a dissemination sheet for outside agencies. Copies designated to these agencies will be numbered and recorded for strict accountability.

ACTION:

If approved this issue will be dated, printed, and disseminated to agencies on dissemination sheet as well as all field offices and to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors.

2-NY, SF, WFO, CG
1 - all other offices

See attached yellow

REC-21 65-74480

sent separately SJM:lfj 10/9/75

ENCLOSURE

/ST-111

Enclosures 3
65-74480

SJM:lfj
(8)

5 OCT 14 1975

[redacted]

MAILED 15
OCT 10 1975
FBI

84 OCT 15 1975

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UNITED STATES

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65-74480-20

~~SECRET~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

ENCLOSURE

DATE: 10/9/75
VOLUME: II
NUMBER: 4
COPY NUMBER:

GPO 954-546

~~SECRET~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

TRENDS

b1

(S)

[redacted]

A SOVIET NATIONAL has offered a surprisingly candid appraisal of problems in the USSR. He says that crime, especially rape, is on the increase and, in Leningrad, women are afraid to go out alone after dark. Large numbers of Soviets are cramped together in severely inadequate housing; transportation is critically short; and, although education is excellent, one needs connections to get his children into the proper schools. WFO SPIA 6/13/75, p. 7

(S)

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

ENCLOSURE
65-74480 20

b1

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[redacted]


IN APRIL, 1975, the Director of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation said that if Congress approved the Most Favored Nation (MFN) status for Romania, trade with the US would go to one billion dollars a year by 1980. As President Ford during August signed the MFN Pact with Romania, there should be a dramatic increase in 1975-1976 in contacts between US businessmen and Romanian officials. NY SATPIA 8/7/75, p. 14

(S)

[redacted]

TECHNIQUES

(S)




b1

TARGETS

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(S)



FEATURES

OCCUPANCY OF THE Soviet residential complex of Riverdale, New York, began earlier this year. Located in Bronx, New York, about 15 miles north of midtown Manhattan, the complex will eventually provide housing for 236 Soviet nationals and their families. NY SPIA 6/11/75, p. 25

THE SOVIETS HAVE requested another 26,000 to 29,000 square feet of floor space on the same floor as that now occupied by the Soviet Information Center, North Tower, World Trade Center, New York, New York. They probably will use the space for additional offices and a display area. NY SPIA 5/12/75, p. 28

CONTRACTS WERE RECENTLY executed to allow the Soviets to take possession of the property at 9 East 91st Street, New York, New York, which will house the Soviet Consulate General. NY SPIA 8/11/75

~~SECRET~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

THE LINE UP - 9/1/75

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS*	WORKING WIVES	DEPENDENTS	TOTAL
USSR	937	187	959	2083
Albania	4	4	10	18
Bulgaria	47	2	74	123
Czechoslovakia	88	8	106	202
East Germany	49	8	50	107
Hungary	64	0	66	130
Mongolia	8	1	22	31
Poland	200	22	248	470
PRC	160	26	9	195
Romania	75	6	114	195
Yugoslavia	180	5	235	420
TOTAL	1812	269	1893	3974

*This is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. The definition refers to all foreign nationals assigned to country establishments in the United States, including embassies, consulates, United Nations missions, United Nations Secretariat employees, and employees of ancillary organizations, such as Amtorg, Intourist, Aeroflot, commercial offices, and press representatives.

~~SECRET~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

~~SECRET~~

DISSEMINATION LIST

The White House

1, Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State

Department of Justice

The Attorney General

Department of State

3 The Honorable, The Secretary of State

Department of Defense

4 Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Department of the Army

5, 5a, 5b Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

Department of the Air Force

6 Office of Special Investigation

Department of the Navy

7 Director, Naval Investigative Service

Department of the Treasury

8 The Honorable, The Secretary of the Treasury

Other Intelligence Agencies and Interested Government Agencies

9 Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Attention: Deputy Director for Operations
10 Director, Division of Safeguards and Security, Energy Research and Development Administration
11 Director, National Security Agency
12 Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

15 DIRECTOR, FBI

~~SECRET~~

downgraded to ~~SECRET~~
per 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc

~~TOP SECRET~~

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FBI
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ANALYSIS
UNITED STATES

b1

(S) (Overview of [redacted] Operations in the United States)

THIS DOCUMENT IS SOLELY FOR USE WITHIN THE FBI

~~Classified by 4375~~
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~~Date of Declassification~~ Indefinite

WRW/jm

~~TOP SECRET~~

AUGUST, 1975

65-74480-19

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Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546


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per 6 USC 24 UC ban
sab 1/3 4

TARGETS


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
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


(S)

TECHNIQUES AND OPERATIONS



(S)



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THE USSR IS having its problems, according to a Soviet national, currently assigned in Canada, who offered a surprisingly candid description. He said that crime, especially rape, is on the increase and that women cannot go out alone after dark in Leningrad. Large numbers of Soviets are cramped together in severely inadequate housing, and transportation is critically short. Also, although education is excellent, one needs connections to get his children into the proper schools. WFO SPIA 6/13/75, p. 7

STATUS OF OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS

A REQUEST HAS been made by the Soviets for another 26,000 to 29,000 square feet of floor space on the same floor as that now occupied by the Soviet Information Center, Suite 86123, North Tower, World Trade Center, NYC. The Soviets are prepared to sign a lease as soon as this space can be made available and will probably use the space for additional offices and a display area.

NY SPIA 5/12/75, p. 28

THE SOVIET TRADE Office (SOVTRA) at 2001 Connecticut Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D. C., is being remodeled and readied for business.

(S)

b1

A RECEPTION WAS held recently by the Soviet Consulate, San Francisco, California, honoring World War II Victory in Europe Day. The affair was held at the Palace of the Legion of Honor and was attended by several hundred business and civic leaders as well as individuals friendly to Soviet Consulate personnel.

SF SPIA 6/16/75, p. 3

OCCUPANCY OF THE Soviet Residential Complex at Riverdale, New York, by Soviet nationals began recently. This complex, located in Bronx, New York, about 15 miles north of midtown Manhattan, eventually will provide housing for 236 Soviet nationals and their families.

NY SPIA 6/11/75, p. 25

~~TOP SECRET~~

Statistics as of 7/1/75

Country	Officials*
USSR	917
Albania	6
Bulgaria	50
Czechoslovakia	85
East Germany	45
(S) Hungary	66
Mongolia	6
People's Republic of China	162
Poland	201
Romania	76
Yugoslavia	183
TOTAL	1,797

b1

*This is a generic designation used for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. These figures do not include working wives.

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : W. R. Wannall

FROM : A. B. Fulton

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES (FINAL)

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Putman

DATE: 5/20/75

1 - Mr. Redfield
1 - Mr. Fulton
1 - [redacted]

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
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Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

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b1
b6
b7C

(S) Recommends approval of attached issue of FINAL publication bearing the subtitle "Overview of [redacted] Operations in the United States." This issue will receive no dissemination outside the FBI.

(S) The purpose of this issue, which is for internal use only, is to provide the field (only 13 offices included), through a summary of situations and events, with an overview of [redacted] This is being done to keep the interested field offices aware of recent situations in sections of the country other than their own as there is currently no lateral dissemination by the field offices preparing summaries involving Soviet Personnel Intelligence Activities (SPIA), Satellite Personnel Intelligence Activities (SATPIA), People's Republic of China Intelligence Activities (PRCIA), and Yugoslav Personnel Intelligence Activities (YUPIA). The identities of sensitive sources are concealed and information from them has been suitably paraphrased.

ACTION:

84-101 REC-20 65-74480-18

If approved, this issue will be dated, printed, and disseminated only to the Chicago, Cleveland, Los Angeles, New Haven, Newark, New York, Pittsburgh, Portland, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington Field Offices and to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors.

b4 0-7 5/27/75 SJM:pld

WRW:tal

5/27/75 SJM:pld

16 MAY 28 1975

[redacted]

Enclosure
65-74480
SJM:pld
(7)

1 ENCLOSURE

343
84 JUN 3 1975

JRB/Rm

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~SECRET~~

downgraded to ~~Secret~~
per 6 03 24 uc baw/sab 7/15/

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FBI
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ANALYSIS
UNITED STATES

b1

(S) (Overview of [redacted] Operations in the United States)

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Exempt from ~~GDS, Category 2 & 3~~
Date of ~~Declassification~~ Indefinite

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Dep. AD Inv. ____
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Comp. Syst. ____
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Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

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MAY, 1975

ENCLOSURE 65-74480-18

GPO 954-546


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per 4 0 324 uc, baw
sab/lsg

TARGETS


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
ENCLOSURE 65-74480-18



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
TECHNIQUES AND OPERATIONS



(S)

TRENDS

(S)



b1

(S) [redacted]

STATUS OF OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS

THE SOVIETS RECENTLY renewed their extensive remodeling of the Soviet Consulate, San Francisco, California. In addition,

(S) [redacted]

b1

(S) [redacted]

THE POLISH FOREIGN Trade Corporation (PEKAO) has opened an office in Chicago.

(S) [redacted]

THE POLISH CONSULATE in Chicago, Illinois, has now completely switched its operations to its new space at 1530 North Lake Shore Drive. The old building is being made into apartments for some of the Consulate's personnel. CG SATPIA 4/4/75, p. 7

(S) [redacted]

THE ROMANIAN COMMERCIAL Office (ROCOMO), Chicago, Illinois, which, it was believed, was being closed because of Romania's unsuccessful attempt to obtain Most Favored Nation status now appears to continue in operation.

(S) [redacted] b1

Statistics as of 5/1/75

Country	Officials *
USSR	899
Albania	6
Bulgaria	49
Czechoslovakia	89
East Germany	41
(S) Hungary	61
Mongolia	6
People's Republic of China	154
Poland	192
Romania	76
Yugoslavia	179
TOTAL	1,752

b1

* This is a generic designation used for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. These figures do not include working wives.

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - J. B. Adams
1 - W. R. Wannall
1 - W. A. Branigan

TO : W. R. Wannall

DATE: 4/17/75

1 - W. O. Cregar
1 - F. S. Putman
1 - A. B. Fulton
1 - [redacted]

FROM : A. B. Fulton

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES (FINAL)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

b6
b7C

Recommends approval of Volume II, number 3, issue of FINAL publication for dissemination to The White House, members of United States Intelligence Board and all field offices.

The purpose of FINAL is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI.

Attached also is a dissemination sheet for outside agencies. Copies designated to these agencies will be numbered and recorded for strict accountability.

ACTION:

If approved, this issue will be dated, printed, and disseminated to agencies on dissemination sheet as well as all field offices and to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors. sent separately SJM:pld 4/28/75 are attached yellow.

2 - NY, WFO, SF, CG
1 - all other offices

TWL/FSP

REG-71

ST-117

JBA for

65-74480-16

3 Enclosures
65-74480
SJM:pld
(8)

MAILED 20
APR 28 1975
FBI

APR 30 1975

ENCLOSURE

84 MAY 7 1975

Filed in 65-74480

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ANALYSIS
UNITED STATES

Classified by 4375
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Date of Declassification Indefinite

DATE: 4/28/75
VOLUME: II
NUMBER: 3
COPY NUMBER:

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
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ENCLOSURE

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TRENDS

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
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NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

65-74480-16

ENCLOSURE

b1

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TECHNIQUES

(S)



(S)

[redacted]

TARGETS

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[redacted]

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(S)

[redacted]

FEATURES

(S)

[redacted]

RECENT INFORMATION SUGGESTS that the opening of a Czechoslovak Consulate in Chicago, Illinois, has been postponed indefinitely. WFO SATPIA 2/20/75, p. 19

THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT is anxious to start building its new chancery in Washington, D. C.; however, some problems are being encountered between the zoning office and Hungarian officials. WFO SATPIA 2/26/75, p. 36

~~SECRET~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

THE LINE UP - 3/1/75

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS*	WORKING WIVES	DEPENDENTS	TOTAL
USSR	898	185	1032	2115
Albania	6	0	15	21
Bulgaria	50	4	94	148
Czechoslovakia	86	9	125	220
East Germany	35	6	33	74
Hungary	60	0	101	161
Mongolia	7	1	15	23
Poland	198	21	291	510
PRC	168	25	6	199
Romania	74	7	124	205
Yugoslavia	180	7	249	436
TOTAL	1762	265	2085	4112

*This is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. The definition refers to all foreign nationals assigned to Country establishments in the United States, including embassies, consulates, United Nations missions, United Nations Secretariat employees, and employees of ancillary organizations, such as Amtorg, Intourist, Aeroflot, commercial offices, and press representatives.

~~SECRET~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

ENCLOSURE 65-74480-16

~~SECRET~~

DISSEMINATION LIST

The White House

1. Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State sent sep.

Department of Justice

2. The Attorney General sent sep.

Department of State

3. The Honorable, The Secretary of State

Department of Defense

4. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Department of the Army

5. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

Department of the Air Force

6. Office of Special Investigation

Department of the Navy

7. Director, Naval Investigative Service

Department of the Treasury

8. The Honorable, The Secretary of the Treasury

Other Intelligence Agencies and Interested Government Agencies

9. Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Attention: Deputy Director for Operations sent sep.
10. Director, Division of Safeguards and Security, Energy Research and Development Administration
11. Director, National Security Agency sent sep.
12. Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board sent sep.

15. Director, FBI - sent sep.

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : A. B. Fulton

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES (FINAL)

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall

DATE: 2/19/75

1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Putman
1 - Mr. Fulton
1 - [redacted]

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
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Ext. Affairs ___
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Laboratory ___
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Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

Recommends approval of attached issue of FINAL publication (S) bearing the subtitle "Overview of [redacted] Operations in the United States." This issue will receive no dissemination outside the FBI.

b1
b6
b7C

The purpose of this issue, which is for internal use only, is to provide the field (only 13 offices included), through a summary of situations and events, with an overview of (S) [redacted]

This is being done to keep the interested field offices aware of recent situations in sections of the country other than their own as there is currently no lateral dissemination by the field offices preparing summaries involving Soviet Personnel Intelligence Activities (SPIA), Satellite Personnel Intelligence Activities (SATPIA), People's Republic of China Intelligence Activities (PRCIA), and Yugoslav Personnel Intelligence Activities (YUPIA). The identities of sensitive sources are concealed and information from them has been suitably paraphrased.

ACTION:

If approved this issue will be dated, printed, and disseminated only to the Chicago, Cleveland, Los Angeles, New Haven, Newark, New York, Pittsburgh, Portland, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington Field Offices and to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors.

Enclosure

65-74480

SJM:aso (8)

1 - ENCLOSURE

REC-75 65-74480-15

MAR 12 1975

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

1 each to Wannall, Branigan, Cregar, Putman, Fulton 2-28-75 SJM:pd

84 MAR 19 1975

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per 60324 uc baw
sab/sg

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FBI
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ANALYSIS
UNITED STATES

(S) (Overview o [redacted] Operations in the United States) b1

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DATE:

ENCLOSURE 65-74480-15

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Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

downgraded ~~to Secret~~
per 60324 UC bAW
sab/lsg

~~TOP SECRET~~

The purpose of this publication is to afford, through a summary of situations and events, an overview o[redacted] b1


(S) [redacted] It is intended solely for the internal use of the FBI. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination has been made.

~~TOP SECRET~~

downgraded ~~to Secret~~
per 60324 UC baw
sab/lsa

~~TOP SECRET~~

TARGETS



(S)

b1

~~TOP SECRET~~


b6
b7C

(S)

MAXWELL SMART OF television fame would have trouble topping a recent performance by an individual who walked into the offices of a large firm in NYC

(S)

TECHNIQUES AND OPERATIONS



b1


(S)

A SOVIET STUDENT, while at the University of Michigan in 1972-73, established a rapport with an American and has been in correspondence with him ever since. Initially, after his return to the USSR, the Soviet's letters concerned innocuous, personal matters.

He then requested various books of the public source variety. Finally, after the American suggested delivering the books to a Soviet establishment for forwarding in order to save on postal costs, the Soviet told him not to send any more books but added that a "neighbor" was planning travel to the US soon and would look him up upon his arrival.


SF SPIA 11/8/74, 4-5

(S)




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TRENDS


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(S)



WHILE COMMERCE AND trade remain as high priority items of the Romanian Government, efforts in these areas have diminished with Romania's unsuccessful attempt to attain MFN status vis-a-vis the US Government. Romanian commercial offices in Chicago and San Francisco are being closed and decisions have been made to reduce the staff of the commercial office in NYC.

EFFORTS ARE CONTINUING to build rapport with numerous emigre groups, and interest is being directed toward increasing the exchange of delegations and academicians between the US and Romania.

WFQ SATPIA 11/15/74, 45

(S)



STATUS OF OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS

(S) [redacted]

b1

THE SOVIETS HAVE been negotiating for a building at 305 East 45th Street, NYC, in which to relocate the SMUN, now located at 136 East 67th Street, NYC. If these negotiations are successful, the present location might be used by the SOVEMB, WDC, to house the Soviet Consulate in NYC.

NY SPIA 12/13/74, 24

BULGARIAN OFFICIALS IN WDC have decided to approach US Department of State regarding the opening of a commercial office in Chicago and, possibly, one in San Francisco. [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC Republic (GDR) has leased the top floor of a building at 1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W., WDC, for use as a chancery.

WFO SATPIA 11/15/74, 51

(S) [redacted]

THE NCNA, NYC, reportedly is negotiating with Radio Corporation of America for a leased communications channel from NYC to Lima, Peru. This form of communications link suggests a large volume of traffic between Lima and NYC as customarily-used systems such as Telex would be less economical.

NY PRCIA 11/11/74, 4-5

~~TOP SECRET~~

Statistics as of 1/1/75

Country	Officials *
USSR	907
Albania	10
Bulgaria	52
Czechoslovakia	86
East Germany	54
Hungary	71
Mongolia	15
People's Republic of China	184
Poland	201
Romania	86
Yugoslavia	182
TOTAL	1,848

(S)

b1

* This is a generic designation used for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. These figures do not include working wives.

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2/28/75

To: SACs, Chicago (Encs. 4)
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Los Angeles (Encs. 2)
New Haven (Encs. 3)
Newark (Encs. 3)
New York (Encs. 5)
Pittsburgh (Encs. 2)
Portland (Encs. 2)
Sacramento (Encs. 2)
San Diego (Encs. 2)
San Francisco (Encs. 4)
Seattle (Encs. 2)
WFO (Encs. 5)

b1
b6
b7C

1 - Mr. Wannall (Enc.)
1 - Mr. Branigan (Enc.)
1 - Mr. Cregar (Enc.)
1 - Mr. Putman (Enc.)
1 - Mr. Fulton (Enc.)
1 - [redacted]

From: Director, FBI

9 0

FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES (FINAL)

ReBuairtel 9/30/74 captioned "Submission of PRCIA, SATPIA, SPIA and YUPIA Communications."

65-74480-14

EX-101 REC-31

Enclosed are copies of captioned publication bearing the subtitle, "Overview of [redacted] Operations in the United States." This is solely for use within the FBI, and its purpose is to provide, through a summary of recent situations and events, a broad perspective of [redacted] service activities in the United States, including targets, techniques and operations, and trends. This should be beneficial as it will periodically provide a summary of information from Soviet Personnel Intelligence Activities (SPIA), Satellite Personnel Intelligence Activities (SATPIA), People's Republic of China Intelligence Activities (PRCIA), and Yugoslav Personnel Intelligence Activities (YUPIA) communications which, according to instructions in referenced airtel, no longer are laterally disseminated by the field offices preparing them.

(C)
(C)

MAILED 23
FEB 28 1975
FBI

MAR 3 1975

Recipient offices should insure that this publication is made available to all Agents involved in the preparation of the SPIA, SATPIA, PRCIA and YUPIA letters as well as to those Agents with investigative

1 - 100-354839 (SPIA)
1 - 65-63483 (SATPIA)
1 - 105-244037 (PRCIA)
1 - 105-31417 (YUPIA)

SJM:pld
(37)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~ MATERIAL ENCLOSED

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

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58 MAR 10 1975

FEB 27 11 54 AM 1975
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GPO 954-546

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105-244037-1
105-31417-1
100-354839-1
65-63483

Airtel to Chicago, et al.
Re: FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis -
United States (FINAL)

interest in any of these areas. Because of the "Top Secret" classification of the enclosures, strict security precautions must be exercised by recipient offices in their handling.

Future issues will be forwarded to recipients by routing slip.

NOTE:

This dissemination was authorized by Fulton to Wannall memorandum dated 2/19/75. The number of copies to the 13 field offices is based on the number of PRCIA, SATPIA, SPIA and YUPIA communications prepared by those offices.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
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~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSE...NATION~~

1 - [redacted]

b6 per FBI
b7C

REC-31 65-74480-13

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: January 9, 1975

EX 104

To: Director
Division of Safeguards and Security
Atomic Energy Commission

Attention: [redacted], Acting Director

From: Clarence M. Kelley, Director

Subject: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
DATED AUGUST 21, 1974, VOLUME II,
NUMBER 1

Referral/Direct

[redacted]

AJD:mjg
(4)

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Date of declassification Indefinite

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BY COURIER SVC
JAN 9 P.M.
EX-104 FBI

54 JAN 20 1975

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GPO 954-546

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Branigan

DATE: 12/5/74

1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Putman
1 - Mr. Fulton
1 - [redacted]

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Director Sec'y ____

b6
b7C

TO : Mr. Wannall

FROM : A. B. Fulton

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES (FINAL)

Recommends approval of seventh issue of FINAL publication for dissemination to The White House, members of United States Intelligence Board and all field offices.

Attached is a copy of Volume II, number 2, of FINAL. The purpose of FINAL is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI.

Attached also is a dissemination sheet for outside agencies. Copies designated to these agencies will be numbered and recorded for strict accountability.

ACTION:

If approved, this issue will be dated, printed, and disseminated to agencies on dissemination sheet as well as all field offices and to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors.

[redacted]

1 - ENCLOSURE

65-74480

Enclosures
SJM:pld
(8)

FBI/SSM

EX-109

REC-18

65-74480-12

3 DEC 24 1974

MAILED 20
DEC 18 1974
FBI

84 DEC 31 1974

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FBI
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ANALYSIS
UNITED STATES

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VOLUME: 2
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ENCLOSURE 65-74480-18

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
TRENDS

(S)

b1

TECHNIQUES

(S)



b1

b1

(S)

[redacted]

TARGETS

(S)

[redacted]

b1

(S)

[redacted]

FEATURES

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE German Democratic Republic were recently in the US for negotiations regarding the establishment of an embassy and possibly a chancery in the Washington, D. C., area. (NY SATPIA 8/7/74 p. 3)

EARLIER THIS YEAR Amtorg Trading Corporation, New York City, celebrated its 50th anniversary as an American corporation with a reception at the Biltmore Hotel in New York. Attendance at the reception was by invitation only, and several US businessmen have since indicated that it was a disappointing, ill-planned, and poorly-hosted affair. (NYSSPIA 7/10/74 p. 29)

(S)

[redacted]

THE LINE UP - 11/1/74

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS*		WORKING WIVES	DEPENDENTS	TOTAL
USSR	982		174	975	2131
Albania	10		0	10	20
Bulgaria	52		4	82	138
Czechoslovakia	102		8	114	224
Hungary	67		0	92	159
Mongolia	15		1	15	31
Poland	207		20	291	518
Romania	89		7	128	224
East Germany	36		4	17	57
Peoples Republic of China	185		22	6	213
TOTAL	1745		240	1730	3715

(S) b1

*This is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. The definition refers to all foreign nationals assigned to Country establishments in the United States, including embassies, consulates, United Nations missions, United Nations Secretariat employees, and employees of ancillary organizations, such as Amtorg, Intourist, Aeroflot, commercial offices, and press representatives.

~~SECRET~~

DISSEMINATION LIST

The White House

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State SENT SEPARATELY

Department of Justice

The Attorney General — SENT SEPARATELY

Department of State

The Honorable, The Secretary of State

Department of Defense

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Department of the Army

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

Department of the Air Force

Office of Special Investigation

Department of the Navy

Director, Naval Investigative Service

Department of the Treasury

The Honorable, The Secretary of the Treasury

Other Intelligence Agencies and Interested Government Agencies

Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Attention: Deputy Director for Operations SENT SEP
Director, Division of Security, Atomic Energy Commission
Director, National Security Agency SENT SEP.
Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board SENT SEP.

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1-Mr. Adams
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Branigan
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Fulton
1-[redacted]

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TO : Mr. Wannall

DATE: 8/5/74

FROM : A. B. Fulton

SUBJECT: FBI, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES (FINAL)

Recommends approval of sixth issue of FINAL publication for dissemination to The White House, members of United States Intelligence Board and all field offices.

Attached is a copy of Volume II, number 1, of FINAL. The purpose of FINAL is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI.

Attached also is a dissemination sheet for outside agencies. Copies designated to these agencies will be numbered and recorded for strict accountability.

ACTION:

If approved, this issue will be dated, printed, and disseminated to agencies on dissemination sheet as well as all field offices and to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors.

Enclosures

65-74480

SM:nlb (7)

65-74480-11

EX-101

AUG 15 1974

ENCLOSURE

58 AUG 22 1974

84 AUG 27 1974

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ANALYSIS
UNITED STATES

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
b1

The purpose of this publication is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI. Emphasis is placed (S) on [redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination is made.

b1


TRENDS

(S)



THE STRICT ATTITUDE of the Czechoslovak government toward issuing visas appears to be continuing as are the rules against visiting with former Czech citizens now residing in the US. (NYO SATPIA 5/7/74, p. 1)


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TECHNIQUES


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(S)



A RECENT EMIGRE REPORTEDLY has been "pressured" into retaining Romanian citizenship as a condition for the release of his wife and child from Romania. (NYO SATPIA 5/7/74, p. 14)

(S)



b1

(S)

[redacted]

TARGETS

(S)

[redacted]

FEATURES

THE US-USSR JOINT Trade Council, Incorporated, 280 Park Avenue, New York (its counterpart is being set up in Moscow) has the following listed goals: (NY SPIA 4/10/74, p. 24)

1. To create a business and governmental environment in both countries conducive to expanded commercial relations between these countries.
2. To facilitate the exploration of opportunities for expanded trade.
3. To conduct research on major issues related to trade between the US and the USSR.
4. To provide assistance to members in both countries in the execution of commercial agreements.
5. To collaborate and provide liaison between both governments on expanding trade relations.

The Soviet trade organization Energomashexport apparently plans to open a company in New York City to market Soviet-produced hydroelectric turbines in the US. This company would most likely be connected with Amtorg Trading Corporation. (NY SPIA 4/10/74, p. 25)

Representatives of Amtorg Trading Corporation and the World Trade Center, New York City, signed a three-year lease to become effective June 1, 1974, for 3052 square feet of space on the 86th floor of the north tower of the World Trade Center. This will house a Soviet information center whose purpose is to promote and develop the import and export of products of the USSR in world trade and commerce. Six or seven Soviet nationals will staff the center at first, and the number next year will probably increase to ten or twelve. (NY SPIA 3/6/74, p. 21)

***

(S) [redacted] b1

THIS OBVIOUS EFFORT might have gone undetected except that the individual he approached was a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from another locale who was in the area to attend a special school.

~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

THE LINE UP - 7/1/74

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS*		WORKING WIVES	DEPENDENTS	TOTAL
USSR	793		163	881	1837
Albania	9		0	8	17
Bulgaria	40		5	76	121
Czechoslovakia	84		13	100	197
Hungary	65		1	87	153
Mongolia	6		1	16	23
Poland	187		20	288	495
Romania	80		5	130	215
East Germany	24		5	8	37
Peoples Republic of China	152		21	5	178
TOTAL	1440		234	1599	3273

(S) b1

*This is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. The definition refers to all foreign nationals assigned to Country establishments in the United States, including embassies, consulates, United Nations missions, United Nations Secretariat employees, and employees of ancillary organizations, such as Amtorg, Intourist, Aeroflot, commercial offices, and press representatives. ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

~~SECRET~~

DISSEMINATION LIST

The White House

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State

Department of Justice

The Attorney General

Department of State

The Honorable, The Secretary of State

Department of Defense

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Department of the Army

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

Department of the Air Force

Office of Special Investigation

Department of the Navy

Director, Naval Investigative Service

Department of the Treasury

The Honorable, The Secretary of the Treasury

Other Intelligence Agencies and Interested Government Agencies

Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Attention: Deputy Director of Plans
Director, Division of Security, Atomic Energy Commission
Director, National Security Agency
Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

~~SECRET~~

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DATE 03-09-2011 BY 60322/UC/LRP/PLJ/ETG

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 4/2/73

FROM : T. J. Smith

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES (FINAL)

Mr. Baker
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Gebhardt
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Thompson
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Mr. Bowers
Mr. Herington
Ms. Herwig
Mr. Mintz
Mrs. Neenan

Recommends approval of fifth issue of FINAL publication for dissemination to The White House, members of United States Intelligence Board and all field offices.

Attached is copy of Volume I, number 5 of FINAL. The purpose of FINAL is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI.

Attached also is a dissemination sheet for outside agencies. Copies designated to these agencies will be numbered and recorded for strict accountability.

ACTION:

REC-54 dated, 65-74480-10

If approved, this issue will be printed and disseminated to agencies on dissemination sheet as well as all field offices and to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors.

Enclosures

65-74480

JEM:glw

2 ENCLOSURE

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
1 - Mr. Larson
1 - Mr. [redacted]

MAILED 5
APR 4 - 1973
FBI

APR 6 1973

5 - DS

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b7C

84 APR 12 1973

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AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)
DATE 03-17-2011

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FBI
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
UNITED STATES

r. Felt
r. Baker
r. Callahan
r. Cleveland
r. Conrad
r. Gebhardt
r. Jenkins
r. Marshall
r. Miller, E.S.
r. Soyars
r. Thompson
r. Walters
ele. Room
r. Kinley
r. Armstrong
r. Bowers
r. Herington
s. Herwig
r. Mintz
rs. Neenan

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

JWM:lkm

Classified by D. E. Moore
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Exemption Category Number 2
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~~ENCLOSURE~~

DATE: 4/27/73
VOLUME: 1
NUMBER: 5
COPY NUMBER:

65-74480-48

The purpose of this publication is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI. (S) Emphasis is placed on [redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination is made.

b1

TRENDS

ALEXSEI KOSYGIN AND Leonid Brezhnev are scheduled to visit the United States this Spring. [redacted] b1

(S) [redacted]

(C) [redacted]

TECHNIQUES

(S) [redacted]

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
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
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
FEATURES

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New Soviet Purchasing Commission

THE UNITED STATES Government has authorized the establishment of a temporary Soviet purchasing commission in New York City to service the Kama River Truck Complex (a massive truck-producing project being built with extensive United States industry participation). Tentative arrangements provide that the commission will be set up for one year, but will be extended in one-year segments, if necessary, for a maximum period of three more years. The commission will consist of a chairman and a maximum of 15 technical assistants

and staff. It will be responsible to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Soviet trade representative in the United States. The commission has signed a three-year lease for space on the sixth floor of the General Motors Building, 767 Fifth Avenue, New York City. It will take up occupancy in this space about April 1, 1973. Since its arrival in mid-January, it has occupied temporary space on the fourth floor of the General Motors Building. (UNCLASSIFIED)

(U)

OMNIBUS NOTES

SOVIET DIPLOMATS ARE significantly expanding public appearances in an apparent attempt to improve public relations. Most of the speeches contain little that is new, or even interesting, but the mere increase in appearances is noteworthy. (CONFIDENTIAL)

(S) [redacted] b1

AEROFLOT HAS MOVED from the space it shared with Intourist at 45 East 49th Street, New York City, and is now located at 545 Fifth Avenue, New York City. (UNCLASSIFIED)

THE MARINE DIVISION of the ATC is moving from the ATC space on the 19th and 20th floors of 355 Lexington Avenue, New York City, and acquiring separate space on the 10th floor of the same building. It will also have separate telephone service. (UNCLASSIFIED)

THE LINE-UP

3/1/73

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS*		WORKING WIVES	DEPENDENTS	TOTAL
USSR	691		144	802	1881
Albania	7		0	11	20
Bulgaria	38		3	64	114
Czechoslovakia	79		11	97	213
Hungary	59		3	98	182
Mongolia	5		0	11	16
Poland	147		26	238	452
Romania	76		2	122	222
TOTAL	1102		189	1443	3100

(S) - 12 -

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*This is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. The definition refers to all foreign nationals assigned to Country establishments in the United States, including embassies, consulates, United Nations missions, United Nations Secretariat employees, and employees of ancillary organizations, such as Amtorg, Intourist, Aeroflot, commercial offices, and press representatives.

SECRET

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DISSEMINATION LIST

The White House

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, ~~Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs~~ Secy of State

Department of Justice

The Attorney General

Department of State

The Honorable, The Secretary of State

Department of Defense

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Department of the Army

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

Department of the Air Force

Office of Special Investigation

Department of the Navy

Director, Naval Investigative Service

Department of the Treasury

The Honorable, The Secretary of the Treasury

Other Intelligence Agencies and Interested Government Agencies

Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Att: Deputy Director of Plans
Director, Division of Security, Atomic Energy Commission
Director, National Security Agency

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[redacted]

SECRET

ENCLOSURE 65-74480-10

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)
DATE 07-21-2011

Felt
Baker
Callahan
Cleveland
Conrad
Dalbey
Gebhardt
Jenkins
Marshall
Miller, E.S.
Purvis
Soyars
Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Ms. Herwig
Mrs. Neenan

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller EM/jwl

DATE: 12/6/72

FROM : T. J. Smith TJS/EWL

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - U. S. (FINAL)

(S) Captioned publication provides an overview of the activities of [redacted] and contains items taken from the full spectrum of our counterintelligence operations.

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b7C

It is classified ~~"Secret,"~~ "Background Use Only" and "Warning Notice - Sensitive Sources and Methods Involved."

RECOMMENDATION:

Because of highly sensitive information contained in this file it should be maintained in the Special File Room.

1 - Mr. J. W. Marshall (Attn: [redacted] Room 1116 IB)
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson
1 - Mr. [redacted]

65-74480

JFM:lkm
(6)

Please place 1 cc in 66-17404 NAP. SEP 11

REC-77 65-74480-9

DEC 8 1972

EWL

Handled by Special File Room on 12-12-72. Nap.

XEROX DEC 8 1972

5 JFM EWL

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-17404-

97 DEC 12 1972

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5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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[redacted]

Baker
Bishop
Callahan
Cleveland
Conrad
Dalbey
Gebhardt
Jenkins
Marshall
Miller, E.S.
Purvis
Soyars
Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Ms. Herwig
Mrs. Neenan

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 12/1/72

FROM : T. J. Smith TJS/ELP

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES (FINAL)

Recommends approval of fourth issue of FINAL publication for dissemination to The White House, members of United States Intelligence Board and all field offices.

Attached is copy of Volume I, number 4 of FINAL. The purpose of FINAL is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI.

Attached also is a dissemination sheet for outside agencies. Copies designated to these agencies will be numbered and recorded for strict accountability.

ACTION:

If approved, this issue will be printed and disseminated to agencies on dissemination sheet as well as all field offices and to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors.

Enclosures

65-74480

JFM:glw (7)

REC-70

65-74480-8

NO DEC 7 1972

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
1 - Mr. Larson
1 - [redacted]

DEC 8 10 23 AM '72
FBI-JUSTICE
RECD E.S. MILLER

DEC 11 15 58 PM '72
FBI-JUSTICE
RECD E.S. MILLER

57 DEC 12 1972

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DATE 03-17-2011

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FBI
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ANALYSIS
UNITED STATES

DEMWAR
Classified by D. E. Moore
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category Number 2
Automatically Declassified on Indefinite

FBI

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

DATE: 12/5/72
VOLUME: I
NUMBER: 4
COPY NUMBER:

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DEMWAR

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

JFM:cakcak

65-74480-8

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

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. Kinley
. Armstrong
. Herwig
s. Neenan

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
The purpose of this publication is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI. Emphasis is placed
(S) on [redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination is made.

ENCLOSURE

65-74480-8

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TRENDS



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MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

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65-74480-8

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
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TECHNIQUES

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
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


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
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FEATURE

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(S) [redacted]

OMNIBUS NOTES

(C) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

(C) [redacted]

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ALL CZECHS TRAVELING to the United States as part of the East-West Exchange Program are required to report to the Czech Embassy upon arrival. This informs the Embassy of their presence in the United States and [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

THE LINE-UP

11/1/72

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS*		WORKING WIVES	DEPENDENTS	TOTAL
USSR	787		143	759	1689
Albania	11		0	11	22
Bulgaria	43		3	69	115
(S) Czechoslovakia	96		11	99	206
Mongolia	14		1	11	26
Hungary	68		3	96	167
Poland	173		27	232	432
Romania	82		2	109	193
TOTAL	1274		190	1386	2850

b1

*This is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. The definition refers to all foreign nationals assigned to Country establishments in the United States, including embassies, consulates, United Nations missions, United Nations Secretariat and ancillary organizations, such as Amtorg, Intourist, Aeroflot, commercial offices, and press representatives. (SECRET)

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DATE 03-10-2011 BY 60322/UC/LRP/PLJ/ETG

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

)10-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: August 24, 1972

FROM : T. J. Smith TJS

1 - Mr. A. J. Decker
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

Felt
Baker
Bates
Bishop
Callahan
Cleveland
Conrad
Dalbey
Jenkins
Marshall
Miller, E.S.
Mohr
Soyars
Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Ms. Herwig
Mrs. Neenan

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES (FINAL)

T. J. Smith

Recommends approval of third issue of FINAL publication for dissemination to The White House, members of United States Intelligence Board and all field offices.

Attached is copy of Volume I, number 3 of FINAL. FINAL is a bi-monthly publication. The purpose of FINAL is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI.

Attached also is a dissemination sheet for outside agencies. Copies designated to these agencies will be numbered and recorded for strict accountability. EX-101

65-74480-57

ACTION:

REC-53

14 AUG 31 1972

If approved, this issue will be printed and disseminated to agencies on dissemination sheet as well as all field offices and to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors.

Enclosures

65-74480

EWL:dan (6)

ENCLOSURE

MAILED 22
AUG 30 1972
FBI

57 SEP 5 1972

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

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EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)
DATE 03-17-2011

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FBI
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ANALYSIS

~~(FINAL)~~

UNITED STATES

Mr. Felt
Mr. Baker
Mr. Bates
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Ms. Herwig
Mrs. Neenan

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ROUTE IN ENVELOPE WHL

65-74480-7

ENCLOSURE

DATE: 8/28/72
VOLUME: I
NUMBER: 3
COPY NUMBER:

FINAL

The purpose of this publication is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI. Emphasis is placed (S) on [redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination is made.


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TRENDS

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
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


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MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

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
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
FEATURES

SOVIET STUDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

b1

Each academic year since 1958, the United States and the Soviet Union have maintained agreements whereby Soviet students have studied at colleges and universities in the United States while their American counterparts have studied in Russia. From the vantage point of 15 years' experience, there are several interesting observations which can be made. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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
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For the upcoming academic year 40 Soviet students have been proposed for study in the United States at about 20 universities and 35 of these have already entered the country. From past experience it was not unusual to note that only one of these students was pursuing study in the field of history and the other 39 were designated for scientific curricula. This apparent oversight was recently corrected when the lone history student was removed from the list of candidates by the Soviets and in his place was substituted a bio-chemist. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) **(WFO airtel, 8/14/72, Bufile: 105-116937)**

POLISH INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

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OMNIBUS NOTES

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THE LINE-UP

8/1/72

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS*		WORKING WIVES	DEPENDENTS	TOTAL
USSR	619		135	710	1464
Albania	7		0	13	20
Bulgaria	38		3	60	101
Czechoslovakia	77		10	96	183
Hungary	60		3	90	153
Mongolia	6		1	10	17
Poland	134		27	209	370
Romania	66		2	107	175
TOTAL	1007		181	1295	2483

(S)

b1

*This is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. The definition refers to all foreign nationals assigned to Country establishments in the United States, including embassies, consulates, United Nations missions, United Nations Secretariat employees, and employees of ancillary organizations, such as Amtorg, Intourist, Aeroflot, commercial offices, and press representatives.

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FINAL

DISSEMINATION LIST

Copy No.

The White House

1. Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Department of Justice

2. The Attorney General

Department of State

3. The Honorable, The Secretary of State

Department of Defense

4. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Department of the Army

5. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

Department of the Air Force

6. Office of Special Investigation

Department of the Navy

7. Director, Naval Investigative Service

Department of the Treasury

8. [redacted] Director, Office of Administrative Security

b6
b7C

Other Intelligence Agencies and Interested Government Agencies

9. Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Att: Deputy Director of Plans
10. Director, Division of Security, Atomic Energy Commission
11. Director, National Security Agency - Director of Security; Att: [redacted] M-55
12. President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~SECRET~~

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-10-2011 BY 60322/UC/LRP/PLJ/ETG

NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVI(
HOFFMAN BUILDING
2461 EISENHOWER AVENUE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22314

IN REPLY REFER TO
NIS-41B/jb
3850
Ser U 3967
21 JUL 1972

From: Director, Naval Investigative Service
To: Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subj: FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis (United States), 16 June 1972

1. Subject document was reviewed with great interest at this Service. The information contained therein is considered valuable to staff members and to field units.

2. It is requested that twenty-five (25) additional copies be furnished this Service for distribution to Naval Investigative Service Offices.

[redacted]

By direction

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b7C

8/11/72 - DISCUSSED WITH [redacted] NISHQ, WHO WAS ADVISED THAT BUREAU COULD NOT SUPPLY REQUESTED COPIES, BUT THAT THERE WAS NO OBJECTION TO NIS OFFICIALS WHO HAVE PROPER CLEARANCES AND NEED TO KNOW HAVING ACCESS TO INCU IN THIS PUBLICATION. LRP

EX-114

REC-58

65-74480-6

16 AUG 11 1972

F33d

File 65-74480

70 AUG 16 1972

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

FROM : T. J. Smith

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES (FINAL)

1 - Mr. A. Rosen
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
DATE: 6/7/72
1 - Mr. A. J. Decker
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

Felt
Mohr
Rosen
Bates
Bishop
Callahan
Campbell
Casper
Cleveland
Conrad
Dalbey
Miller, E. S.
Ponder
Soyars
Waikart
Walters
Tele Room
Holmes
Gandy

Recommends approval of second issue of FINAL publication for dissemination to The White House, members of United States Intelligence Board and all field offices.

Attached is copy of Volume I, number 2 of FINAL. The purpose of FINAL is to offer to the United States Intelligence Community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI.

First issue was dated 4/7/72 and considerable favorable response has been received from outside agencies. Although FINAL was initially envisioned as a monthly publication, it appears through experience that a bi-monthly period will assure a better quality document and future issues will be keyed to this period.

FINAL IS A BIMONTHLY PUBLICATION

REC-66 65-74480-5

Attached also is a dissemination sheet for outside agencies. Copies designated to these agencies will be numbered and recorded for strict accountability.

ACTION:

ST-111

12 AUG 10 1972

If approved, this issue will be printed and disseminated to agencies on dissemination sheet as well as all field offices and to appropriate Seat of Government officials and supervisors.

Enclosures

EWL:dan
(7)

MAILED 22
JUN 16 1972
FBI

70 AUG 16 1972

6/12 1:46p.

FINAL

DISSEMINATION LIST

Copy No.

The White House

1. Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Department of Justice

2. The Attorney General

Department of State

3. The Honorable, The Secretary of State

Department of Defense

4. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Department of the Army

5. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

Department of the Air Force

6. Office of Special Investigation

Department of the Navy

7. Director, Naval Investigative Service

Department of the Treasury

8. [redacted] Director, Office of Administrative Security

Other Intelligence Agencies and Interested Government Agencies

9. Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Att: Deputy Director of Plans
10. Director, Division of Security, Atomic Energy Commission
11. Director, National Security Agency - Director of Security; Att: [redacted] M-55
12. President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

b6
b7C

65-74580-5

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

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AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)
DATE 03-17-2011

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FINAL

June 9, 1972

The purpose of this publication is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI. Emphasis is placed (S) on [redacted]. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination is made.

b6
b7C

EWL:dan

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Felt
Mr. Campbell
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Waikart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room


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EM
WGC
TJS
EWL
65-74480-5

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TRENDS

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TECHNIQUES


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TARGETS

(S)



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FEATURES

PIONEER POINT SOVIET ESTATE

On 5/18/72, the Soviet Government completed purchase of approximately 45 acres of land commonly called Pioneer Point, Maryland, for reported price of $1,120,000. The property is located on the eastern shore in Queen Annes County, and is designated on commercial maps as Corsica Neck, west of Centerville, Maryland. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Buildings on the site consist of former estate house for use as summer residence by Ambassador, a smaller building for use as summer recreation center for children, and several outbuildings including a caretaker's residence. Existing dock on Chesapeake Bay can accommodate boats of 40 feet in length and up to nine feet in draft. Soviets are negotiating for two cabin cruisers in the 27-foot range. They plan to surround acreage with high chain link fence. (UNCLASSIFIED)


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CHINESE IN UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT

Because of the increase in Chinese language work at the United Nations, the Secretariat is currently hiring and training 45 new Chinese translators and interpreters, at a cost of $500,000. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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
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It was stated that their jobs should not be considered "secure" and their degree of compliance with the above conditions, especially the first, would bear on promotions and even tenure in their present jobs. The Mission was apparently under the impression it had significant, if not complete, control over Secretariat employees engaged in Chinese related work. The hiring issue has been resolved by allowing the Mission to talent-scout and recommend people for the additional positions. It is now in the process of recruiting loyal, "ideologically safe" individuals from China and the rest of the world. How far the Mission will be able to enforce its demands on Secretariat employees is yet to be seen. (UNCLASSIFIED) Source: 62-7787-Sub 246



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
OMNIBUS NOTES

(C)



EVIDENCE INDICATES THE Romanian Government may be in serious need of U. S. dollars. It is charging exorbitant "processing fees" for Romanian-born U. S. residents to bring relatives here, and to renounce Romanian citizenship in order to apply for U. S. citizenship. The government has gone so far as to legislatively broaden the definition of a Romanian citizen, to require more individuals to be subject to these "processing fees." (UNCLASSIFIED) Source: CG SATPIA 5/5/72 p. 14 NYO SATPIA 5/5/72 (Romanian)

(C)



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THE LINE-UP

5/1/72

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS*	WORKING WIVES	DEPENDENTS	TOTAL
USSR	627	144	784	1555
Albania	5	0	8	13
Bulgaria	37	3	75	115
(S) Czechoslovakia	77	10	91	178
Hungary	57	3	104	164
Mongolia	7	1	11	19
Poland	134	26	230	390
Romania	63	3	94	158
TOTAL	1007	190	1397	2592

b1

*This is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. The definition refers to all foreign nationals assigned to Country establishments in the United States, including embassies, consulates, United Nations missions, United Nations Secretariat employees, and employees of ancillary organizations, such as Amtorg, Intourist, Aeroflot, commercial offices, and press representatives.

~~SECRET~~
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis

UNITED STATES

DATE: 6/16/72
VOLUME: I
NUMBER: 2
COPY NUMBER: ____

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NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
ENCLOSURE

65-74480-5

~~SECRET~~

TRENDS

(S)

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TECHNIQUES

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~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 03-10-2011 BY 60322/UC/LRP/PLJ/ETG

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

FROM : T. J. Smith

1 - Mr. A. Rosen
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
DATE: 4/5/72
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

Tolson
Felt
Campbell
Rosen
Mohr
Bishop
Miller, E.S.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Cleveland
Ponder
Bates
Waikart
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES (FINAL)

Recommends dissemination of first issue of monthly FINAL publication to The White House, members of United States Intelligence Board, and all field offices.

Purpose of FINAL is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI. Text of first issue was approved by Director per memorandum T. J. Smith to Mr. E. S. Miller, 3/29/72.

Attached is copy of first issue in finished form. Cover page on this issue will be replaced in future issues by distinctive, stylized cover now being prepared.

Recommend copies be disseminated as follows:

1. To The White House and the Acting Attorney General.

REC-29 65-74480-4

2. To the following members of the United States Intelligence Board: State Department; Central Intelligence Agency; Defense Intelligence Agency; Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Army; Naval Investigative Service; Office of Special Investigations, United States Air Force; National Security Agency; Treasury Department; and Atomic Energy Commission.

22 APR 21 1972

For strict accountability, all copies disseminated to outside agencies will be numbered, and a record of dissemination kept for each issue.

Enclosure

EWL:jan
(7)

MAILED 22
APR 10 1972
FBI

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE
ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

56 APR 25 1972

3. All FBI field offices. Believed essential that same broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations which we offer to intelligence community should be given to our own field offices. We note that more and more smaller offices throughout the country are becoming involved in sensitive espionage investigations.

Consideration was given to disseminating FINAL to all Legal Attaches; however, in view of potential weakness in security in disseminating this document abroad and also in view of the lack of operational responsibility on part of Legal Attaches, it is recommended that no dissemination be made to these offices.

ACTION:

1. That first issue of FINAL be approved for dissemination as stipulated above.

2. That, if approved, this memorandum be returned to Research Section, which will effect dissemination.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-10-2011 BY 60322/UC/LRP/PLJ/ETG

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Felt
Campbell
Rosen
Mohr
Bishop
Miller, E.S.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Cleveland
Ponder
Bates
Waikart
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 4-13-72

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - U.S. (FINAL)

This is to recommend dissemination of monthly FINAL publication to [redacted] Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).

The purpose of FINAL is to offer to the U.S. intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the U.S. which are within the purview of the FBI. The first issue dated 4-7-72 has been disseminated to Dr. Henry Kissinger at The White House, the Acting Attorney General and members of the United States Intelligence Board. Strict accountability is being maintained on dissemination to outside agencies.

[redacted] PFIAB, advised Supervisor R. H. Haynes that this publication would be of direct interest to [redacted] in his position as [redacted] of the PFIAB and asked if [redacted] could be added to the dissemination.

In view of the responsibilities of the PFIAB, this appears to be a legitimate request.

ACTION:

If approved, the initial copy of FINAL dated 4-7-72, as well as subsequent issues, will be disseminated by White House liaison to Admiral Anderson.

RHH:sjr (8)
1 - Mr. A. Rosen
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson
1 - Mr. R. H. Haynes

furnished Bunker for Anderson GAD

REC-35 65-74480-31

ST-116

22 APR 20 1972

APR 24 1972

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DATE 03-10-2011 BY 60322/UC/LRP/PLJ/ETG

SAC, Chicago

4/12/72

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES (FINAL)

Attention of recipient offices is called to new publication in above caption. Initial issue was sent to all field offices and member agencies of the United States intelligence community under date 4/7/72. You will note that FINAL is keyed to the monthly SPIA and SATPIA letters which are submitted by your offices. Your continuing cooperation is necessary to insure that the FINAL publication is a success and that appropriate material is called to the Bureau's attention in the SPIA and SATPIA letters.

You should alert appropriate personnel to this continuing need at the Bureau. If interim information of importance suitable for inclusion in this publication is developed, it may be sent separately by communication entitled "FINAL" and marked "Attention: Research Section." Any other correspondence relating to this publication, including your comments or suggestions, may be sent in the same form. FINAL is planned as a monthly publication.

2 - San Francisco
2 - New York
2 - WFO

EWL:jan
(12)

Tolson
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Miller, E.S.
Callahan
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Tele. Room
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Gandy

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DATE 03-30-2011

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Campbell
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Waikart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

1 - Mr. A. Rosen
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
DATE: 3/29/72
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

FROM : T. J. Smith

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES (FINAL)

Recommends initiation of regular monthly letter in above caption for circulation to elements of United States intelligence community.

The purpose of this publication is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI. Emphasis is placed on [redacted] (S) In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained therein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination is made.

b1

Attached is text of first issue of FINAL. Format is broken down into several categories, i.e. Trends, Techniques, Targets. As a feature of this issue, we set forth a perspective on the recent arrest of a Soviet on espionage charges. As a continuing feature, we conclude with section entitled "The Line-Up" which tabulates legal presence of hostile intelligence in United States, broken down by countries, number of officials, known or suspected intelligence officers, percentage of intelligence officers, number of working wives, and number of dependents.

FINAL is intended as quality publication for highly selective circularization to The White House and other essential elements of United States intelligence community. It will bear classification "Secret - No Foreign Dissemination." Upon approval, attached proposed text and format will be placed in finished form which will include appropriate cover page now being prepared.

Enclosure

EWL:jan
(7)

REC-3 65-74480-5
ST-114
MCT-57
APR 11 1972
ENCLOSURE
(74480)

CONTINUED - OVER

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MAY 2 1972

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
Re: FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis - United States (FINAL)

ACTION:

1. If approved, FINAL will be initiated as monthly publication. Appropriate memorandum will be submitted with finished product specifying United States intelligence agencies to which FINAL will be directed.

2. If approved, attached copy should be routed to Research Section, Domestic Intelligence Division, for further processing as indicated above. (ATTACHMENT SHOULD BEAR A CURRENT DATE WHEN DISSEMINATED)

FWK
WOB

DEM

ADDENDUM: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION: 3/29/72: ESM:jan:

We have had this on the "drawing board" for about four months since we feel a need to draw the activities of Soviet-bloc intelligence into a perspective whereby a better appreciation for the impact of such activities can be created within the Bureau and in selected offices outside the Bureau. I feel we will accomplish this through this document and recommend approval.

JAS

OK H. EM

DJP

WGC

R

~~SECRET~~

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DATE 03-17-2011

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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

- UNITED STATES -

F I N A L

APRIL 7, 1972

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iller, E.S.
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aikart
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ele. Room
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MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

65- 74480-1

Volume 1
Number 1

ENCLOSURE

NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

b1

FINAL

The purpose of this publication is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI. Emphasis is placed on [redacted] In the interest of operati[redacted] and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination is made.

(S)

EWL:kaf

SEE NOTE PAGE SEVEN


Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Campbell
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Waikart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

EM
TJS/ELR
DJD

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TRENDS


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SINCE THE SEPTEMBER, 1971, defection in England of Oleg Lyalin, officer of the 13th Department of the KGB


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TECHNIQUES

(S)






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TARGETS



(S)

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FEATURE

At 7:00p.m. on [redacted] KGB officer [redacted] a Soviet national employed as [redacted] met with an American agent at the [redacted] New York. [redacted] was pleased with the confidential material [redacted] which this agent brought to the meeting and spoke enthusiastically concerning the future. Outside the restaurant he obtained the material from the agent and placed it in a briefcase. He gave the agent an envelope containing $650, and after a cordial exchange of farewells, the two separated. Seconds later, [redacted] was confronted by Special Agents of the FBI and placed under arrest. At this point [redacted] in a vain attempt at disassociation. He was advised of his rights under United States law, both in English and Russian, and returned to New York City. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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Although this instance was marked by a degree of drama, as well as a happy counterintelli[illegible]

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[redacted]

Since all other Soviet officials stationed in the United States are subject to reciprocal agreement restricting unapproved travel to within 25 miles of the city of employment, the freedom of travel accorded to all UNSEC employees is an advantage which Soviet intelligence has never failed to exploit. However, there is one distinct disadvantage to the Soviets of which [redacted] became painfully aware. He does not have diplomatic immunity and is presently free on $100,000 bail awaiting trial on espionage charges. (UNCLASSIFIED)

OMNIBUS NOTES

(S)

(C)

[redacted]

THE LINE-UP

3/1/72

COUNTRY	PERCENTAGE	WORKING WIVES	DEPENDENTS	TOTAL
USSR	33.85	140	804	1591
Albania	33.34	0	10	16
Bulgaria	22.23	3	73	112
Czechoslovakia	31.89	9	101	179
Hungary	40	3	100	158
Mongolia	0	1	8	15
Poland	23.62	25	216	368
Romania	36.21	4	88	150
TOTAL	32.27	185	1400	2589

(S)

b1

*This is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. The definition refers to all foreign nationals assigned to Country establishments in the United States, including embassies, consulates, United Nations missions, United Nations Secretariat employees, and employees of ancillary organizations, such as Amtorg, Intourist, Aeroflot, commercial offices, and press representatives.

NOTE:

Classified ~~"Secret~~ - No Foreign Dissemination" due to sensitivity of information and sources from which derived, unauthorized disclosure of which would cause serious damage to defense interests of the United States. See memorandum T. J. Smith to Mr. E. S. Miller, dated 3/21/72, captioned "FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis (FINAL)," prepared by EWL:jan.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

No Duplication Fees are charged for Deleted Page Information Sheet(s).

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FBI File No. HQ 65-74480 - Section 2

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DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 03-17-2011

Memorandum

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Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Insp. ____
Intell. ____
Lab. ____
Legal Coun. ____
Off. Cong. & Public Affs. ____
Rec. Mgmt. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To : Mr. E. J. O'Malley

Date 3/19/82

From : [redacted]

Subject : FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
Vol 7
FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary," for dissemination within the FBI. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices and appropriate Headquarters personnel. (U)

APPROVED:

Director ____
Exec. AD-Adm. ____
Exec. AD-Inv. ____
Exec. AD-LES ____

Adm. Servs. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____

Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. ____
Rec. Mgmt. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____

File 65-74480

1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
1 - Mr [redacted]
1 - Mr [redacted]

1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr.
1 - Mr.

TJD:enb (7)

Enclosure

(CONTINUED - OVER)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

~~Classified and Extended by 859~~
~~Reason for Extension, FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (3)~~
~~Date of Review for Declassification March 19, 2002~~

1 ENCLOSURE

BE-84 65-74480-57

16 MAY 10 1982

61 MAY 20 1982

105

FBI/DOJ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary

b6
b7C

DETAILS:

This publication provides an overview and analysis
(C) of [redacted] Detailing of key FBI foreign
counterintelligence operations is also provided. This
(C) issue is devoted to the activities of [redacted] during the
first nine months of 1981. Printed copies will be supplied
(U) when printing process is complete. (S)

b1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~
Not for Dissemination Outside the FBI

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)
DATE 03-17-2011

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FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary Volume VII



Not for Dissemination Outside the FBI
~~SECRET~~

Security Precautions

Warning Notice	Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
National Security Information	Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~Classified and Extended by 4671~~
Reason For Extension ~~FCIM, II,~~ 1-2.4.2 (2) and (3)
~~Date of Review~~ For Declassification (January ~~1,~~ 2002)

~~SECRET~~

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Dissemination List → 77

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide an overview and analysis of [redacted]

(C) [redacted] b1

Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. This particular issue is devoted to the activities of [redacted]

(C) [redacted] during the first nine months of 1981. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed documented form. Some of the material contained herein has been obtained from other elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ, Intelligence

(U) Division, Attention: [redacted] CI-3A. (C) b6 b7C

(S)

[redacted]

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(S)

[redacted] Perhaps the most significant of these involved the investigation of [redacted] After extensive interviews, [redacted] was arrested on [redacted] and charged with espionage; he pleaded [redacted] and was sentenced to [redacted]

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b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] The compromise could very well have had a damaging impact on U.S. national security interests, since it is [redacted] (S)

(S) [redacted] b1

(S) [redacted] b1

(S) [redacted] was declared persona non grata (PNG) by the United States Department of State (USDS), [redacted]

(S) [redacted] At the same time, the USDS protested such Soviet espionage activities and demanded that they be halted immediately. ~~(S)~~

(S) [redacted]

(C) [redacted]

On the other hand, during 1981 the arrest and conviction of William Holden Bell, an employee of the Hughes Aircraft Corporation, and [redacted] on charges of espionage, demonstrated more clearly than ever the damage that may be done to U.S. national security interests by the smaller (vis-a-vis the SIS) Warsaw Pact services. In a highly sophisticated operation, [redacted] spotted, assessed, and recruited a U.S. citizen with access to highly classified information of value to the Soviets. The Poles were willing to pay a substantial sum for the information and employed sound operational security practices. Moreover, [redacted] cover was impeccable--he was a [redacted]

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b7C

(S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

b1

In compiling the data for this section, two principal sources have been tapped--tasking of double agents by intelligence officers and general inquiries made to FBI assets by IOs. Therefore, in some cases, for reasons of
(U) operational security, specificity has been avoided. (X)


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Scientific and Technical Intelligence

(C) [redacted]

(C)

(S)




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A case conducted jointly by U.S. Customs, the USDC, and the Internal Revenue Service involving a businessman named [redacted] and two other subjects illustrates those trends. On [redacted] were



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
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Military Intelligence

(S)




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Political Intelligence



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Economic Intelligence

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Conclusions

(S)

V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

(S) [redacted]

b1

[redacted]

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b7C

Defection of [redacted] b6 b7C

On [redacted] years old [redacted] was accompanied by his wife, daughter, and son-in-law. In defecting, [redacted] stated:

[redacted]

The defection of [redacted] climaxed a year which saw the defection (as well as recruitment-in-place) of a considerable number of Polish officials and intelligence officers. (S)

(U)

(S) [redacted] b1

COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, OCTOBER 1, 1979

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS
USSR	1,217
PRC	239
POLAND	287
GDR	77
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	98
CUBA	100
ROMANIA	80
HUNGARY	79
BULGARIA	51
VIETNAM	12
NORTH KOREA	12
YUGOSLAVIA	154
ALBANIA	12
MONGOLIA	10
TOTAL	2,428

(S)

b1

COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, DECEMBER 1, 1980

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS
USSR	1,050
PRC	481
POLAND	389
GDR	135
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	98
CUBA	155
ROMANIA	89
HUNGARY	109
BULGARIA	79
VIETNAM	20
NORTH KOREA	14
YUGOSLAVIA	342
ALBANIA	9
KAMPUCHEA	9
LAOS	11
TOTAL	**2,990**

(S)

b1

COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, DECEMBER 1, 1981

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS
USSR	1,113
PRC	820
POLAND	331
GDR	119
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	94
CUBA	72
ROMANIA	90
HUNGARY	114
BULGARIA	86
VIETNAM	21
NORTH KOREA	15
YUGOSLAVIA	246
ALBANIA	10
TOTAL	3,131


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MAJOR COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER, 1979 - DECEMBER, 1981

(S)



b1

SECRET

SECRET

(S) [redacted] OFFICIAL PRESENCE

DECEMBER 1, 1981

(S) [redacted]

b1

(S) [redacted] INTELLIGENCE PRESENCE b1

DECEMBER 1, 1981

(S) [redacted]

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
902D MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP
Fort Ritchie Resident Office
Fort Ritchie, Maryland 21719

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FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

IAGPA-A-FR

10 September 1981

SUBJECT: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review

FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis

Chief
Terrorist Research and Analytical Center
Room 4049
FBI Headquarters
Washington, D.C. 20535

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-17-2011 BY 60322/UC/LRP/PLJ/ETG

Dear Sir:

Request that this office be put on the mailing list for your publication, FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review. I have reviewed past issues of this publication and have found it most helpful in the performance of our unit mission to provide Operations Security support to military units in our assigned area of responsibility.

If there is a similar document concerning terrorist activity that you publish, I would like to be put on that mailing list as well.

I have found your field elements to be most helpful and appreciate your assistance in this matter.

DE-84 65-74480-56

The mailing address for this office is:

Special Ag(S) in-Charge
Fort Ritchie Resident Office
902d MI Group
Ft. Ritchie, MD 21719

10 OCT 21 1981

Sincerely,

Vernon L. Fleming

VERNON L. FLEMING
Captain, MI
Special Agent-in-Charge

(Communication sent out dated 10/21/81)

FEB 3 1982

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Fort Ritchie Resident Office
USAINSCOM CI & SIGSEC DET DS
Fort Ritchie
Cascade, Maryland 21719
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DOD 314

U.S.MAIL

Chief
Terrorist Research and Analytical Center
Room 4049
FBI Headquarters
Washington, D.C. 20535

44

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DATE 03-17-2011 BY 60322/UC/LRP/PLJ/ETG

Memorandum

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Exec AD Inv. ___
Exec AD LES ___
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Adm. Servs. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

To : Mr. E. J. O'Malley

From : [redacted]

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 03-17-2011

'6/81

Subject : FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review," for dissemination to elements of the United States Intelligence Community, as well as the Senate and House intelligence committees. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved for dissemination, as detailed on attached list, to elements of the United States Intelligence Community and the Congress. (U)

APPROVED:

Director ___
Exec. AD-Adm. ___
Exec. AD-Inv. ___
Exec. AD-LES ___

Adm. Servs. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___

Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___

Enclosures - 2 ENCLOSURES

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

DE-85

65-74480

(CONTINUED - OVER)

TJD:enb (8)

7 OCT ~~22~~ 1981

1 - Mr. F. M. Mullen, Jr.
1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr. [redacted]

1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr. [redacted]

b6
b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classified and Extended by~~ 859
Reason for Extension, ~~FCIM, II~~, 1-2.4.2 (3)
~~Date of Review~~ for Declassification ~~August~~ 6, 2001

79 NOV 3 1981

FBI/DOJ

Memorandum from Mr. [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley b6 b7C
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review
65-74480

DETAILS:

(C) This publication provides an overview and analysis of [redacted] b1

(C) This particular issue is devoted to the activities of [redacted] during the latter six months of 1980. Printed copies of this publication will be supplied

(U) when print process is completed. (C)

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Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)
DATE 03-17-2011

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FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review

Volume VI

July, 1981



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Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

~~SECRET~~

FBI/D(

Security Precautions

Warning Notice	Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
National Security Information	Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
ORCON	Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator
NOFORN	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

~~Classified and Extended by 859~~
Reason For Extension ~~FCIM~~, II, 1-2.4.2 (2) and (3)
Date of ~~Review~~ For Declassification ~~(July 1~~, 2001)

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The purpose of this publication is to provide an overview and analysis of [redacted]


(C) [redacted]

Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. This particular issue is devoted to the activitites of [redacted]

(C) [redacted] during the latter six months of 1980. For purposes of brevity, these services will henceforth be referred to as [redacted]

(C) [redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ, Intelligence Division, Attention: [redacted] CI-3(A). (U) ~~(U)~~

The latter half of 1980 also saw the culmination of the massive influx of Cuban refugees into the United States--eventually, the figure mounted to roughly 127,000 refugees.



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(S) [redacted] b1


In September of 1980, the National People's Congress of the PRC formally admitted that the targets of the 1976-1985 economic plan were unattainable and announced that an entire new plan would be devised to take its place. In accordance with this new plan a number of contracts have been cancelled with the Western nations and Japan, primarily in the area of heavy industry. Cutbacks in the budget regarding the procurement of military hardware have also occurred, however, the State Council of the PRC has stated that China intends to push new programs in light industry (consumer goods, computers, microelectronics), agriculture and energy, that will require inputs of foreign technology, capital, and management skills. (U)

The U.S. Government, under the Carter administration, supported China's modernization program in consideration of China's contribution to global strategy. China's failure to modernize would erode its role in maintaining the global balance to the disadvantage of China as well as the United States and its allies. Therefore, the United States signed numerous bilateral agreements in science and technology, education, and trade and granted loans and trade credits to the PRC. This situation led to a liberalization of controls on the export of U.S. high technology items and on authorization, on a case-by-case basis, for sales of non-lethal military support equipment (trucks, radar, transport aircraft, helicopters, and communications and training equipment) to the PRC. Additionally, delegations from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Ministry of National Defense (MND) have visited numerous defense-related corporations seeking military-related information. (S)

(U)


As part of the modernization program and in tune with U.S.-PRC educational exchange initiated in 1978, approximately 6,000 PRC students are now in the United States studying and doing research in all academic disciplines in every region of the United States.

(S)




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Officials Involved in Criminal Activities


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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

(S)



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b6
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(S) [redacted] was perhaps dramatized on [redacted] when [redacted] was arrested in New York City by Special Agents (SA), shortly after [redacted] a [redacted] citizen, was allegedly tasked by the Soviets to [redacted] (Although the fact that [redacted] was in contact with the Soviets has been established, [redacted]

(S) [redacted] "claims" to have been so tasked, but he conceivably could have claimed such tasking to alleviate fears of [redacted] The case also brought to the fore an issue which is increasingly becoming a concern of the U.S. Government--the [redacted] to

(U) the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. (S)

[redacted]

The case opened in [redacted] when [redacted] of [redacted] b6 b7C offered the individual [redacted] are company trade secrets and thus proprietary information. A [redacted] compared the [redacted] to the "recipe for Coca Cola." Needless to say, the [redacted] is embargoed for exportation to the Soviet Union. (U)

Fortunately, the employee contacted by [redacted] reported the [redacted] offer immediately to his superiors at [redacted] who in turn contacted the FBI. From that point on, [redacted] dealings with [redacted] as well as other computer firms, were constantly monitored by the FBI. In his negotiations, [redacted] freely admitted that he was attempting to obtain the [redacted] for the Soviet Government, with which [redacted] As the negotiations wore on, [redacted] offer escalated first to [redacted] then finally to [redacted] (U)

Eventually, however, [redacted] realized that he could not, himself, acquire the [redacted] He thereupon contacted an employee of a firm housed in the same building in which [redacted] is located, and offered to pay

the individual to obtain the [redacted] The individual immediately contacted the FBI, and at this point a UCA was interjected into the case. The UCA was introduced to [redacted] as a [redacted] (U) b6 b7C b7E

[redacted]

[redacted] He was sentenced on [redacted] to [redacted] in prison. In a [redacted] the U.S. Government [redacted]

[redacted]

(C) [redacted] b1

(S) [redacted] b1

Why the Soviets would target [redacted] in particular, is explicable. As noted by an official of [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] The [redacted] offered by the [redacted] is, the official explained, "a drop in the bucket," compared to the millions spent by [redacted] in developing this type of advanced technology. The prosecution in the case estimated the value of the [redacted] (U)

(C) [redacted] b1

APPENDIX

COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, JUNE 1, 1979

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS
USSR	1,222
PRC	234
POLAND	271
GDR	77
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	107
CUBA	84
ROMANIA	80
(S) HUNGARY	78
BULGARIA	48
VIETNAM	9
NORTH KOREA	13
YUGOSLAVIA	151
ALBANIA	10
MONGOLIA	11
TOTAL	2,395

b1

NOTE: OFFICIALS IS A GENERIC DESIGNATION USED BY THE FBI FOR PRACTICAL OPERATIONAL CONVENIENCE AND SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH DIPLOMATIC DESIGNATIONS.

COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, JUNE 1, 1980

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS
USSR	1,116
PRC	448
POLAND	301
GDR	98
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	104
CUBA	159
ROMANIA	74
HUNGARY	79
BULGARIA	52
VIETNAM	18
NORTH KOREA	14
YUGOSLAVIA	279
ALBANIA	8
MONGOLIA	13
KAMPUCHEA	4
LAOS	11
TOTAL	2,778

(S)

b1

COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, JUNE, 1981

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS
USSR	1,041
PRC	701
POLAND	365
GDR	112
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	90
CUBA	79
(S) ROMANIA	87
HUNGARY	107
BULGARIA	79
VIETNAM	21
NORTH KOREA	14
YUGOSLAVIA	352
ALBANIA	11
TOTAL	3,059


b6
b7C

MAJOR COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

JUNE, 1979 - JUNE, 1981

b1

(S)



(S) [redacted]

In April, 1981, alterations were made in the list of

(S) [redacted] and Cambodia, Laos, and

(S) Outer Mongolia were deleted. The complete [redacted]

list is as follows:

(S) [redacted]

b1

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DISSEMINATION LIST

b6
b7C

Department of Justice, The Attorney General - 1

Department of the Treasury, Director, U.S. Secret Service -1; Special Assistant for National Security - 1

Director of Central Intelligence - 1; Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Counterintelligence - 2

Department of State, The Secretary of State - 1

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency - 2

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army - 5

Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force - 1

Director, Naval Investigative Service, U.S. Navy - 1

Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Deputy Director for Operations (Counterintelligence Staff; Publications Unit) - 2; National Foreign Assessment Center - 1; Executive Secretary, Director of Central Intelligence Security Committee - 1; Director of Security (Security Analysis Group) - 1

National Security Agency, Director - 1; M56 - 1; M503 - 1; Publication Unit - 1

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Navy Security Committee Member - 1

Department of Defense, Director for Counterintelligence and Security Policy, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense - 1

Chief, Security Education Division, Defense Industrial Security Institute - 1

Director, Division of Security, Nuclear Regulatory Commission - 1

~~SECRET~~

Department of Energy - 3

Director, FBI - 1

Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

Memorandum

Exec AD Adm. ___
Exec AD Inv. ___
Exec AD LES ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To : Mr. E. J. O'Malley 4/81

From [redacted]

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1
DATE 03-17-2011

Subject: FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

b6
b7C

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary," for dissemination within the FBI. (U)

ANALYSIS

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices and appropriate Headquarters personnel. (U)

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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V-84

Enclosure 1 - ENCLOSURE

(CONTINUED - OVER)

65-74480

OCT 23 1981

TJD:enb (7)

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classified and Extended by~~ 859
Reason ~~for Extension, FCIM, II,~~ 1-2.4.2 (2) and (3)
~~Date of Review~~ for Declassification ~~June 24, 2001~~

79 NOV 2 1981

FBI/DOJ

Memorandum from Mr. [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary

DETAILS:

b1
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(C) This publication provides an overview and analysis of [redacted]

(C) This issue is devoted to the activities of [redacted] during the last six months of 1980. Printed copies

(U) will be supplied when printing process is complete.

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)
DATE 03-17-2011

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary

Volume VI

April 1981

Security Precautions

Warning Notice	Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
National Security Information	Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~Classified and Extended by 859~~
Reason For Extension ~~FCIM, II~~, 1-2.4.2 (2) and (3)
Date ~~of Review~~ For Declassification (~~April 1~~, 2001)

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[redacted] Soviet Principal Confronted by SA 65

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Communist Country Official Presence in the United States, June, 1979-March, 1981 69-73

(S) [redacted] 77

CHART

Major Communist Country Presence in the United States, June, 1979-March, 1981 75

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b1
b6
b7C

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide an overview and analysis of [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. This particular issue is devoted to the activitites of [redacted]

(C) [redacted] during the latter six months of 1980. For purposes of brevity, these services will henceforth be referred to as [redacted]

(S) [redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Some of the material contained herein has been obtained from other elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ, Intelligence

(U) Division, Attention: [redacted] CI-3(A). (S)

Additionally, delegations from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Ministry of National Defense (MND) have visited numerous U.S. military installations and defense-related corporations with almost a free hand to gain material. An interesting note to this cooperation is that

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
As part of the modernization program and in tune with U.S.-PRC educational exchange initiated in 1978, approximately 6,000 PRC students are now in the United States studying and doing research in all academic disciplines in every region of the United States.

(S)

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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

(S)



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APPENDIX

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HUNGARY	78
BULGARIA	48
VIETNAM	9
NORTH KOREA	13
YUGOSLAVIA	151
ALBANIA	10
MONGOLIA	11
TOTAL	2,395

(S)

b1

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GDR	98
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	104
CUBA	159
ROMANIA	74
HUNGARY	79
BULGARIA	52
VIETNAM	18
NORTH KOREA	14
YUGOSLAVIA	279
ALBANIA	8
MONGOLIA	13
KAMPUCHEA	4
LAOS	11
TOTAL	2,778

(S)

b1

COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, MARCH, 1981

b1

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS
USSR	1,026
PRC	626
POLAND	369
GDR	127
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	92
CUBA	79
ROMANIA	80
HUNGARY	104
BULGARIA	83
VIETNAM	23
NORTH KOREA	13
YUGOSLAVIA	357
ALBANIA	9
MONGOLIA	14
TOTAL	**3,002**


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MAJOR COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

JUNE, 1979-MARCH, 1981

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124

1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

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FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)
DATE 03-21-2011

8/23/81

Director, FBI

LEGAT, London (703+0)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SPIA; SATPIA
FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
FCI MATTER

Classified ~~"Confidential"~~ in entirety, unless otherwise noted. (U)

Re Legat London airtel 2/12/81 and Bureau 8/3 dated 3/3/81 with enclosure. (U)

By above referenced routing slip, Legat London was furnished a copy of the current, September, 1980, edition (Volume 35) of the FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary (FCS). Legat London will receive future editions of this semi-annual summary.

The purpose of this communication is to address the forwarding of copies of SPIA and SATPIA to Legat London.

A review of this matter at FBIHQ determined that the SPIA and SATPIA bi-monthly publications are timely "cold" summaries of active and ongoing cases of the FCI. While efforts are made not to identify assets and sensitive techniques, sufficient detail is present on specific cases to lead to their identification. The SPIA summary has distribution only to FBIHQ, and establishment offices of New York, D.C., and San Francisco, upon whom these summaries have impact.

The detail reported in particular cases [illegible] investigation in the U. S. as set forth in SPIA and SATPIA is seen by FBIHQ as information not actually needed by Legat London, whereas the FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary is seen to best serve the needs of the Legat since it sets forth a broad FCI view and analysis to include

INDEXED
NOT RECORDED

(C) [redacted]

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

RLJ:smd
(11)
100-354839 (SPIA)
1 - 65-63488a (SATPIA)

1 - 65-74480 (FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY)
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
and extended by 4412
Reason for Extension: FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (2 and 3)
Date of review for declassification: 08/23/2001

55 AUG 31 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Airtel to Legat, London
Re: SPIA, SATPIA
FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
FCI MATTER

Your interest in keeping abreast of current matters in the FBI field is noted by FCIRC, and we will remain cognizant of any additional studies or publications on FCI subjects which could be of assistance to you, and will forward same where appropriate.

Inquiries and/or comments concerning the FCS should be directed to INTD, attention CI-3-A Unit.

NOTE:

This addresses Legat, London's request to receive current issues of SPIA, SATPIA, and FCS as previously indicated they should in Cregar memorandum 10/31/79, captioned (C) "Coordination of Leads To/From [redacted] setting forth (U) policy as pertains to Legat, London. (X) b1 b6 b7C

Coordination with [redacted] Assistant Section Chief CI-2, and [redacted] CI-3, has determined that copies of SPIA and SATPIA have not been sent to Legats in general for reasons to include security of the information, assets and techniques described in the documents; the fact that SPIA and SATPIA are tightly held summaries for FBIHQ and establishment office use, and are not seen as needed by Legats since the information on individual cases and trends may be too specific for a specific area (i.e., San Francisco), and not necessary for the (U) needs of a Legat, such as London. (X)

After review of this matter, it is apparent that CI-3-A Unit publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary (FCS)" Clearly fills the needs and requests of Legat, London to be kept advised of current trends and interests in the FCI field, since this publication covers the broad FCI field and cites trends and major developments. CI-3-A has insured Legat, London will regularly receive copies of FCS, current copy of (U) which is now in preparation. (X)

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DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)
DATE 03-21-2011

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review Volume V

November, 1980

Security Precautions

Warning Notice	Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
National Security Information	Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
ORCON	Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator
NOFORN	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

~~Classified and Extended by 1756~~
~~Reason For Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2~~ (2 and 3)
~~Date of Review For Declassification~~ (November 1, 2000)

~~SECRET~~

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide an overview and analysis of [redacted]

(C) [redacted]


Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. This particular issue is devoted to the activities of [redacted]

(C) [redacted] during the first six months of 1980. For purposes of brevity, these services will henceforth be referred to as the [redacted]

(C) [redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. (U) (S)

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(S)



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Aside from the [redacted] case, two other significant counterintelligence actions, involving double agent operations, were initiated against the SIS in mid-1980. In May of 1980, the U.S. Department of State (USDS) lodged a strong

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protest with Soviet diplomatic officials regarding the activities of [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

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
[redacted] Following the USDS protest, [redacted] recalled by the Soviet Union. (S)

That same month, the USDS lodged yet another protest, this one relating to the activities of [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

[redacted] was also impelled to depart the United States. (S)

(S) [redacted]




(S)

b1

Cuban-American relations during the initial portion of 1980 have been greatly affected by the influx of over 125,000 Cuban refugees into the United States. The refugee exodus is the result of economic, social, and political pressures that have been building since 1977. The Cuban

economy has stagnated, and the already austere standard of living has deteriorated even further. Additionally, a rapidly expanding labor force has created a labor surplus, and incidences of crime, of poor job performance, and of political discontent have been on the increase. (U) (S)

(S)



b1

(S) [redacted]

Scientific and Technical Intelligence

[redacted]

(S)


Political Intelligence

(S)

b1

V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

(S)



b1

The Neutralization of an East German Illegal

As detailed in the "Review" of March, 1979, a suspected East German illegal using the identity, [redacted] (at the time of publication, for security purposes, the name "Schmidt" was used in the article) was located in New York City. He was employed by a major [redacted] which has, as one of its clients, the United States Department of Defense; thus the firm handled some classified data. [redacted] was married to a woman who, although being a naturalized U.S citizen, is a Cuban immigrant. [redacted]

b1
b6
b7C

(S)

[redacted]

APPENDIX

COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, OCTOBER, 1979

Country	Officials
USSR	1,217
PRC	239
Poland	287
GDR	77
Czechoslovakia	98
Cuba	100
Romania	80
Hungary	79
Bulgaria	51
Vietnam	12
North Korea	12
Yugoslavia	154
Albania	12
Mongolia	10
Total	2,428

(S)

b1

NOTE: Officials is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations.

COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, OCTOBER, 1980


Country	Officials
USSR	897
PRC	481
Poland	359
GDR	121
Czechoslovakia	96
Cuba	155
(S) Romania	78
Hungary	87
Bulgaria	66
Vietnam	18
North Korea	14
Yugoslavia	324
Albania	9
Mongolia	11
Kampuchea	3
Laos	11
Total	2,730

b1

MAJOR COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER, 1979 - OCTOBER, 1980

b1

(S)



~~SECRET~~

DISSEMINATION LIST

Number

36 [redacted]

35 Department of Justice, The Attorney General - 1

37, 34 Department of the Treasury, Director, U.S. Secret Service - 1; Special Assistant for National Security - 1

30, 31, 32 Director of Central Intelligence - 1; Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Counterintelligence - 2

54, 55, 56, DOE

29 Department of State, The Secretary of State - 1

27, ~~33~~ Director, Defense Intelligence Agency - ~~X~~ 1

22, 23, 24, 25, 26 Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army - 5

17, 18, 19, 20, 21 Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force - 5

16 Director, Naval Investigative Service, U.S. Navy - 1

11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 28 Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Deputy Director for Operations (Counterintelligence Staff; Hostile Contacts Branch) - 2; National Foreign Assessment Center - 1; Executive Secretary, Director of Central Intelligence Security Committee - 1; Publications Unit - 1

40 N.R.C.

57, 58, 59 9, 10, 59 National Security Agency, Director - 1; M56 - 1

8 Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Navy Security Committee Member - 1

7 Department of Defense, Director for Counterintelligence and Security Policy, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense - 1

6 Chief, Security Education Division, Defense Industrial Security Institute - 1

1 Director, FBI - 1

4 Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

5 Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

2 - O'Malley

3 [redacted]

37 -

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Exec AD Adm. ___
Exec AD LES ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
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Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
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Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. E. J. O'Malley EJO/LA

DATE: 12/15/80

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EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)
DATE 03-21-2011

FROM: [redacted]

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review," for dissemination to elements of the United States Intelligence Community, as well as the Senate and House intelligence committees. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved for dissemination, as detailed on attached list, to elements of the United States Intelligence Community and the Congress. (U)

APPROVED
Director
Exec. AD-Adm.
Exec. AD Inv.
Exec. AD LES
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Ident.
Intell. EJO/LA
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.

Enclosures - 2

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

65-74480

(CONTINUED - OVER)

TJD:enb (8)

1 - Mr. F. M. Mullen, Jr.
1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr.

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~~Classified and Extended by 5071~~
~~Reason for Extension, FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (3)~~
~~Date of Review for Declassification December 15, 2000~~

61 APR 13 '81

FBI/DOJ

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Asst. Dir.:
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Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. E. J. O'Malley

DATE: 9/22/80

0124

FROM : [redacted]

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "~~FBI~~ Foreign Counterintelligence Summary," for dissemination within the FBI. (U)

b6
b7C

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices and appropriate Headquarters personnel. (U)

APPROVED:
Director
Exec. AD-Adm.
Exec. AD-Inv.
Exec. AD-LES
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
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FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)
DATE 03-21-2011

DE-21

(CONTINUED - OVER)

TJD:enb (7)

Enclosure

65-74480

1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr.

1 - Mr.
1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified and Extended by 1756
Reason for Extension, FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (3)
Date of ~~Review~~ for Declassification September 22, 2000

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI/DOJ

Memorandum from Mr. [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary
65-74480

b1
b6
b7C

DETAILS:

(C) This publication provides an overview and analysis of [redacted] This issue is devoted to

(C) the activities of [redacted] during the

(U) first six months of 1980. (S)

Not for Dissemination Outside the FBI

~~SECRET~~

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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DATE 03-21-2011

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FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary

Volume V

September, 1980

ENCLOSURE 65-114281-51

Not for Dissemination Outside the FBI

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 51

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Communist Country Presence in the United States, June 9, 1979 71

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CHART

Major Country Communist Country Presence in the United States, June, 1979 - June, 1980 75

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide an overview and analysis of [redacted]

(C) [redacted]

Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. This particular issue is devoted to the activities of [redacted] b1

(C) [redacted] during the first six months of 1980. For purposes of brevity, these services will henceforth be referred to as [redacted]

(C) [redacted]. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Some of the material contained herein has been obtained from other elements of the United States intelligence community, as well as the intelligence services of certain friendly, foreign Governments. (U)

(S) [redacted]

During the initial portion of 1980, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union continued to deteriorate, largely as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

b1

Within the past year, however, there has been a marked decline in Soviet official presence. Due in part to the closing of the Soviet Consul General, New York, New York (SOVCONY), [redacted]

(S) [redacted] Soviet presence has declined from 1,222 in June, 1979 to 1,116 in June, 1980. Furthermore, within the past year there has been a decrease in Soviet east-west exchange visitors to the United States, as well as a marked decrease in Soviet merchant shipping docking in U.S. ports.

(U) ~~(S)~~

(S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]


b1

Cuban-American relations during the initial portion of 1980 have been greatly affected by two central elements--a stepped up anti-American propaganda campaign by Cuban leader Fidel Castro and the influx of over 125,000 Cuban refugees into the United States. A stimulant to Cuban anti-American propagandizing has been a perception by Castro that U.S. hostility towards Cuba and the Soviet Union is escalating dangerously. [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

The refugee exodus is the result of economic, social, and political pressures that have been building since 1977. The Cuban economy has stagnated, and the already austere standard of living has deteriorated even further. Additionally, a rapidly expanding labor force has created a labor surplus, and incidences of crime, of poor job performance, and of political discontent have been on the increase. The exodus will, however, probably result in only temporary alleviation of pressures on the Cuban leadership since the country's basic economic problems are not being addressed and will continue to cause trouble for Castro. (U) (S)

(S)



b1

Political Intelligence

(S)



V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

[redacted] b6 b7C

In February, 1980, the Government of Canada declared Assistant Military Attache [redacted] Persona Non Grata (PNG), because of the Soviet's persistance in abusing their diplomatic status by conducting espionage activities. Concommitant with the PNG action, the Canadians released a statement for the press which detailed the abuses of the Soviets:

> "The case involved a citizen of the United States, employed in a sensitive position in the U.S.A., who was in contact with the Soviet Embassy and tasked to obtain information. The R.C.M.P., with the cooperation of the FBI, monitored the case and, with the help of a U.S. citizen, determined that over a period of some sixteen months the Soviets met clandestinely with the U.S. citizen, using traditional signal arrangements and dead letter boxes, in the Ottawa area, where exchanges of information and money took place."

(S) [redacted] b1

COMMUNIST COUNTRY PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, JUNE 1, 1980

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS
USSR	1,116
PRC	448
POLAND	301
GDR	98
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	104
CUBA	159
ROMANIA	74
HUNGARY	79
BULGARIA	52
VIETNAM	18
NORTH KOREA	14
YUGOSLAVIA	279
ALBANIA	8
MONGOLIA	13
KAMPUCHEA	4
LAOS	11
TOTAL	2,778

(S)


b1

MAJOR COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

JUNE, 1979 - JUNE, 1980

b1

(S)



SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Assoc. Dir. ____ b6
Dep. AD Adm. ____ b7C
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
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Crim. Inv. ____
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Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. E. J. O'Malley

DATE: 3/28/80

FROM : J. H. Geer

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review," for dissemination to elements of the United States Intelligence Community, as well as the Senate and House intelligence committees. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved for dissemination, as detailed on attached list, to elements of the United States Intelligence Community and the Congress. (U)

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EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)
DATE 03-28-2011

APPROVED:

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Exec. AD-Adm.
~~Exec. AD-LES~~

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Intell.
Laboratory

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Rec. Mgnt.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.

Enclosures - 2 ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

(CONTINUED - OVER)

65-74480

TJD:en (9)

1 - Mr. L. Colwell
1 - Mr. F. M. Mullen, Jr.
(Attn: [redacted])
1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
1 - Mr. [redacted]

1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr. J. H. Geer
1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr. [redacted]

MAY 7 1980

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~~Classified and Extended by~~ 222
~~Reason for Extension, FCIM, II,~~ 1-2.4.2 (3)
~~Date of Review for Declassification~~ March 28, 2000

8 JUN 20 '80

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI/DOJ

Memorandum from Mr. J. H. Geer to Mr. E. J. O'Malley
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review
65-74480

DETAILS:

(C) This publication provides an overview and analysis of [redacted] b1

(C) [redacted] This particular issue is devoted to the activities of [redacted] during the latter seven months of 1979. (S)

(U)

DISSEMINATION LIST

b6
b7C

Department of Justice, The Attorney General - 1

Department of the Treasury, Director, U.S. Secret Service -1; Special Assistant for National Security - 1

Director of Central Intelligence - 1; Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Counterintelligence - 2

Department of State, The Secretary of State - 1; Director of Intelligence Liaison - 1; Office of East European Affairs - 1; Office of East Asian Affairs - 1; Office of American Republic Affairs - 1

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Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force - 1

Director, Naval Investigative Service, U.S. Navy - 1

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Director, Division of Safeguards and Security, Department of Energy - 1

National Security Agency, Director - 1; M503 - 1; M56-1; Publications Unit - 1

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65-7488 - 5

Department of Defense, Director for Counterintelligence and Security Policy, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense - 1

Chief, Security Education Division, Defense Industrial Security Institute - 1

Director, FBI - 1

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FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review Volume IV

March, 1980

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MJD:en

MAIL ROOM ☐

65-74480-50

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[redacted] 49 b6 b7C

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INTRODUCTION


(C) The purpose of this publication is to afford an overview and analysis of [redacted] Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations and operational techniques is also afforded. This particular issue is devoted to the activities of [redacted] during latter seven months of 1979. For purposes of brevity, these services will henceforth be referred to as [redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific detailed, documented form. (U)

b6
b7C

(S) [redacted]

During the latter part of 1979, relations between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were undermined by a number of developments, the most decisive of which was, of course, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. b1

(S) [redacted]



(S)

b1

which was dramatized in the fall of 1979 by publicity surrounding the publication of The Fourth Man, by Andrew Boyle. This book explores the lives of the infamous Englishmen

who spied for the Soviets, Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, and Anthony Blunt, who were recruited to the Soviet cause when they were students at Cambridge University in the 1930s. (8)

(U)

[redacted] CI-1 Unit Chiefs.

b1
b6
b7C

(S)

As reported in the "Review" of March, 1979, Poland was the first among Eastern European nations to attempt a special relationship with the United States. Poland has held most-favored-nation status (MFN) since 1960, and trade between Poland and the United States has increased steadily. Unfortunately for Poland, its economic standing in the international community has been undermined by heavy indebtedness to the West, including the United States. Polish diplomatic efforts in the United States are thus centered around fostering trade and, in general, cultivating good relations between the two nations. In light of Poland's positive stance towards the United States, it is not surprising that [redacted]


b1

(C)

[redacted]

(S)

[redacted]



(S)

b1

The current leadership of the People's Republic of China has launched a multibillion-dollar program to acquire Western machinery and technology to help modernize their nation's primitive industrial base. The program was initiated in February of 1978, when Chairman Hua Guofeng announced that,

as the initial stage of the modernization plan, 120 major industrial projects were to be completed under a ten-year (1976-85) economic plan. To achieve the ambitious construction and production targets of the plan, massive infusions of Western technology and equipment will be required. The long-range objective of the program is to propel the Chinese economy to "front line" status by the year 2000. (U)

b1

(S)


(C)

(U) Encryption and Decryption Codes and Toilet Paper Concealment Device (S)

(U) Custom-Built Miniaturized Camera (S)


(U) Camera in Operational Position (S)

(U) Sample of Film From Camera (S)



(U)

There has long been a question over the placement of homosexuals in sensitive positions, mainly because it has been held that homosexuals are particularly vulnerable to compromise and recruitment b1



(C)

Generally speaking, the homosexuals present an opportunity for recruitment that cannot be overlooked

(S)

An individual employed in a sensitive position and discovered to be a homosexual will be closely assessed

(S)

Homosexuality may, however, be

only one of many factors that are considered. Homosexuality, combined with financial distress, drug or alcohol addiction, employment dissatisfaction, or marital discord are a few of the possibilities that may prove to be a deciding factor in a recruitment approach. The posture of the SIS vis-a-vis the homosexual was discussed by John Barron in his book, "KGB: The Secret Work of the Soviet Secret Agents" (Reader's Digest Press, 1974). Barron noted, that "contrary to popular supposition, the KGB is not primarily interested in homosexuals because of their presumed susceptibility to blackmail. In its judgment, homosexuality often is accompanied by personality disorders that make the victim potentially unstable and vulnerable to adroit manipulation. It hunts the particular homosexual who, while more or less a functioning member of his society, is nevertheless subconsciously at war with it and himself. Compulsively driven into tortured relations that never gratify, he cannot escape awareness that he is different. Being different, he easily rationalizes that he is not morally bound by the morals, values and allegiances that unite others in community or society. Moreover, he nurtures a dormant impulse to strike back at the society which he feels has conspired to make him a secret leper." (U)

105-271060

(C) There have been a number of cases in history of modern espionage where the recruited [redacted] agent was a homosexual. Perhaps most notable were the [redacted] Of these three individuals, homosexuality played a pivotal role in the


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recruitment of [redacted]

(C)



~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DAMI-CIC

19 March 1980

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

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b7C

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
ATTN: Acting Chief, Intelligence Division
J. Edgar Hoover Building
Washington, DC 20535

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-28-2011 BY 60322/UC/LRP/PLJ/ETG

Dear Mr. O'Malley:

Your publication, ~~FBI Foreign Counterintelligence~~ Review, which is periodically disseminated by your office, has been of great value to this Directorate. In order for more of our senior counterintelligence personnel located at Fort Meade, Maryland and Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia to benefit from this excellent publication, we require an increase in the number of copies received by this Directorate from three (3) to five (5).

Sincerely,

[redacted]
LTC(P), GS
Director of Counterintelligence

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
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Crim. Inv. ____
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Rec. Mgnt. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

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TO : Mr. W. O. Cregar

DATE: 2/13/80

FROM : J. H. Geer
FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYST

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-28-2011

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary," for dissemination within the FBI. (U) VOLUME IV FEB. 1980

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices and appropriate Headquarters personnel. (U)

APPROVED:		
Director	Adm. Serv.	Legal Coun.
Exec. AD-Inv.	Crim. Inv.	Plan. & Insp.
Exec. AD-Adm.	Ident.	Rec. Mgnt.
Exec. AD-LES	Intell.	Tech. Servs.
	Laboratory	Training
		Public Affs. Off.

TJD:en (7)

Enclosure

(CONTINUED - OVER)

65-74480

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr. [redacted]

1 - Mr. J. H. Geer
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas
1 - Mr. [redacted]

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b7C

ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAR 10 1980

Classified and Extended by 222
Reason for Extension ~~FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2~~ (3)
Date of Review for Declassification ~~February 13, 2000~~

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI/DOJ

b1

IV. [redacted] 41

(S) [redacted] 41

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Security Review of Agent Operations 44

Travel by Intelligence Officers 45

(S) [redacted] 45

V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 47

(S) [redacted] 47

[redacted] 59

PHOTOGRAPHS

(S) [redacted] 51-58

[redacted] 59

b6
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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to afford an b1
(C) overview and analysis of [redacted]
[redacted]
Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations and operational techniques is also afforded. This particular issue is devoted to the activities of [redacted]
(C) [redacted] during latter seven months of 1979. For purposes of brevity, these services will henceforth be
(C) referred to as [redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific detailed, documented form. Some of the material contained herein has been obtained from other elements of the United States Intelligence Community, as well as the intelligence services of certain friendly foreign
(U) Governments. (S)

(S) [redacted]

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During the latter part of 1979, relations between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were considerably undermined by a number of developments. In late August, an incident occurred which sparked enmity between the two states. Soon after [redacted] defected in New York City, [redacted] was escorted by Soviet officials to a departing Aeroflot flight for an immediate trip back to the Soviet Union. Since it was not known whether or not [redacted] was being coerced into leaving the United States, the U.S. Government prevented the airliner from departing Kennedy International Airport. For three days, controversy ensued, until the Soviets allowed American officials on board to interview the defector's [redacted] (U)

U.S.-Soviet relations became further strained when it became disclosed that a Soviet combat brigade, made up of over 2,000 troops, was stationed in Cuba. The Soviets contended that the brigade had been in Cuba since the early 1960s, and was used strictly for training purposes. The U.S. Government differed with this contention, as elucidated by President Carter on October 1, "there is a high degree of confidence that it is not a unit with a primary purpose of training Cubans." The U.S. Government entered into negotiations with the Soviets and attained assurances from the Soviets, that, among other things, the "unit in question is a training center; that it does nothing more than training, and can do nothing more." To help insure Soviet cooperation, the


United States took a number of steps, which included an increase in surveillances of Cuba and the expansion of military maneuvers in the region. (U)

But, by far the most decisive event to affect U.S.-Soviet relations adversely occurred, of course, in late December, when upwards of 85,000 Soviet troops poured into neighboring Afghanistan, to help consolidate the establishment of a pro-Soviet regime [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] Referral/Consult

[redacted] President Carter reacted to the Soviet invasion with a number of moves, including the postponement of consideration of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II); the halting of grain shipments to the Soviet Union; and the consideration of a U.S. boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics, which are scheduled to be held in Moscow. (U)

(S) [redacted] b1



(S)

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As reported in the "Summary" of January, 1979, Poland was the first among Eastern European nations to attempt a special relationship with the United States. Poland has held most-favored-nation status (MFN) since 1960, and trade between Poland and the United States has increased steadily. Unfortunately for Poland, its economic standing in the international community has been undermined by heavy indebtedness to the West, including the United States. Polish

diplomatic efforts in the United States are thus centered around fostering trade and, in general, cultivating good relations between the two nations.


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Travel by Intelligence Officers


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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

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(U) Forged Identification Documents (S)

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

In reply refer to
I-02331/80

26 FEB 1980

POLICY REVIEW

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

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DATE 03-28-2011 BY 60322/UC/LRP/PLJ/ETC

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SUBJECT: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review

The FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review has come to our attention as being a document that would be most useful to us in the execution of our responsibilities both as Program Manager for the DoD FCI Program and in our overall policy making capacity for Counterintelligence within the Department of Defense.

We would appreciate being added to your distribution list and, in addition, it would be most helpful if you would provide us copies of previous issues.

for L. Britt Snider
Director for Counterintelligence
and Security Policy

79 MAR 27 '80

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar
1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr. J.H. Geer
1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr. [redacted]

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BY LIAISON

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)
DATE 03-28-2011

Date: December 13, 1979

To: Commander
Office of Special Investigations
Department of the Air Force
Forrestal Building
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Chief, Acquisitions and Analysis Division
Directorate of Counterintelligence

From: William O. Cregar, Assistant Director

Subject: REQUEST FOR RELEASE OF INFORMATION

Reference is made to your letter dated December 3, 1979, captioned "Release of Information," your reference IVOA. (U)

We interpose no objection to your reprinting in the "AFOSI Quarterly Counterintelligence Brief" the article and photographs entitled [redacted] b1
(C) [redacted] as sanitized
in the enclosure to referenced letter. It is understood
(U) that the ~~"Secret"~~ classification will be maintained. (C)

Your attention is invited to the final paragraph of the text of the article which makes reference to "pages 55 through 59" of the FCI Review. It is expected that you will desire to change this reference. (U)

62-85557
(1) - 65-74480 (FCI Review)

JPT:vcl/prh (9)

SEE NOTE - Page 2

ORIGINAL FILED IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUPLICATE YELLOW

NOT RECORDED
160 DEC 27 1979

Classified ~~and Extended~~ by 222
Reason for ~~Extension~~ ~~FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2~~ (2) & (3)
Date ~~of Review~~ for Declassification December 13, ~~1999~~

Commander
Office of Special Investigations

Note:

In the October, 1979, edition of the "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review" appeared aforementioned article which described a double agent operation which resulted in the temporary detention of [redacted] b1

(C) [redacted] AFOSI submitted a sanitized copy of the article and requested permission to reprint it in its "Quarterly Counterintelligence Brief" which is designed to provide USAF commanders worldwide

(U) significant counterintelligence information. (U)

This has been coordinated with Supervisor [redacted] b6 b7C CI-2. (U)

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

October 24, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM O. CREGAR
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FROM: [redacted]

SUBJECT: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review

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The Secretary of the Treasury has forwarded the copy of subject publication to my office, which is responsible within Treasury for liaison with the intelligence community. We have found the publication of definite interest to our office and selected officials in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and Operations.

I am sure the publication would also be of definite interest to the Director of the Secret Service. Because of the physical separation of our offices I would very much appreciate your sending a separate copy directly to him at Secret Service headquarters, 1800 G Street, N.W., on a regular basis.

I would also suggest that future copies of this and similar publications be sent directly to my office in Room 4324, Main Treasury Building, since it is our responsibility to see that the documents are made available to Treasury officials on a need-to-know basis.

65-74460-46

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
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FBI File No. HQ 65-74480 - Section 3

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Memorandum

65-7[illegible]
62-117931

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Crim. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
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Rec. Mgnt. ___
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Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

To : Mr. E. J. O'Malley

Date 7/25/85

From : [redacted]

b6
b7C

Subject : ~~FBI FOREIGN COUNTER INTELLIGENCE REVIEW~~ VOLUME XI
"FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

This communication is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ in its entirety.

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review" for dissemination to individuals and elements listed on attached dissemination list.

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated externally to individuals and elements listed on attached dissemination list.

DE-60

65-74480-65

APPROVED: Adm. Servs. ___ Laboratory ___
Crim. Inv. ___ Legal Coun. ___
Director ___ Off. of Cong & Public Affs. ___
Exec AD-Adm. ___ Ident. ___ Rec. Mgnt. ___
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AUG 30 1985

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FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 03-28-2011

2-ENCLOSURE

Enclosure ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

~~T~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

65-74480

(CONTINUED - OVER)

1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
1 - [redacted]
1 -
1 -
1 -

RJD:lw (7)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by 859
Declassify on: OADR

JAN 10 1986

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley b6 b7C
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review
65-74480

DETAILS:

The "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review" provides an overview and analysis of [redacted] b1
(C) [redacted] It is for dissemination externally to individuals and elements listed on attached dissemination list. Printed copies will be distributed when printing process is completed.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-28-2011

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Office of Legislative Affairs - 1; Counsel for
Intelligence Policy - 1

Department of the Treasury, Director, U.S. Secret
Service - 1; Special Assistant for National Security - 1

Department of State, The Secretary of State - 1

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency - 2

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and Evaluation Staff/DDI - 2; Director, Office of
Security - 1; Chief, Security Analysis Group/Office of
Security - 1

National Security Agency, Director - 1; M56 - 1; M503 - 1;
Publication Unit - 1

65-74480-65

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Navy Security Committee Member - 1

Department of Energy - 5

Department of Defense, Director for Counterintelligence and Security Policy, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense - 1

Chief, Security Education Division, Defense Industrial Security Institute - 1

Chief, Security Education Group, Office of Security - 1

Director, Division of Security, Nuclear Regulatory Commission - 1

Director, Office of Security, General Accounting Office - 1

Director, FBI - 1

Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

Intelligence and Security Command, U.S. Army - 8

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FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1, 6)
DATE 03-03-2011

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~~SECRET~~

FBI FOREIGN COUNTER INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

VOLUME XI

This communication is classified ~~"Secret/Orcon" in its entirety~~.

~~SECRET~~

~~Classified by 859~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~

65-74480-65

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
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide, on a semiannual basis, an overview and analysis of [redacted] (S) [redacted]

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Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed documented form. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ, Intelligence Division, Attention: [redacted] CI-3 Section, B Unit.

(S)



b1

The expulsion of nearly 150 Soviet officials worldwide in 1983 was directed primarily at those engaged in S & T intelligence collection. Many of those expelled, including two from the United States, were KGB Line X officers. These expulsions, even when coupled with strained U. S. - Soviet relations, do not appear to have had a significant effect on Line X activities in the United States. It would seem that there would be a disruptive effect upon SIS operations when a KGB officer is forced to depart unexpectedly, since it frequently requires several months to arrange for a replacement. The FBI has, however, not detected any activity which might be construed as compensating for the expulsion of an officer. This may be explained in part by the fact that the broad S & T requirements can often be satisfied through the acquisition of unclassified information. Furthermore, targeted material can be acquired outside the United States under more favorable operating conditions, or inside the United States by Warsaw Pact intelligence services.

Active Measures

During the first week in July, 1984, allegations surfaced that the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) had sent a letter to the Olympic Committee of Zimbabwe, threatening violence against its Olympic teams. Shortly thereafter, similar letters containing threats, racist, and derogatory language were received by other African and Asian countries. Countries known to have received the letters are Ghana, Mali, Cameroon, Senegal, Uganda, Nigeria, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Hong Kong, Malaysia, South Korea, Philippines, Burma, Japan, Singapore, and the People's Republic of China (PRC).

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
b1

Top-level leaders of the different factions of the KKK were interviewed by the FBI. They categorically denied any knowledge of the letters and pointed out many discrepancies in the logo appearing on the letters.

The words and phrases used in the purported Klan letters are not colloquial English and are characteristic of nonnative use of the English language. In addition, the timing of the mailing of the letters to coincide with the visit of Secretary of State Shultz to Malaysia is indicative of a desire to make the most of these circumstances for propaganda purposes. During this visit, Tass published an article saying that the KKK has "expressed in an extremely base manner what the architects of American Policy have in their mind." The article said that the Reagan administration "has mounted such ferociously anti-socialist activities as has made participation of sportsmen from Socialist countries in the Los Angeles Olympics impossible."

It is clear that the news release was part of a preconceived plan on the part of the Soviets to immediately publicize material that would support their decision to boycott the Olympics and imply that the letters are in some way connected with President Reagan's foreign policy.

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In [redacted] a separate but seemingly related espionage matter came to the attention of the FBI. Through [redacted] the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and then the FBI were approached concerning the [redacted] in exchange for information he would supply to the U. S. Government on his illegal activities. [redacted]

[redacted]

It was apparent that the activities of the [redacted] under investigation by the FBI. [redacted] it became necessary to establish a relationship with the [redacted] to insure a continued dialogue. This was accomplished by the [redacted]

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In [redacted]. They were in the form of detailed but anonymous depositions which [redacted] transcribed from cassette tapes. The depositions were quite detailed but frequently rambling in style. Most important, however, based upon one of the depositions, the FBI was able to identify [redacted] who resided in [redacted] California. Thus, the first goal of the FBI investigation had been accomplished with the identification of [redacted]

Further investigation revealed that [redacted] had maintained [redacted] who was an [redacted]

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All the pieces of the investigative puzzle seemed to fit.

For arrest purposes, it was now necessary to catch flagrante delicto with classified material, or at least locate documents in his possession.

The FBI's technical coverage provided the answer to this problem.

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In conclusion, U. S. army analysts have described the damage caused by espionage involvement with the as

DISSEMINATION LIST

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AD-Inv.	[illegible]	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.
Exec. AD-LES	[illegible]	Rec. Mgmt.
	Intell	Tech. Servs.
		Training

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[redacted] as a result of the murder of [redacted]

Within a month of the murder, FBI investigations had developed five suspects all of whom belonged to the [redacted] Further investigation revealed that officers of the [redacted] had been in contact with [redacted] and had tasked gang members to murder [redacted] since the [redacted] had received information that [redacted]

Eventually, the Governmen[redacted] for complicity in the murder plot, all of whom were tried and convicted on charges of murder [redacted]

Although the [redacted] Government denied any involvement in the murder of [redacted] the incident has become a cause celebre, and has spurred protests from members of the United States Congress and the Chinese-American community.

[redacted] Neutralization of an [redacted] Agent

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On [redacted]

[redacted] The [redacted] investigation also spawned the arrest in [redacted] of [redacted] a U.S. citizen, on charges of espionage, and also led to investigations (some of which are still ongoing) of several other individuals.

The investigation was initiated in [redacted] The period during which he sold the documents occurred during the 1970s. The woman reported that [redacted] served as a conduit through which the documents were passed to the [redacted]

In the course of an interview, the [redacted]

After [ ] departure, the [ ] explained that the [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

During the interview with the FBI, the woman recounted other suspicious activities on the part of [redacted] Several years ago, while the [redacted] had given a [redacted] which was similar to that used by [redacted] during his visit. Further, during another visit to the [redacted] A security service of the [redacted] was then contacted regarding [redacted] and the response of the [redacted] tended to corroborate the woman's allegations. As early as [redacted] had been investigated by the [redacted] for suspected espionage activities. From that point on the [redacted] cooperated in the FBI investigation of [redacted]

The [redacted] regarding the allegations of [redacted] He firmly denied any of the charges and countered by stating that [redacted]

[redacted]

Fortuitously, shortly after the interview it was learned that the [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Under monitoring by the FBI, a meeting was duly arranged. At this rendezvous, [redacted] was quite voluble, giving

[redacted]

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Based upon what was learned in this meeting, it was decided to set up a double agent operation, [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] It was further decided to introduce a UCA into the operation. The UCA would impersonate a [redacted]

[redacted]

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Through the end of [redacted] the woman communicated with [redacted] by telephone, and mentioned to him that she had a [redacted] for the document and departed the scene of the meeting, whereupon he was placed under arrest.

There were a number of spinoffs of the [redacted] case. The one which had the most tangible results was the neutralization and arrest by [redacted] authorities of [redacted] a U. S. citizen and civilian employee of the U. S. military, for supplying military documents to [redacted] awaits trial in [redacted] The [redacted] and other military personnel who allegedly supplied documents to [redacted] admitted being acquainted with the [redacted] but strongly denied compromising any classified data. The fact that [redacted] was not cooperative with the prosecution assured that no further convictions would evolve from his arrest.

The most significant aspect of the case is its degree of sophistication, which demonstrated once again the high level of skill of which the [redacted] services are capable. [redacted] operated, almost without detection, in excess of 15 years, and the precise number of servicemen compromised by the [redacted] will probably never be known. The modus operandi executed by [redacted] was

quite ingenious. Although a [redacted] may seem innocuous, it could serve as an excellent setting for spotting, assessing, and recruiting agents. [redacted] like local taverns, oftentimes take on the form of a "club-house," where individuals can socialize. This is apparently what [redacted] was to U. S. [redacted] also provided a service that is needed by virtually everyone--[redacted]

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The case also demonstrates the potential security problems caused when hundreds of thousands of American troops, most poorly paid, are stationed in a foreign setting. It is interesting to note that, in [redacted] long career of espionage, few American servicemen reported his activities.

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Arrest and Conviction of [redacted] Agent

On [redacted] a United States citizen, was sentenced to [redacted] FBI investigation had discovered that over a [redacted] included in these documents was extremely sensitive information relating to the [redacted] of the United States. For his services [redacted] The [redacted] case marked the [redacted] that an American had been arrested for involvement with the [redacted] for espionage purposes [redacted] as a result of his espionage activities with [redacted]

The FBI learned in [redacted] that sensitive classified information concerning the [redacted] had been compromised to the [redacted] The information was received from a confidential source who at that time was a [redacted] (This fact was disclosed in the affidavit and subsequent court documents after [redacted] arrest and arraignment; the source has since been [redacted] The source also reported that the classified information was furnished to the [redacted] who had been introduced to the [redacted] in [redacted]

According to the source, the introduction of the American was brokered by an individual named [redacted] The FBI had previously investigated [redacted] due to his alleged involvement in [redacted] to the Soviets and Soviet Bloc countries. After an extensive investigation, it was eventually decided to proceed with an interview of [redacted] On [redacted] was interviewed by the FBI and denied any knowledge of involvement in the [redacted] to a hostile country.

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[redacted]

Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Exec AD Adm. ____
Exec AD Inv. ____
Exec AD LES ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Insp. ____
Intell. ____
Lab. ____
Legal Coun. ____
Off. Cong. & Public Affs. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

To : Mr. E. J. O'Malley

Date 5/24/85

From : [redacted]

Subject : FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

This communication is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ in its entirety.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~PURPOSE~~:

To recommend approval of attached publication "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary" for dissemination within the FBI. (U)

~~RECOMMENDATION~~:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices and appropriate Headquarters personnel. (U)

~~APPROVED:~~ Director ____ Exec. AD-Adm. ____ Exec. AD-Inv. ____ Exec. AD-LES ____ Adm. Servs. ____ Crim. Inv. ____ Intell. ____ Laboratory ____ Legal Coun. ____ Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. ____ Rec. Mgnt. ____ Tech. Servs. ____ Training ____

Enclosure

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

65-74480

(CONTINUED - OVER)

1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
1 - [redacted]
1 -
1 -
1 -
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AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 03-28-2011

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~~Classified by 859~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~

68 DEC 18 1985

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary
65-74480

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~~DETAILS~~:

The "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary" provides an overview and analysis of [redacted]

(C) [redacted] It is solely for dissemination within the FBI. Printed copies will be distributed when printing process is completed.

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Memorandum

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Exec AD Adm. ____
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Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. ____
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Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

To : Mr. E. J. O'Malley

Date 8/9/84

From : [redacted]

Subject : FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

CFIT from WI Intelligence Analyst

This memorandum is classified ~~"Secret"~~ in its entirety.

PURPOSE:

b6
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To submit FCI Review for approval to be disseminated to designated members of the Intelligence Community.

RECOMMENDATION:

That FCI Review be approved for dissemination to designated members of the Intelligence Community.

DMS JPW JB DESRLL LCB DKP/BP

APPROVED:

Director		Adm. Servs.	Laboratory
Exec. AD-Adm.		Crim. Inv.	Legal Coun.
Exec. AD-Inv.		Ident.	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.
Exec. AD-LES		Inspection	Rec. Mgnt.
		Intell.	Tech. Servs.
			Training

Enclosure
1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
1 - Mr.
1 - Mr. [redacted]

1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

DMS:jyl
(6)

(CONTINUED - OVER)

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

1 - ENCLOSURE

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NOV 1 1984

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EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 03-28-2011

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1983-411-864/9070

33 DEC 11 1984

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley
Re: FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

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DETAILS:

This study provides an overview and analysis of

(S) [redacted]

Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded.

The Foreign Counterintelligence Review is published on a semi-annual basis.

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DATE 03-03-2011

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FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW
VOLUME X

October 1984

This communication is classified ~~"Secret"~~ in ~~its entirety~~, unless otherwise indicated.

~~SECRET~~

~~Classified by: 859~~
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13

Security Precautions

Warning Notice	Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
National Security Information	Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Noforn	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
Orcon	Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator

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
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide, on a semi-annual basis, an overview and analysis of [redacted] (S) [redacted] b1 b6 b7C

Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed documented form. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ, Intelligence Division, Attention: [redacted] CI-3A. (U) (C)

NOTE: The information contained in this study is current as of August 1984.

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In [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] in the United States. [redacted] went [redacted] was learned by the news media; but in early [redacted] an unrelated FBI investigation developed information that several pro-PRC Chinese-Americans were [redacted] It is not clear that the Chinese-Americans planned this at the behest of Chinese diplomats, but investigation

indicated that some PRC diplomats were at the least aware of [redacted] IOs from the [redacted] Government also became involved in the [redacted]


[redacted]

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


b1

Since the closure of most Nicaraguan Consulates in June 1983, the NIS appears to be utilizing the Nicaraguan solidarity groups more extensively. The groups most frequently used are the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), the National Network in Solidarity with the Nicaraguan People, and various local groups. The above two groups seem to be specifically designed to influence U.S. policy and public opinion on Central

America. The National Network in Solidarity with the Nicaraguan people is funded in part by contributions from approximately 60 local groups, churches, and public foundations. CISPES is a federation of approximately 300 local organizations which support the Salvadoran opposition through demonstrations, teach-ins, and publications. They are active on university campuses and are supported by individual contributions and foundation grants.

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(S) [redacted] b1

Silicon Valley

The Silicon Valley, an area of high technology in Santa Clara County near San Jose, California is of continuing

(S) interest to [redacted] There are more than 300 firms in this area that have DOD contracts and have personnel with national security clearances and facilities approved for maintaining national security classified information. These manufacturers produce a large portion of American high-tech material, such as semi-conductors, guided missiles and space vehicles. They also produce engineering and scientific equipment and surgical and medical instruments.

(S) [redacted] could also target major military facilities located near the Silicon Valley area. Such facilities include Moffett Field Naval Air Station (anti-submarine warfare regional center), U.S. Air Force Facility, Sunnyvale (satellite servicing center), Defense Language Institute (DOD Language Training Center), etc.

Also located nearby are research and/or educational institutions involved in classified or highly technical studies. Such institutions include Stanford University, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, NASA-Ames Research Center and the Monterey Institute for International Studies.

III. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

EXPULSIONS OF SOVIETS

According to public accounts, host governments have expelled at least 135 Soviet officials for inappropriate activities during 1983, a sharp increase from 49 in 1982 and 27 in 1981. Most were expelled from countries (United States, France, Italy, Ireland, Japan, Canada, Thailand, Great Britain, West Germany, Norway, and Spain) for engaging in traditional forms of espionage. Others were expelled for active measures operations involving the West European antinuclear movement (Switzerland, West Germany). Because many governments prefer not to publicize such expulsions, the total number of expellees may be higher than the public record would indicate.

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During the past year or so, eight Soviet officials were expelled from the United States for attempting to acquire classified information. A brief synopsis of these cases is presented below:

[redacted]

While assigned as [redacted] was confronted by FBI Agents as he met with a U.S. citizen who had access to information concerning the [redacted], who was attempting to obtain classified information, voluntarily departed the United States on [redacted] after a protest by the U.S. Government.

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While assigned as retrieved a package from a dead drop in a rural area of He was detained by the FBI. The package was recovered and found to contain photographs of classified U.S. Government documents. He was expelled by the State Department on

While assigned to the initiated an approach to and attempted to secure a highly classified document. He was expelled by the State Department on

was assigned as was the primary handling officer of a U.S. citizen passing classified documents to the Soviets from was quietly recalled after who serviced a drop in this operation, was confronted by the FBI.

On Special Agents of the FBI confronted as he met with an

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FBI asset in a restaurant parking lot in [redacted]
The asset was in the process of delivering a classified document for which [redacted] was declared PNG.

[redacted]

While assigned as [redacted] initiated contact with [redacted] and asked this individual to obtain specific classified/restricted military-related documents. [redacted] met with [redacted] obtained the required documents and was confronted by FBI Agents. The documents were retrieved and [redacted] was expelled by the State Department on [redacted]

[redacted]

While assigned as [redacted] was observed by the FBI removing material from a clandestine dead drop as part of a Soviet intelligence operation. He was expelled by the State Department on [redacted]

[redacted]

On [redacted] the FBI interdicted a clandestine [redacted] being handled by [redacted] as [redacted] was in the process of clearing a dead drop [redacted] at the KGB

Residency in New York, [redacted] quietly departed the United States for Moscow on [redacted] before any formal PNG action could be taken against him. While the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., has been orally informed that [redacted] activities in the United States were considered by the U.S. Government to be incompatible with his diplomatic position, there has been no publicity given to this incident to date.

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An individual assigned to the U.S. Navy at had contacted the SMO, in Washington, D.C. on and twice again on the afternoon of He indicated that he possessed a security clearance and had access to highly classified material, and wanted to arrange the transfer of that material to the Soviets. Due to the fact that was in the U.S. Navy, liaison was immediately established between the FBI and the Naval Investigative Service (NIS).

Investigation ascertained that was employed as an in the U.S. Navy, with the He had a "Top Secret" clearance and extensive access to sensitive compartmented information concerning

It was next decided to approach with a operation, in an attempt to determine precisely how determined he was to sell classified data.

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was taken into administrative custody by NIS. In a general court martial that followed,

After the court martial, was given

During extensive interviews conducted by the FBI and NIS, admitted that he had contacted the Soviets with the objective of obtaining money. He fully intended to sell highly classified, sensitive, compartmented information to the Soviets, and had considered defecting to the Soviet Union as early as also admitted that he had considered

A polygraph examination of

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

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[redacted] THE ARREST OF AN [redacted]

On [redacted] was arrested by the FBI and indicted on charges of espionage. The arrest of [redacted] was the [redacted] of a [redacted] in the United States.

The operation began in early [redacted] when [redacted] a [redacted] had previously been spotted and assessed in a classic recruitment scenario. [redacted] In return, [redacted] offered to pay, and in fact did pay [redacted] then encouraged [redacted] to obtain employment with a firm which held contracts with the DOD. Instead, the American obtained employment with [redacted] continued to task the American to obtain unclassified documents.

In [redacted] and the American passed classified U.S. Government documents to [redacted] at each meeting for these documents.

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In [redacted] tasked the American to provide classified documents on the subject of [redacted] During the next meeting at [redacted] restaurant, the American student passed a [redacted] Upon exiting the restaurant, [redacted] was arrested and subsequently indicted on charges of espionage.

[redacted]

[redacted] Our investigation of [redacted] was initiated in [redacted] predicated upon information received from the [redacted] We assisted the [redacted] in their investigation of prime suspect [redacted] while [redacted] was at the [redacted] was [redacted]

The damage assessment of the [redacted] affair has not been fully determined. It is clear, however, that [redacted] was passing classified documents concerning [redacted] national security and foreign affairs to the KGB.

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DISSEMINATION LIST

Assistant to the President
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Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

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214

Memorandum

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& Public Affs.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To : Mr. E. J. O'Malley

Date 9/26/83

From : [redacted]

Subject : ~~X~~FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

b6
b7C

This communication is classified "~~Confidential~~" ~~in its entirety.~~

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of enclosed publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review," for dissemination to elements of the United States Intelligence Community as well as the Senate and House intelligence committees. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That enclosed publication be approved for dissemination, as detailed on enclosed list, to elements of the United States Intelligence Community and the Congress. (U)

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FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 03-28-2011

DES/1K
CO, ALS, RAM/SK
TS/SK

Enclosures - 2

65-74480

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
1 - [redacted]
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -

TJD:pdh (8)

(CONTINUED-OVER)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DE-60

~~Classified by 859~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

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b7C
25X1

17 JAN 4 1985

FBI/DOJ

'4 APR 14 1985

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley
RE: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review
65-74480

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b7C

DETAILS:

This publication provides an overview and analysis of [redacted]

(C) [redacted] Printed copies of this publication will be supplied when printing process is completed.

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DATE 03-09-2011 BY 60322 UC/LP/PLJ/JCF

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Department of State, the Secretary of State - 1

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency - 2

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U. S. Army - 5

Office of Special Investigations, U. S. Air Force - 5

Director, Naval Investigative Service, U. S. Navy - 1

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Central Intelligence Agency, Deputy Director for Operations
(DDO) - 1; Office of Communications/DOD - 1; Policy
Coordination Staff/DDO - 2; Chief, Counterintelligence (CI)
Staff - 1; CI Staff (Publications) - 1; Deputy
Director for Intelligence (DDI) - 1; Chief, Collection
Requirements and evaluation Staff/DDI - 2; Director,
Office of Security - 1; Chief, Security Analysis
Group/Office of Security - 1

National Security Agency - 5

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Navy
Security Committee Member - 1

65-74480-64

ENCLOSURE

Department of Energy - 5

Department of Defense, Director for Counterintelligence and Security Policy, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense - 1

Chief, Security Education Division, Defense Industrial Security Institute - 1

Director, Division of Security, Nuclear Regulatory Commission - 1

Director, Office of Security, General Accounting Office - 1

Director, FBI - 1

Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide, on a semiannual basis, an overview and analysis of [redacted] (S) [redacted] Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed documented form. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ, Intelligence Division, Attention: [redacted] (U) CI-3B. ~~(C)~~

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PHOTOGRAPHS

Arrest of [redacted] 46-47

Interdiction of [redacted] 54-55

(S) [redacted]

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DISSEMINATION LIST 63

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(S) [redacted] b1 b6 b7C

IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 41

[redacted] Arrest and Conviction of an Agent of the [redacted] 41

Counterintelligence Actions 52

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DATE 03-03-2011

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FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

SEPTEMBER 26, 1983

This communication is classified "~~Secret~~ - ORCON/NOFORN" ~~in its entirety~~, unless otherwise indicated.

~~SECRET~~ - ORCON/NOFORN

~~Classified by 859~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~

65-74[illegible] 6[illegible]

Another key development is that since January, 1983, a total of about 70 Soviet officials (including 47 from France) have been expelled from countries of the industrial West, as well as, one from Japan—the first time a Soviet had been expelled from that country for espionage since World War II. Multiple, seemingly coordinated expulsions will perhaps compel the Soviets to be less aggressive in their intelligence activities. In the case of the United States, this will perhaps apply to S & T collection and active measures (see Section IV for more information on expulsions). Based on past experience, we would expect Soviet intelligence officers to exercise caution in continuing intelligence related contacts and to institute selective counterintelligence and security measures to test their sources and developmental contacts. It is expected that Soviet intelligence officers will resume their aggressive collection activities with little change in their methods once the current expulsion issue cools.

The [redacted] also saw the culmination of an operation that resulted in the neutralization of an individual who could have been developed into a useful agent by the Soviets. The case was initiated when an individual was detected making contact with the Soviet Military Office (SMO), Washington, D. C. The individual indicated that he had access to highly classified data he was willing to sell to the Soviets. b6 b7C

Investigation identified the potential agent as [redacted] a member of the United States Navy who did in fact have access to sensitive information. [redacted] was eventually apprehended (before passing any data to the

Soviets) and in [redacted] unauthorized contact with the Soviets. The case is very much similar to the recent case involving [redacted] (see the last issue of the "Review;" a more detailed account of the [redacted] case will be included in Volume X of the "Review").

(S) [redacted]

(Blank)

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(S)

Counterintelligence Actions

b1 per FBI

During the past year a significant number of counterintelligence actions were initiated against [redacted] some of which involved the expulsion of IOs. They are as follows:

Soviet Intelligence Services

[redacted]

Referral/Direct

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INTERDICTION OF [redacted]

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Department of Energy - 5

Department of Defense, Director for Counterintelligence and Security Policy, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense - 1

Chief, Security Education Division, Defense Industrial Security Institute - 1

Director, Division of Security, Nuclear Regulatory Commission - 1

Director, Office of Security, General Accounting Office - 1

Director, FBI - 1

Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

OP 13-6

(U) ~~SECRET~~
Not for Dissemination Outside the FBI (S)

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary Volume IX

6-1-89
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
(U) Not for Dissemination Outside the FBI (S)
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Paragraphs 1 and 3 are not pertinent per paragraph C of stipulation dated 4-28-84.

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
6-1-89
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Declassify on: OADR
~~Para. 2 only reviewed~~

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Memorandum

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Crim. Inv. ___
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Legal Coun. ___
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Rec. Mgnt. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To : Mr. E. J. O'Malley

Date 8/29/83

From : [redacted]

Subject : FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

This communication is classified ~~"Confidential" in its entirety.~~

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of enclosed publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary," for dissemination within the FBI. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That enclosed publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices and appropriate Headquarters personnel. (U)

b6
b7C

APPROVED:	Adm. Servs.	Laboratory
	Crim. Inv.	Legal Coun.
Director		Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.
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Exec. AD-Inv.	Inspection	Tech. Servs.
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1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
1 - [redacted]
1 -
1 -
1 -

DE-118

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60X

2 JUL 23 1984

Enclosure

TJD:pfh (7)

(CONTINUED-OVER)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classified by 859~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~

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68 AUG 9 1984

FBI/DOJ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley
RE: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary

DETAILS:

b1
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b7C

This semiannual publication provides an overview and analysis of [redacted]
(C) [redacted]. Detailing of key FBI foreign counterintelligence operations is also provided. Printed copies will be supplied when printing process is complete.

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FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

AUGUST, 1983

This communication is classified ~~"Secret" in its entirety,~~ unless otherwise indicated.

~~SECRET~~ 25X 5 10 22 AM '83

~~Classified by 859~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~

65-74470-60X

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~~SECRET~~

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IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 41

[redacted] Arrest and Conviction of an Agent of the [redacted] 44

Counterintelligence Actions 53

~~SECRET~~

b1
b6
b7C

PHOTOGRAPHS

Arrest of [redacted] 46-47

[redacted] 49

Interdiction of [redacted] 54-55

(S) [redacted]

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide, on a semiannual basis, an overview and analysis of [redacted] b1 b6 b7C


(S) [redacted] Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed documented form. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ, Intelligence Division, Attention: [redacted]

(U) [redacted] CI-3B. (C)


Another key development is that since January, 1983, a total of about 70 Soviet officials have been expelled from countries of the industrial West, including one from Japan--the first time a Soviet had been expelled from that country for espionage since World War II. Multiple, seemingly coordinated expulsions should send the Soviets a clear message that their intelligence activities have exceeded acceptable levels. In the case of the United States, this message applies to S & T collection and active measures (see Section IV for information on this topic). Based on past experience, we would expect Soviet intelligence officers to exercise caution in continuing intelligence related contacts and to institute selective counterintelligence and security measures to test their sources and developmental contacts. It is expected that Soviet intelligence officers will resume their aggressive collection activities with little change in their methods once the current expulsion issue cools.

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(S)




(S)



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In early 1983, officials at the U. S. Department of State (USDS) formally protested the type of activity described above to a senior official at the PRC Embassy. In a separate incident, USDS officials also protested the activities of a San Francisco Consulate official (see Section IV for more on this topic).

(S)




(S) [redacted] That agent, identified as [redacted] was sentenced to [redacted] (see Section IV). As a result of this incident, the FBI anticipates that the [redacted] will revert to its practice of avoiding meets in the United States.

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(S) [redacted]

(S)



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(S) [redacted] Two known CuIS IOs were expelled for their involvement in clandestine intelligence activity (see Section IV). In addition, the U. S. Department of State has recently imposed a 25 mile travel restriction on official Cuban representatives assigned in New York City. It is speculated that such a move will force Cubans to arrange for more clandestine meets in New York City.

GOC involvement in narcotics trafficking has enjoyed tremendous media attention in recent months. Various allegations have surfaced which indicate that the GOC has provided safe haven in Cuba to narcotics traffickers in exchange for a service charge and to some extent, the support of guerrilla insurgency in Latin America.


In examining the available information/allegations regarding the likelihood that the GOC is involved in narcotics trafficking, it must be said that there are ample motivations for the GOC to become involved: a desire to support insurgency in South and Central America; a dire need to obtain hard currency to offset economic woes; and possibly an attempt to subvert U. S. society by making narcotics more readily available.

Various reporting suggests that the GOC is certainly capable and willing to engage in illicit narcotics trafficking; however, the bulk of reporting regarding the GOC role stems from individuals closely associated with one particular case and does not further establish a widespread Cuban involvement.

Although many drug traffickers in the Miami area are of Cuban extraction evidence is not available to indicate that these individuals are operating in concert with the GOC. Investigations are continuing regarding certain individuals who have been implicated as part of the Cuban connection. One

(S) [redacted] b1

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


b1

In the overview, we can speculate that the GOC has participated in and benefited from narcotics trafficking throughout the Caribbean. Considering the proximity of Cuba to the United States, the increasing volume of narcotics activity in the Caribbean, and the potential benefits to the GOC from its participation, it appears feasible and likely that the GOC's involvement will continue.

policy posture maintained by the United States vis-a-vis Poland. Finally, there has been some very recent targeting related to Poland's ongoing financial crisis. Efforts have been made in Washington and New York City to determine American views regarding the ability of Poland to meet its massive debts.

(S)




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UNITED STATES
OCTOBER, 1980 - JUNE, 1983

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DATE 03-29-2011

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[redacted] b6 per FBI b7C

Whatever was the Soviets made of the [redacted] case demonstrates clearly the significant amount of money the Soviets are willing to pay for this type of information. This is particularly true when one calculates the amount expended by the Soviets in terms of what the dollar was valued at in the early 1960s [redacted] at the dollar's current value, [redacted] was paid the equivalent of over [redacted] the amount paid [redacted] far exceeds that given to recruited Soviet agents in recent espionage cases (e.g., during the 1970s, [redacted] Referral/Direct

(S) [redacted] b1 Referral/Direct

SECRET

65-17780 - 60

Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

To Mr. E. J. O'Malley

Date 2/15/83

From : [redacted]

FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Subject : FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW VOLUME VIII JANUARY 1983

PUBLICATION

This communication is classified "~~Confidential~~" in its entirety, unless otherwise indicated. (U)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

10/4/85 Classified by ~~SP4ELW/KFA~~

Declassify on: OADR

#261,612

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review," for dissemination to elements of the United States Intelligence Community, as well as the Senate and House intelligence committees. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and dissemination, as detailed on attached list, to elements of the United States Intelligence Community and the Congress. (U)

~~APPROVED:~~	Adm. Servs.	Laboratory
	Crim. Inv.	Legal Coun.
Director		Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.
Exec. AD-Adm.	Ident.	Rec. Mgmt.
Exec. AD-Inv.	Inspection	Tech. Servs.
~~Exec. AD-LES~~	Intell.	Training

Enclosures - 2 ENCLOSURE

65-74480

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

1 - Mr. J. L. Tierney
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

(CONTINUED - OVER)

65-74480-59

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DATE 03-28-2011

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DE-82

~~Classified by 1541~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

724

71 APR 28 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary, Volume VIII
65-74480

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DETAILS:

(C) This publication provides an overview and analysis [redacted] This particular issue is devoted to the activities of the hostile intelligence service during the latter half of 1982. Printed copies of this publication will be supplied when print process is completed. (U) (X)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

VOLUME VIII

January, 1983

This document is classified ~~"Secret"~~ in its entirety, unless otherwise indicated.

~~10/4/85 multiple sources~~
~~Classified by SP4ELW/KFA~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~ # 261,612
Declassified Army information on page #64 per Army Let, 11/18/85.
SP4ELW/KFA 12/5/85

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FOI/PA # 261,612
APPEAL #
SERIAL #
E.O. # 12356
DATE 10/4/85 INITIALS KFA

~~Classified by 1541~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~

~~SECRET~~

(S-1) = ARMY
(S-2) = Customs (Treasury)
(S-3) = Air Force

V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATION 63

[redacted] 63

70

(U) PHOTOGRAPHS

(U) (S) Interdiction of [redacted] 4

13 (S)

63

70

(S) [redacted]

DISSEMINATION LIST 77

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b7C

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide, on a semiannual basis, an overview and analysis of [redacted]

(S) [redacted] Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed documented form. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ, Intelligence Division, Attention: [redacted]

(U) [redacted] CI-3B. (U)

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(S)

(S) A GRU officer, energetically pursued the development of a social relationship
(U) with an American. (S)

After learning, through an acquaintance, that the American had access to classified U. S. military information, tasked the American to obtain a "Secret" United States Air Force (USAF) document. On the night of the FBI interdicted the passage of the material to . Two days later, was declared persona non grata (PNG) by the U. S. Department of State (USDS).

(S)

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(U) Interdiction of [redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~

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Office of Special Investigations, U. S. Air Force - 5

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(U) National Security Agency, Director - 1; M56 - 1; M503 - 1; Publication Unit - 1 (S-WH)(S)

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Navy Security Committee Member - 1

Department of Energy - 5

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Chief, Security Education Division, Defense Industrial Security Institute - 1

Director, Division of Security, Nuclear Regulatory Commission - 1

Director, Office of Security, General Accounting Office - 1

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	Crim. Inv.	Legal Coun.
Director		Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.
Exec. AD-Adm.	Ident.	Rec. Mgmt.
Exec. AD-Inv.	Inspection	Tech. Servs.
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Requirements and evaluation Staff/DDI - 2; Director,
Office of Security - 1; Chief, Security Analysis
Group/Office of Security - 1

(U) National Security Agency, Director - 1; M56 - 1; M503 - 1; Publication Unit - 1 ~~A(5-4)(8)~~

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Navy
Security Committee Member - 1

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Department of Energy - 5

Department of Defense, Director for Counterintelligence and Security Policy, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense - 1

Chief, Security Education Division, Defense Industrial Security Institute - 1

Director, Division of Security, Nuclear Regulatory Commission - 1

Director, Office of Security, General Accounting Office - 1

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1 - E. J. O'Malley
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -

b6
b7C

BY LIAISON

Date: August 3, 1982

FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYST

To: Colonel
Director of Counterintelligence
Headquarters Air Force
Office of Special Investigations
Department of the Air Force

Attention: IVO

From: Edward J. O'Malley
Assistant Director, Intelligence Division

Subject: REQUEST FOR APPROVAL TO REPRODUCE AND DISTRIBUTE FBI PUBLICATION "FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW"

Regarding your letter dated July 26, 1982, requesting approval to reproduce and distribute FBI publication "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review."

We are pleased to learn that this FBI publication is of considerable interest and value to your organization. You have our approval to reproduce 16 copies of the document for distribution within AFOSI to those U. S. based units engaged in counterintelligence activities.

TJD:bjk (8)

NOTE: Based on consultation with , it was decided to allow AFOSI to reproduce and distribute the publication.

Exec AD Adm. ___
Exec AD Inv. ___
Exec AD LES ___
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6 APR 25 1984

Delivered by Liaison
on 8/4/82
by ELF

65-74410-58X3

17 DEC 29 1982

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE, DC 20332

REPLY TO ATTN OF: IVO [redacted]

FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

26 JUL 1982

SUBJECT: FBI Counterintelligence Review

b6
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TO: Mr Edward J. O'Malley
Asst Director, Intelligence Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington DC 20535

FEDERAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 5- [redacted]

1. Your publication, FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review Volume VII, was recently brought to my attention by members of my counterintelligence staff. They were enthusiastic about this product and suggested that, if possible, we should make it available to AFOSI District offices in the United States. After reviewing the publication, I share my staff's appreciation for the product. It would indeed be of considerable interest and value to AFOSI officers working on counterintelligence matters throughout the U.S. In this regard and with your concurrence, we would like to reproduce 16 copies of this document for distribution within AFOSI to those U.S.-based units engaged in CI activities. We fully recognize the sensitivity of this publication and would insure its protection accordingly.

2. Please pass on my appreciation and that of my CI staff to the members of your Intelligence Division for this outstanding publication.

[redacted]

RICHARD F. LAW, Col, USAF
Director of Counterintelligence

Ltr to Gen, dtd 8/5/82
TSD: GFK

DE-60 65-74480-58X

Rec'd by Gawson, 7/28/82.
ELF

61 APR 25 1984

HELPING TO PROTECT A GREAT WAY OF LIFE

Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To : Mr. E. J. O'Malley

From : [redacted]

Date 1/3/83

Subject : ~~X~~FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY VOLUME VIII
FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis

This communication is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ in its entirety, unless otherwise indicated. (U)

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary," for dissemination within the FBI. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices and appropriate Headquarters personnel. (U)

APPROVED:

Director	Adm. Serv.	Laboratory	
Exec. AD-Adm.	Crim. Inv.	Legal Coun.	
Exec. AD-Inv.	Ident.	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.	
Exec. AD-LES	Inspection	Rec. Mgmt.	
	Intell.	Tech. Servs.	
		Training	

1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

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~~ssified by 1541~~
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(CONTINUED - OVER)

65-74480
File

DE-105

65-74480-58X1

JG 25 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary, Volume VIII

b1
b6
b7C

DETAILS:

(C) This publication provides an overview and analysis [redacted] Detailing of key FBI foreign counterintelligence operation is also provided. Printed copies will be supplied when printing process is complete. (U) (C)

~~SECRET~~

Not for Dissemination Outside the FBI

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary

Volume VIII

December, 1982



Security Precautions

Warning Notice	Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
National Security Information	Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
VOLUME VIII

December, 1982

This document is classified "Secret" ~~in its entirety,~~ unless otherwise indicated.

~~Classified by~~ 1541
~~Declassify on:~~ OADR

~~SECRET~~

See stamp from pg 461

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b7C
b7E

V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATION 63

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
[redacted] 66 Referral/Consult

67

APPENDIX

(S) [redacted] b1

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
(S) A GRU officer, energetically pursued the development of a social relationship with an American.

After learning, through an acquaintance, that the American had access to classified U. S. military information, tasked the American to obtain a "Secret" United States Air Force (USAF) document. On the night of the FBI interdicted the passage of the material to Two days later, was declared persona non grata (PNG) by the U. S. Department of State (USDS).

(S)

File 101 - 52 "#96

(S)




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100-376259 JE, Appeal, CF-2 Supervisor

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~~SECRET~~

(S)



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Notes: see p. 55 for overall reference

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KL-7 Rotors

Whatever use the Soviets made of the [redacted] windfall, the case demonstrated clearly the substantial amount of money the Soviets are willing to pay for this type of information. This is particularly true when one calculates the amount expended by the Soviets, in terms of what the dollar was valued at in the early 1960s (at the dollar's current value, [redacted] was paid the equivalent of over [redacted]. The amount paid [redacted] far exceeds that given to recruited Soviet agents in recent espionage cases (e.g. during the 1970s, [redacted]

b6 per FBI
b7C

65-72863 [redacted] CI-1 Supervisor

(S) [redacted]

b1
Referral/Direct

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Memorandum

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Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
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Training ___
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To : Mr. E.J. O'Malley

Date 5/28/82

From : [redacted]

Subject : FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review," for dissemination to elements of the United States Intelligence Community, as well as the Senate and House intelligence committees. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved for dissemination, as detailed on attached list, to elements of the United States Intelligence Community and the Congress. (U)

b6
b7C

~~APPROVED:~~ Director ___
Exec. AD-Adm. ___
Exec. AD-Inv. ___
~~Exec. AD-LES~~ ___

Adm. Servs. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
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Rec. Mgnt. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___

Enclosures - 2

65-74480

1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

TJD:cmb (7)

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

(CONTINUED - OVER)

1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

5 JUN 9 1982

ENCLOSURE
ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified and Extended by 859
Reason for Extension, ~~FCIM~~, II, 1-2.4.2 (2) and (3)
Date of ~~Review~~ for Declassification May 18, 2002.

7 JUN 21 1982

FBI/DOJ

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review
65-74480

DETAILS:

b1
b6
b7C

This publication provides an overview and analysis [redacted] Printed copies of this publication will be supplied when print process is completed. (C)

(U)
(C)
(C)

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Director for Intelligence (DDI) - 1; Chief, Collection
Requirements and Evaluation Staff/DDI - 2; Director,
Office of Security - 1; Chief, Security Analysis
Group/Office of Security - 1

National Security Agency, Director - 1; M56 - 1; M503 - 1;
Publication Unit - 1

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Navy
Security Committee Member - 1

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and Security Policy, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense - 1

Chief, Security Education Division, Defense Industrial
Security Institute - 1

Director, Division of Security, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission - 1

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FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review

Volume VII



Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

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(S)

DISSEMINATION LIST 71

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide an overview and analysis of [redacted] (S)

[redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed documented form. Some of the material contained herein has been obtained from other elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ, Intelligence Division, Attention [redacted] CI-3A. (U) ~~(S)~~

b1
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b7C

(S) [redacted]

b1 per FBI

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

(S) [redacted]

The case demonstrated clearly the substantial amount of money the Soviets are willing to pay for this type of information. This is particularly true when one calculates the amount expended by the Soviets, in terms of what the dollar was valued at in the early 1960s. The amount paid [redacted] far

b6 per FBI
b7C

exceeds that given to recruited Soviet agents in recent espionage cases (e.g. [redacted] b1 per FBI b6 b7C

(S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted] b1 per FBI Referral/Direct

In handling [redacted] the Soviets were extremely amateurish and ineffective, and this enabled the FBI to blunt an operation that could have been very productive for the SIS. In this sense, the case is very similar to another recent case in which a valuable source of information was compromised due largely to a lack of security employed by the Soviets. (Detailed studies of both the [redacted] and [redacted] cases will appear in the next issue of the "Review.") (S) b6 per FBI b7C

(U)

[redacted] Referral/Direct

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(S)

[redacted]

b1


A case conducted jointly by [redacted] involving a businessman named [redacted] and two other subjects illustrates those trends. On [redacted]

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[redacted]

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b1

FBI Operation vs. PRCIS Agent

This investigation was a spinoff of another FBI operation which involved an investigation into the activities of a Chinese national and resident of the United States who had

been tasked by the PRC to collect material in the United States. To facilitate the collection of the targeted material, the individual was instructed to establish a number of projects. Initial funding for the projects, which came from the PRC Government, amounted to $250,000. (S)

(U)

In providing guidance to the leadership of the various projects, the PRCIS established a conduit for communications. Investigation revealed, however, that the PRCIS were also using the conduit to task agents operating inside the United States. Further investigation disclosed that the agent was employed at a major defense-related institute, held a high security clearance, and thus had access to significant, classified information. In communications, the PRCIS stressed to the agent the necessity for maintaining strict security, since the operation had been productive. (S)

(U)

At one point, the PRCIS aimed questions at the agent, geared to clarify information, which the agent had previously provided. The agent was instructed to transmit the answers in the most secure manner possible, i.e. through a trusted colleague or a known PRCIS officer assigned to the PRC Embassy in Washington, D.C.

As the investigation continued, it was determined that the agent was planning to travel overseas, most probably to meet with PRIC operatives. Through cooperation with the U.S. Customs Service, the agent's luggage was searched as he attempted to depart the United States. Inside the luggage was found a note containing the above-noted questions, with an answer to the first question. Before boarding the airline, however, the agent, perhaps "spooked," tore up the note and handed it to his wife. (S)

(U)

Considering the level of sensitivity of material being compromised, it was decided to interview the agent and either recruit him or eliminate his access to classified data. Thus, the subject was interviewed and, initially, denied any knowledge of espionage activities. But he soon ended his attempts at denial. He acknowledged that the FBI had done a professional job in uncovering his activities, but refused to put forth a formal confession. Shortly thereafter, he voluntarily resigned from his position. (U) (S)

Shortly after this confrontation, it was also decided to interview another individual who conceivably had knowledge of the agent's espionage activities. After an initial period of deception, the individual, who is a native-born Chinese, made several admissions. Besides admitting that he had arranged for the agent to meet with PRC representatives, he also stated that he had received information from the agent and had delivered it to a PRCIS operative in Washington, D.C. Shortly after this delivery, the Chinese traveled to the PRC and met with PRCIS officers, who praised the quality of information passed by the agent and gave him the list containing the questions for passage to the agent. (U) (S)

Aside from these cursory admissions, the subject refused to supply the FBI with any further information and would not agree to testify against the agent. Due to this uncooperativeness, measures were taken to force his permanent departure from the United States. (U) (S)

As for the PRCIS agent, he is now employed elsewhere and no longer has access to classified data. At this point, one thing is certain--the PRCIS, in a classic espionage operation, was able to obtain significant data of great value to the PRC. (U) (S)

V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Neutralization of a [ ] Agent Operation

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On [ ], an FBI investigation, which lasted well over two years, culminated when [ ] year old employee of the [ ] was interviewed by Special Agents (SAs) of the Los Angeles Field Office. After a lengthy period of verbal maneuvering,

during which [redacted] was confronted with the fact that the FBI had determined that the [redacted] employee was a recruited agent of the [redacted] Thus ended a counterintelligence operation which resulted in the neutralization of what had been, for the [redacted] a highly productive recruitment. (S)

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b7C

(U)

The case was initiated when information was developed that the [redacted] had perhaps recruited as an agent an employee of the [redacted] with access to classified data of interest to the [redacted] Further investigation isolated an individual who was an employee of [redacted] with pertinent access and lived within a [redacted] named [redacted] was then presumed to be the principal in the operation. Surveillance of the subject revealed him making contact with [redacted] in what appeared to be, conceivably, an intelligence meet. (S)

(U)

After a period of unproductive investigation however, it was decided to survey the neighborhood to determine if any other likely suspect could be uncovered. Since surveillances of [redacted] had not disclosed much hard

evidence of the principal engaging in clandestine meetings within the United States, it was also decided to determine which [redacted] employees had traveled abroad, in particular at a time when [redacted] was also out of the country. (S)

(U)

Detailed examination of [redacted] neighborhood quickly disclosed that a [redacted] with pertinent access to classified information, lived within [redacted] and had traveled to Europe at roughly the same time that the [redacted] operative was on a similar trip. [redacted]

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(U) [redacted] Needless to say, [redacted] now became the prime suspect in the case. (S)

[redacted]

Subsequent investigation of [ ] revealed that he held a position at [ ] he therefore had excellent access to classified data. It was also discovered that [ ] had made several trips to Western Europe, conceivably to be debriefed by his [ ] handlers. After another trip to Europe in [ ] it was decided to attempt to bring the case to a conclusion by confronting [ ] in an interview. (S)

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(U)

In developing a strategy for the confrontation, it was decided to approach [ ] initially along the lines of a standard contact case interview, with the interviewing Agents questioning the suspect about the activities of [ ] was quite open about his knowledge of [ ] giving information about the [ ] personal habits, etc. But, as the interview evolved, the Agents gradually shifted the focus of the interview to [ ] with particular attention being directed to [ ] overseas travel. (S)

(U)

[ ] was then shown surveillance photos of him taken in the lobby of a hotel; the photos showed [ ] standing alongside an unidentified individual. Upon seeing the photos, [ ] then appeared to shift into a mood of deep-conscience searching. (S)

(U)

The interviewing SAs then changed the direction of the interview by broaching the details regarding the defection of a highly placed [ ] officer and the "shocking" revelations

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he made to the FBI. [ ] greeted this initially with silence, but then said, [ ] was then apprised of right to counsel, whereupon he paused and reflected for roughly two minutes. It was at this point that [ ] admitted that he had done it "for the money." At the conclusion of the interview he signed a statement acknowledging his complicity in acts of espionage. Being a commercial representative, [ ] incriminating statement, the [ ] was arrested by SAs of the Los Angeles Field Office. (U) (S)

In subsequent debriefings, [ ] disclosed the full details of his dealings with [ ] had developed a social relationship with [ ] in the latter part of [ ]. In the course of this relationship [ ] revealed to [ ] that he was having financial difficulties. [ ] offered financial assistance to [ ] in return for [ ] jumped at the offer, initially supplying the [ ] with unclassified documents. [ ] realized, however, that even by supplying [ ] with unclassified documents, he had compromised himself and eventually the [ ] would request classified material. Inevitably, [ ] did begin to request classified material, and [ ] was only too capable of satisfying [ ] requirements (see Section II of this issue for a detailed recounting of the information supplied to [ ] was paid well for his services: in the course of the operation, [ ] received approximately [ ] (U) (S)

Initially, [redacted] met with [redacted] in the United States, and supplied the agent with [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

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From a counterintelligence perspective, a most difficult aspect of the case was establishing the identity of the agent. The individual originally investigated was, in several ways, a very plausible subject, and hence, some valuable time was expended unproductively. [redacted] modus operandi in the case, i.e., executing intelligence meetings in Europe, also made identification of the agent difficult. The fact that the [redacted] began to execute intelligence meetings overseas meant that surveillance of [redacted] would not have uncovered the agent. (S)

(U)

In relation to [redacted] modus operandi in the operation, the use of trade as an intelligence cover is by no means without precedence. But [redacted] is in many ways quite unique. Usually, an IO operating out of a trade establishment can be identified since he is one of the more unproductive members of the staff. [redacted] had, however, made the [redacted] Achievements of this nature are quite unusual for a [redacted] IO. When one takes into account that [redacted] it becomes apparent that the [redacted] was a very talented IO. (S)

(U)

(U) [redacted]

Regarding the overall impact of the case, the response of [redacted] officials to the arrest and conviction will probably serve to undermine morale within the [redacted] Following the arrest of [redacted] The vision of a loyal IO, one who had performed a great service to the [redacted] state in recruiting a highly valuable agent, [redacted] cannot help having a sobering effect upon [redacted] personnel. (S)

(U)

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Secondly, the damage assessment which the [redacted] was forced to undertake as a result of various defections has been made more difficult by the neutralization of [redacted] The [redacted] will now have to attempt to determine which [redacted] defector developed by the FBI within the past few years was responsible for the compromise of the [redacted] operation. (S)

(U)

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Finally, perhaps the most significant aspect of the case is that it helps to demonstrate the existence of cooperation between the [redacted]

(S)

[redacted]

65-7005

(S)

[redacted]

(S) [redacted]

As yet, it is difficult to determine what impact the defection has had on the [redacted] diplomatic corps or upon [redacted] operations. Due to an internal security crackdown imposed upon the [redacted] official community in the United States, [redacted] personnel have been close-mouthed about such sensitive topics. One thing, however, is certain--the defection of such a prominent official is strong evidence of the deep malaise infecting the Polish diplomatic and intelligence corps. (S)

(U) 105-36612; [redacted] CI-2 Supervisor

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FBI File No. HQ 65-74480 - Section 4

Memorandum

DATE: 03-28-2011
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To : Mr. J. H. Geer

Date 3/7/88

From : [redacted]

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SSP

Subject : FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (FCI) REVIEW

CLASS ____
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b7C

This memorandum is classified ~~"Secret" in its entirety.~~

PURPOSE:

To submit FCI Review for approval to be disseminated to all FBI field offices and appropriate members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (see attached list), and to recommend that publication of a separate FCI Summary be discontinued.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the FCI Review be approved for dissemination to all FBI field offices and members of the U.S. Intelligence Community appearing on the attached dissemination list.

APPROVED:

Director	Adm. Servs.	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.
Exec AD-Adm.	Crim. Inv.	Off of Lia. & Intl Affs
Exec AD-Inv.	Ident.	Rec. Mgmt.
Exec AD-LES	Inspection	Tech Servs
	Intell.	Training
	Laboratory	
	Legal Coun.	

2. That henceforth, the FCI Review be disseminated to both FBI field offices and appropriate members of the U.S. Intelligence Community and the separate FCI Summary publication be discontinued.

APPROVED:

Director	Adm. Servs.	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.
Exec. AD-Adm.	Crim. Inv.	Off of Lia. & Intl Affs.
Exec. AD-Inv.	Ident.	Rec. Mgmt.
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	Intell.	Training
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Enclosure

1 - Mr. J. H. Geer
1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr.

RJS:enb (6)

1 - [redacted]
(Attn: [redacted])
1 - Mr. [redacted]

(CONTINUED - OVER)

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~~Declassify on: OADR~~

[redacted]

FBI/DOJ

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. J. H. Geer
Re: Foreign Counterintelligence (FCI) Review

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DETAILS:

The attached report was prepared by the CI-3A Unit with considerable input from the CI-3B Unit. It was coordinated with both the CI-1 and CI-2 Sections. The study provides an overview and analysis of [redacted] b1

(S) [redacted] Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded.

The FCI Summary and FCI Review have heretofore been disseminated to FBI field offices and appropriate members of the U.S. Intelligence Community, respectively. An examination of previous issues, however, indicates such a close similarity between the two as to essentially constitute a duplication of effort which necessarily entails a waste of manpower and resources.

Therefore, it is recommended that only one publication be produced, entitled the FCI Review, and that this publication be disseminated to both FBI field offices and the U.S. Intelligence Community.

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ON 02-18-2011

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~~SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON~~

FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW
VOLUME XIV

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This document is classified ~~SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON~~ in ~~its entirety~~ unless otherwise stated.


(S) The purpose of this publication is to provide, on a semi-annual basis, an overview and analysis of [redacted] detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed documented form. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to

b1

(U) FBIHQ, Intelligence Division, Attention: [redacted]

NOTE: The information contained in this study is current as of January 1, 1983, unless otherwise stated.

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
During September and October, 1986, the U.S. Government expelled 80 Soviet officials, the overwhelming majority of whom were known or suspected intelligence officers (IOs) and coopted agents. The expulsions represented an unprecedented punitive action by the U.S. Government and an extraordinary opportunity, from a counterintelligence perspective, to regulate the Soviet intelligence presence in the United States.

The September, 1986 expulsion of 25 officials from the Soviet Mission to the United Nations (SMUN) in New York resulted from Soviet failure to comply with the phased reduction of SMUN, Ukrainian, and Byelorussian Missions to the United Nations (UMUN and BMUN) personnel ordered by the U.S. Government in March, 1986, in response to rising national security concerns over the disproportionately large Soviet presence in New York and the concomitant increase in espionage activity. Based on recommendations from the FBI, the U.S. Government selected IOs or coopted agents to depart the United States in accordance with the schedule for the phased reduction in personnel.

The mass expulsion of the Soviet Intelligence Services (SIS) operatives has had a tremendously disruptive impact on Soviet intelligence operations in the United States. Soviet capabilities to mount effective intelligence operations were further diminished by the deliberate ouster of many experienced operations officers, operations support personnel, and all en poste officers serving in leadership positions. Soviet intelligence oeprations have undoubtedly suffered without the benefit of experienced operatives and the guidance afforded staff personnel by veteran officers.

(S)

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On March 4, 1987, Jonathan Pollard, a former counterintelligence analyst at the Naval Intelligence Support Center (NISC), Suitland, Maryland, was sentenced to life imprisonment. Pollard's wife, Anne Louise Henderson-Pollard, received a sentence of two concurrent five-year terms. The Pollards' convictions and subsequent sentencings stemmed from Jonathan Pollard's passage of classified material to the Government of Israel over a one-and-one-half year period beginning in June 1984.

(S) [redacted] b1

recent case, [redacted] was arrested and convicted of violations of the Arms Export and Control Act and the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. [redacted] acting as a courier for [redacted] was interdicted at Los Angeles International Airport, Los Angeles, California by U.S. Customs Services agents. [redacted] was placed under arrest after a search of [redacted] luggage revealed three boxes containing documents restricted for export. As a result of [redacted] activities, [redacted] departed the United States prior to being declared personna non grata by the United States Department of State. b6 b7C

II. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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arrived in the United States in [redacted] maintained a G-4 Visa (officer or employee of an international organization) and, therefore, retained only limited immunity.

Investigation determined that [redacted] was born on [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] arrest, arrested [redacted] on charges of espionage. In an agreement brokered at the highest levels of both governments, [redacted] was [redacted]

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[redacted] returned to the Soviet Union on [redacted] one day after [redacted] was released from confinement in Moscow. The incident clearly emplified the extent to which the Soviets will act in order to secure the release of an intelligence officer not protected by diplomatic immunity as well as the dilimma faced by the United States when contemplating measures to counter the threat posed by such officers. In addition to securing [redacted] release, the arrest of [redacted] was almost certainly designed to warn the United States of the consequences of such countermeasures.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

[redacted] ESPIONAGE CASES

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On [redacted] Sergeant [redacted]

[redacted] and asked if they could talk. Subsequently, [redacted] advised that he had been meeting with Soviet intelligence since late [redacted]

[redacted] was born [redacted] in Chicago, Illinois. b6 b7C

In [redacted] was a [redacted] in turn, introduced [redacted] to her [redacted] has been identified as a KGB Officer. [redacted] met with [redacted] several times and provided valuable classified material.

In [redacted] was transferred to the [redacted] met approximately [redacted] with [redacted] and continued to provide classified information. At the [redacted] turned [redacted] over to his friend [redacted] has been identified as a known KGB Line KR officer.

On [redacted] was convicted in [redacted] An agreement was reached with [redacted] to reduce his sentence by five years in exchange for his complete cooperation.

During the debriefing, [redacted] admitted passing [redacted]

As the investigation proceeded, others were implicated. [redacted] claims that [redacted] admitted to him that he had been cooperating with the Soviets "for quite a while" and had [redacted] allegedly told [redacted] that he was mad at "the system" and was "paying them back in his own way."

[redacted] saw [redacted] reading classified information and setting some aside, presumably for transmittal to the Soviets. [redacted] apparently confided in [redacted] and "admitted that he was in a bad situation with the Russians and they were forcing him to do it." According to [redacted] he and [redacted]

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After [redacted] departed Moscow in [redacted] the KGB attempted to recruit [redacted] reportedly had [redacted] who wanted him [redacted] to provide classified information on Embassy activities. All charges against [redacted] were dropped in [redacted] because, to date, the U.S. Government has not been able to corroborate [redacted] statements that he and [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

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U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review

Volume XIV

6-1-89
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Memorandum

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To : Mr. J. H. Geer

Date 2/9/87

From :

DATE: 03-28-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UC/LP/PLJ/JCF
REASON: 1.4 (c)
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Subject : FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY/REVIEW VOLUME XIII

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Crim. Inv. ___
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Lab. ___
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PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary/Review," for dissemination within the FBI and to elements of the United States Intelligence Community, as well as the Senate and House Intelligence committees.

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved for dissemination within the FBI and to elements of the United States Intelligence Community, as well as the Senate and House Intelligence committees, as detailed on attached list.

APPROVED

Director
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Enclosure

1 - Mr. J. H. Geer
1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr. [redacted]
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FBI/DOJ

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Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. J. H. Geer
RE: FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY/REVIEW VOLUME XIII

DETAILS:

This publication (the version called the "Summary is disseminated internally; the "Review" is disseminated externally) provides an overview and analysis of [redacted] b1

(C) [redacted] Detailing of key counterintelligence operations is also included. External dissemination list is attached. Copies of publication will be provided upon completion of printing process.

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FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

VOLUME XIII

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~~SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON~~

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide, on a semi-annual basis, an overview and analysis of [redacted] b1

(S) [redacted]

Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed documented form. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ, Intelligence Division, Attention: [redacted] b6 b7C

(U) CI-3B. ~~(C)~~

NOTE: The information contained in this study is current as of November 1, 1986, unless otherwise stated.

b1

(S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

In the United States, the Communist Party, U.S.A. (CPUSA), and its front groups have been directed to undertake operations to influence the activities of independent peace organizations. One objective of the Soviet campaign is to influence United States and European peace and disarmament organizations to focus only on the American SDI program, while ignoring Soviet strategic defense programs.

A campaign centered around the U.S./USSR People's Peace Treaty (PPT) is one of the more recent Soviet efforts to influence the American public opinion in favor of current Soviet foreign policy priorities and to exert pressure on U.S. Government officials to effect changes that are favorable to Moscow. This active measures campaign is designed to stimulate the collection of millions of signatures on a bilingual petition addressed to

the President of the United States, the General Secretary of the USSR, and the Secretary General of the United Nations. The petition was adopted and signed August 8, 1986, by a joint U.S./USSR delegation. The signature gathering part of the PPT will last for a year in both the United States and the Soviet Union.

The stated aim of the PPT campaign is to "influence the negotiations in Geneva to speedy and substantial arms reductions," along the lines proposed by the Soviet Union. The principal control and direction for this program comes from the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace in Moscow.

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(S)

b1

During the past year, [redacted] was disrupted by the arrest of [redacted] a known [redacted] of espionage for [redacted]

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b7C

Reliable sources indicate that [redacted] previously [redacted]

[redacted] arrest resulted in a public exposure b6 b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] The arrest was significant because it

[redacted]

(S) [redacted] b1

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C

On [redacted] a Federal Grand Jury in the District of Columbia returned a two-count indictment charging [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted] to the second part of the indictment and was subsequently sentenced to [redacted] in prison.

[redacted] indictment was the result of an FBI

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b7C

(S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

b1

Approximately 30 minutes later, a black male wearing a maroon jacket and carrying a briefcase arrived at

(S) [redacted] He left a half hour later.

(S) [redacted]

[redacted] (During a subsequent interview with [redacted] he stated that he visited another Soviet establishment, believed to be the Soviet Embassy, on [redacted] at which time he provided the Soviets with 15 more pages of a document.)

b6
b7C

Investigation revealed that [redacted] was [redacted] an employee of [redacted] Washington, D.C., which [redacted] during which Secret and Top Secret information relating to the national security was provided to Congress. [redacted] had access to this material.

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b7E

On [redacted] an undercover Special Agent [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

this point, was arrested.

It is significant to note that is a confirmed with a long history of drug-related problems. When he was arrested for espionage, it was determined that he was pressed by a need for money as a result of his continued drug use. Among the spate of espionage prosecutions that have occurred in the past few years, substance abuse played an important role in three other cases: et al.

On was found guilty of espionage charges, including the attempt to pass classified information to a foreign government, The following day,

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~~SECRET~~

To : Mr. J. H. Geer

Date 2/12/86

From : [redacted]

b6
b7C

Subject : FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

This memorandum is classified ~~"Secret" in its entirety.~~

PURPOSE:

To submit FCI Review for approval to be disseminated to appropriate agencies of the Intelligence Community.

RECOMMENDATION:

That FCI Review be approved for dissemination to appropriate agencies of the Intelligence Community.

APPROVED

Director
Exec AD-Adm.
Exec AD-Inv
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Adm. Servs.
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Ident.
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Training

Enclosure

1 - Mr. J. H. Geer
1 - [redacted]
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1 - [redacted]

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3 MAY 1986

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* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1983-411-864/9070

FBI/DOJ

SJP 171386

Memorandum from [redacted] Mr. J. H. Geer b6 b7C
Re: FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

DETAILS:

This study provides an overview and analysis of b1

(S) [redacted]

Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded.

The Foreign Counterintelligence Review is published on a semi-annual basis.

~~SECRET~~

(U) Not for Dissemination Outside the FBI (S)

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: 02-25-2011
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FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary Volume XII

May 1986

~~6-1-89~~
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Security Precautions

Warning Notice	Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
National Security Information	Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

VOLUME XII

This document is classified ~~Secret-Noforn-Orcon in its entirety,~~ unless otherwise stated.

~~SECRET-NOFORN-ORCON~~

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide, on a semi-annual basis, an overview and analysis of [redacted] b1


(S) [redacted]

Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed documented form. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ,

(U) Intelligence Division, Attention: [redacted] (C) b6 b7C

NOTE: The information contained in this study is current as of December 1, 1985, unless otherwise stated.

b1

(S) 

The Geneva Summit in November, 1985 was the target of an aggressive Soviet active measures campaign conducted by the Communist Party, United States of America (CPUSA) and its front organizations. In response to CPUSA national directives, local CPUSA chapters initiated several programs:

- telephone calling program and letter writing campaigns to various Congressmen.

- distribution of literature and petitions on topics such as nuclear test bans and "Star Wars".

- attempts to influence and mobilize a broad movement within church groups, unions and civic organizations to end the arms race.

- publication of a special issue of The Daily World covering the Geneva Summit.


(S) [redacted] b1

The most recent example of this cooperation was seen in the [redacted] espionage case. [redacted] had provided the PIS with classified documents relating to the [redacted] Many of the documents [redacted] b6 b7C

(S) [redacted] b1

(S) [redacted] b1

(S)



b1

The main thrust of the Romanian effort is penetration of the emigre community in attempts to influence opinions. Additionally, there is a real concern by the Ceausescu regime toward the Hungarian emigre community and its emphasis on human rights violations against the Hungarian minority in Romania.

II. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

EXPULSIONS/EXCLUSIONS

According to recent information, host governments in Africa, Europe and Asia/Pacific expelled a total of 57 Soviets for espionage in 1985. No expulsions were reported in the Middle East or in the Western Hemisphere; however, this is due more to the preference by governments not to publicize such expulsion actions rather than a lack of expulsions. In spite of the quiet expulsions, this number is still higher than the 1984 figure of 19.

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] Washington, D.C., was [redacted] arrived in the United States on [redacted] and had become a rather active IO. [redacted] the killing of Major Arthur Nicholson. Nicholson, a member of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission in East Germany, was shot on March 24, 1985, by a Soviet sentry. Nicholson was observing a Soviet military installation at the time of the shooting. The official Soviet statement issued by the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., said the sentry was acting in strict conformity with the military manual against an "unknown intruder." The statement also said that Nicholson did not comply with the sentry's warnings.

[redacted] departed the United States on [redacted] as a result of his participation in the [redacted] espionage case. [redacted] arrived in the United States on [redacted] and was assigned as a [redacted] in Washington, D.C.

b6
b7C Per FBI

On [redacted] was seen in the area where [redacted] had dropped a bag filled with classified documents which resulted in [redacted] arrest. [redacted] was subsequently recalled to the Soviet Union.

[redacted]

Referral/Direct

Expulsion of a Cuban IO

(S) During 1985, [redacted] led to a PNG action against [redacted] at the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, D.C. Based upon [redacted]

(S) [redacted] Contributing factors to the PNG action were two separate [redacted] and his [redacted]

On the two occasions, the first involving [redacted] and the second [redacted] attempted to remove several [redacted] from a Washington [redacted] Protests over these two incidents were lodged with the Cuban Government which chose to ignore an informal recommendation that [redacted] permanently depart the United States on [redacted]

Shortly after the second incident, [redacted] travelled to Albuquerque, New Mexico, [redacted]

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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CASES

[redacted]

During [redacted] contacted the Boston Division of the FBI and said that [redacted] was committing espionage by selling secrets to the Soviet Union. [redacted] alleged that [redacted] had been engaged in this activity for approximately [redacted] years, commencing in [redacted] further alleged that [redacted] was continuing to commit espionage by using people he [redacted]

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During the week of [redacted] the FBI learned that [redacted] was planning to travel over the weekend of [redacted] The Norfolk and Washington Field Divisions of the FBI were mobilized in the event that [redacted] traveled to Washington, D.C. On [redacted] FBI Agents observed [redacted]

He proceeded to a remote area in [redacted] stopped at a certain intersection [redacted] A search of the drop area resulted in the recovery of a paper shopping bag near a tree. The bag was partially filled with pieces of trash to conceal a carefully wrapped manila envelope sealed with masking tape. The envelope contained approximately [redacted] classified and unclassified documents.

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On [redacted] at approximately 3:30 a.m., [redacted] was arrested in the [redacted] Maryland and charged with espionage by Special Agents of the FBI.

During the surveillance of [redacted] a car bearing [redacted] was later identified as the driver of the vehicle. [redacted] abruptly departed the U.S. several days later.

An examination of the documents recovered at the drop site revealed that the majority came from the [redacted] was assigned to the [redacted] at the time. In addition to the documents recovered at the drop site, there were [redacted] to his Soviet handler addressed, "Dear Friend". In the [redacted] and provided his Soviet handler with status

reports and assessment information concerning each. Subsequent investigation and analysis resulted in the identification of all [redacted] It was later determined that [redacted] but based on investigation, it was determined that he was not involved in espionage activity. [redacted] was identical to [redacted] and [redacted]

b6
b7C

On [redacted] was detained for questioning [redacted] A search of [redacted] On [redacted] Upon arrival, he was arrested by the FBI for espionage. In a subsequent statement he confessed to committing espionage. In short, he advised that in [redacted]

In a series of interviews with [redacted] he admitted that on a number of occasions beginning in [redacted] he delivered classified and unclassified documents to his [redacted] The documents were obtained from his [redacted] compensation for his espionage activities. Finally, [redacted] advised that [redacted] was making "big bucks" by furnishing "high class," "high level" information.

b6
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Following the arrest of [redacted] the FBI searched [redacted] The search resulted in the recovery of numerous documents and papers of evidentiary value. Most significant, however, were the following: [redacted]

[redacted] He also traveled to [redacted] for face-to-face meetings with Soviet IOs. [redacted] received money and instructions from the drops within the United States and at the meetings outside the United States. FBI analysis reveals that [redacted] would meet [redacted] shortly before his contacts with Soviet intelligence.

[redacted] profession as a [redacted] was an excellent cover for conducting espionage. [redacted] but yet avoid attracting suspicion. In short, [redacted] was considered by Soviet intelligence to be an excellent agent. He provided the [redacted]

[redacted] were indicted for espionage on [redacted] to espionage charges. Under the terms of a [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] was indicted on [redacted] and convicted [redacted]

[redacted]

The trial of [redacted] the sole remaining defendant, began in [redacted]

[redacted]

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~~SECRET~~ FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY;

VOLUME XI

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED ~~"SECRET" IN ITS ENTIRETY.~~

RE LEGAT LONDON TELETYPE, SEPTEMBER 5, 1985, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

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1 - MR. [redacted]
(ATTN: [redacted]
1 - MR.
1 - MR. [redacted]

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

(S) 74450-67

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2 SEP 18 1985

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~~S E C R E T~~

FBI FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

ATTN: [redacted] CI-3; [redacted] CI-1

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~~FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY, VOLUME XI.~~

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(S) [redacted]

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JAN 10 1986

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